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The Public's
In 1910, after years of
people California
tion., laying the groundwork
(PUC) free of utility
to determine its role in
future into the next decade,
The issue
beyond.
From all appearances.
telephone service

any

Telecommunications Re ulation
utilities and their customers, the
of the California ConstituPublic Utilities Commission
at the heart of a struggle
of California's telecommunications

it

be regulated in the 1990's

pleased with the quality of
telephone companies indicate a
there are more Califorbusiness and leisure activities than
are ready to be implemented

by the telephone companies as soon as they receive PUC authorization; some are
already being offered on an interim basis, pending resolution of jurisdictional
disputes between the PUC and the FCC. And telephone company profits have hit
record heights, exceeding 14 percent return on equity in recent years. (For
example, Pacific Bell, in 1988, earned approximately $1.2 billion on revenues of
$11 billion.)
One might ask, in these circumstances, what substantial societal gains can
be attained by relaxing regulation of the telephone companies?
On the other hand, to hold with the opponents of regulatory change that the
telephone companies should not be permitted in any way to advance the coming
"information society" may be short-sighted and deny the appropriate use of
billions of dollars of ratepayer investments represented by telephone company
assets and labor.
Unfortunately, these larger issues of accountability and responsible planning for Californians' collective future may be lost in the welter of self-serving
claims and counterclaims being put forward by the telephone companies and their
opponents in several pending regulatory proceedings.
This hearing is intended to examine the role of regulation in the evolution
of California's telecommunications infrastructure and how pending regulatory
proceedings, and future legislation, may shape this role.
A Complex Telecommunications Industry
Challenges California's Regulators
Five years ago, the Bell System monopoly was dismembered at the hands of
the U.S. Justice Department and AT&T's own executives. Today, different firms
provide long-distance and local telephone service, under supervision by a federal
court and the Federal Communications Commission; still other firms offer other
information services. The success of this policy .is still hotly debated.*
*Today, after three decades,the Federal Communications Commission's policy of inducing competition in the telecommunications industry is facing serious criticism. International competition

What not debatable is that the American telecommunications industry is
considerably more complex than it was before 1984.
case California, where telephone company revenues
exceed $15
annually. California, probably the most lucrative and fastestgrowing telecommunications market in North America (and possibly the world),
is a region exceedingly dependent on the appropriate provision and regulation of
telecommunications services. All public telecommunications providers in California, to a greater or
degree, are regulated by the Public Utilities
Commission
• AT&T, MCI, US Sprint, AHnet, and a host of smaller "resellers" provide
long-distance voice and data service in California. (The Los Angeles-San
Francisco "hop" is the "hottest" --most frequently used-- transmission link
in the world.
• California's two largest telephone companies, Pacific Bell (a subsidiary of
Pacific Telesis, a holding company), and GTE California (a subsidiary of
GTE Corp.), provide local voice and data telephone service to approximately 11 million and 2.5 million telephone customers, respectively.
• Twenty-two
telephone companies provide local voice and data
service to an additional half-million Californians.
These long-distance carriers and the local telephone companies provide the
public telecommunications network, the infrastructure on which California's
future information economy can grow. These telecommunications firms thus
have a responsibility and an incentive to support the development of an
information economy; but they may also be tempted to exploit this development
to their own advantage.
and Canada, where integrated national telecommunications
plat:tonm
technological
is one reason for this reassesstelecommunications policy, which is encouraging
but industry concentration in the "core," invites skepticism.
~:::.....::.:.~~"'""'""""~=~=~"'""' "Introduction" (attached).
:UH._, ...........
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The
faced with a very complex situation, is today asking, "How shall
we manage change?" One solution proposed to the Commission is that it permit
the
private interests greater leeway to make longrange
proposal is sometimes labeled "regulatory
flexibility" or "marketplace-driven regulation." Two proceedings taking place
right now will
the PUC's will to hew to its historical regulatory
"Alternative Regulatory Framework" Investigation (I. 87responsibilities:
September 1987; and the "Enhanced Services"
11-033), which
proceeding (A. 88-08-031) .

•

The Traditional Goals of Regulation

purposes

"alternatives," utility regulation and its traditional
appreciated.

The
goals utility regulation include: (a) assuring just and
reasonable rates, (b) preserving the ability of the utility enterprise to attract
capital on reasonable terms, (c) preventing abuse of monopoly power and undue
discrimination among customers, and (d) assuring adequate service·. In Califorbeen meant "high quality."
nia, "adequate service" has

•

regulation ideally links rates to costs (including
regulation meets the reciprocal interests of
utilities and
the utilities, capital attraction on reasonable
terms; and (b) for
just and reasonable prices (rates) for service.
The PUC, in the past, has used the general rate case as the principal proceeding
for determining appropriate rates for the utilities. During a general rate case,
which may last several years, public hearings afford both formal and informal
opportunities
by anyone with an interest in the utility's operation.
The PUC
the
duty of rate design: deciding who pays what for
which service.

company

responsibility for telephone
new technology. These investments must be sufficient

but not
In the
1970's, when subscribers complained about General
Telephone's poor service, the PUC permitted GTE's rates to rise, to cover the
company's investments in new state-of-the-art switching equipment. This year,
after
Pacific Bell's technology investments revealed
that some
were not necessary, the PUC directed Pacific Bell
to reduce its rates by more than $120 over the next three years. In the future, as
telephone company planners call for additional investments, the PUC's vigilance
in this area may
even more important.
can intervene on the ratepayers' behalf when the
telephone
or
who use their facilities employ unfair business or
1985, the PUC fmed Pacific Bell $17 million for abusive
marketing
marketing practices that resulted in customers (especially non-English-speaking
customers) signing
for services they did not understand or want. Refunds to
those customer
by the PUC totalled another several million dollars. This
year, the PUC investigating the marketing practices of pay-phone operators and
cellular telephone companies.
Nevertheless, despite its successes, traditional rate regulation has its
detractors. The
Communications Commission (FCC) under Presidents
Carter, Reagan,
Bush
sought to reduce its regulatory involvement in
dramatic fashion. At the state level, local telephone companies have staged
with traditional utility regulation;.
intensive
to do

a modified form of regulation in 1985, shortly
the long duration of general rate cases imperiled
technological change and threatened its financial
called for a moratorium on the general rate case.
The Alternative Regulatory
Framework Investigation (I 87-11-033)

but in 1
it nur•uuo.
of telephone

Pacific Bell's uCalifomia Plan for Rate Stability,"
own investigation into potential new methods
PUC, with a majority of newly appointed

rate-of-return regulation might be
sufficient incentives for the provision
The PUC had already begun the
the long-distance carriers, a process
and was inclined to consider how it
verneru with the local telephone companies.
Regulatory Framework" Investigation
rate case was quickly concluded and
on hold. Also put on hold were attrition
that would normally occur on an
...... v.u..u.

nni'h.nl:>f"

might
Pending coJnPietJton
(I. 87-11

I

into three "phases." Phase One,
issues of pricing flexibility in clearly
is examining the issues of
Phase Three will consider the issue
after a new regulatory structure for

(1)

this

the Investigation, allowing for
high-speed data services in the local
flexibility for Pacific Bell's and GTE
scrutiny for special contracts negotilargest customers.
expected to be completed by August of
its decision. (A proposed decision
judge presiding over the Investigation

different proposals to the PUC in
more "flexible regulation" (a
deregulation) to maintaining the status

.... u ••,..,.

quo.
and

made by Pacific Bell, GTE California,
T,...,....,,,,,,..... Advocates (DRA).
hiatus on general rate cases and the
'''"'''""1:..£,"'.,'...
'",,.., without close PUC scrutiny. GTE
on general rate cases and a
companies would like greater
and to price services closer to cost (which
that this will permit them to install new
otherwise would be uneconomical, and to
the local telephone market.

Sharing
Bradstreet

competition
of regulation
until Phase
the

produce a
competitive

Law,

proposals. Some are opposed because these
own telecommunications business. Among these are
Sprint, and MCI Communications.
Alarm. Bay Area Teleport, Dun &
publishes Yellow Pages and runs an
a telecommunications management firm serving
are concerned that the issue of
they believe should precede any lightening
.........,__,,..,,.,. companies, has been put on the back burner
parties fear unequal competition with
markets. (Amvox, Extension
and the newspaper industry,
taken similar positions in related
venues.) The California Cable
telephone company proposals will
omnarnes and allow them to cross-subsidize
captive ratepayers.
consumers of telephone services are also
but for different reasons. The
Association, the TeteCenter for Public Interest
at this hearing by the City of

A

rate-of-return regulation is adequate to
the PUC when it began the Investigation.
of proof is on those who want change; the
.... '"'._...... ""..... they argue. They advise the PUC
.. ..,o.4& ........... might ask to be made

the current mode of regulation is inapmarket environment and only serves

companies (represented at this hearing by the
are not directly critical of the Pacific
they contend that any new regulatory
situation as small companies with few

a less dramatic overhauling of the current
has not stirred a great deal of controversy
a narrow line between maintaining traditional
regulatory modifications. Though
the sweeping scope of the telephone
vUJ.vU.L•!.U.

The Enhanced Services Proceeding (A. 88-08-031)
I

Commission (FCC) authorized the
"enhanced services" in addition to basic
March 1988, federal Judge Harold E.
permitted the local telephone companies
electronic meeting points (one or
a customer can dial to reach a variety of
Bell applied for
the "Enhanced Services"
Pacific Bell, information service

providers can get started more cheaply using Pacific Bell's gateway technology,
rather than having
in technology of their own.
collection, program monitoring and
censorship, and
alternative gateway options are currently
being contested by
this proceeding. VISA, Inc., wants
assurances
and other billing and collection
options (other
billing through the telephone company) will be available to
information vendors
customers. Dun & Bradstreet is concerned
about a
that Pacific Bell Directory might be
settlement prohibits the local telephone
companies
this type of information service.) The Information
Providers Association (IP A),
is engaged with Pacific Bell in negotiations regarding information
has in the past raised important questions
a common carrier-- the telephone company-- exerregarding the
cising
over the content communications. The IP A and the American
Newspaper Publishers Association were involved in last year's successful
legislative effort to limit the accessibility of objectionable 976 services under
state, not telephone company, guidance. Telenet (not represented at this hearing) questions the efficacy of Pacific Bell's gateway plans.
Via
the PUC has granted Pacific Bell interim
authority
videotex (computer-message) services.
Pacific
voice-mail services on an interim basis.
These
information regarding consumers'
willingness
they also afford Pacific Bell an
outstanding
to gain familiarity
these new services, including
operational and
expenence. The grant of interim authority afforded
Pacific Bell by the
to provide
new services, is not limited by any
apparent
other
the
notice that it may, in the future, alter the
has
discouraged Pacific Bell from setting forth
grant of authorization.
on its trial runs.

1

and the Bi

er Picture

of the iceberg of a much

•
Investigation is taking place, let alone
regulatory change and what is at stake for
as evidenced by turnout at
has been pauce. Except for the
and the Center for Public
in this decisive proceeding that
no public consens11;s supporting radical
the political consequences of

-----·---= organ of state government,

the New York Public Service
initiated an ambitious, longv ...... .., requirements. Its intent
telecommunications policy could affect
adopting possibly irreversible
direct the PUC to craft a similar
excellent thinkers and do-er's in
a public alerted to the need for a
I.UU. ...., .........

•
consensus

1

What do Californians expect from their technological future? The
question begs to be answered, as the public interest deserves to be served.

Robert Jacobson
Principal Consultant
June 1, 1989

Committee
regulation include: (a) assuring
the ability of the utility enterprise
abuse of monopoly
and (d) assuring highAre these goals inappropriate for
in the 1990's?
ideally links rates to costs
method to achieve the
terms and (b) just and
regulation recommended -still serve the public interest?
before the Public Utilities
("Alternative Regulatory Frame-

sider,

adequate to identify and conof issues that should be of
include, among others:
service.
telecommunications

•

encourage the presentaof Californians at large?
so, how?
the 1

and the PUC of
telecommunications policy?

1. National Regulatory Research Institute. Telecommunications Modernization:
Who Pays? September, 1988. (The NRRI, the research arm of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, or NARUC, explains the care that must be taken
dealing with investments new telecommunications technology.)

2. International Communications Association. Adapting State Regulation of
Telephone Companies to Industzy Change. 1989. (The ICA, a national organization of
large telecommunications customers, argues for continuing traditional rate-of-return
regulation.)
3. Sam Ginn. "A Regulatory Busy Signal Blocks Phone Progress," Los Angeles
Times, May 12, 1989. (Ginn, chairman of Pacific Telesis, the parent company of Pacific
Bell, argues for less regulation.)
4. Julie Amparano Lopez. "New Telephone Services Fail to Connect," Wall
Street Journal, May 24, 1989. (Discusses marketing acumen of the telephone
companies.)
5. Bruce L. Egan. "Capital Budgeting for Fiber," Telecommunications, May
1989. (Egan, a telecommunications economist at Columbia Unbiversity, explains the lure
of fiber optic cable for telephone companies.)
6. Johnnie L. Roberts. "AT&T Asks End Of Electronic Publishing Ban," Wall
Street Journal, April24, 1989. (AT&T was prohibited from entering the electronic
publishing business, until 1989, by the divestiture settlement. Time's up.)
7. Joe Sharkey. "Newspaper Publishers Debate Pros, Cons of Allying With
Phone Firms," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1989. (The newspapers and their
association, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, have long been opposed to
telephone company entry into electronic publishing.)
8. Janet Guyon. "As Telephone Information-Service Firms Proliferate, Concern
Mounts Over Abuses, Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1989. (New services provided
over the telephone network, but not by the telephone company, pose an uncharted terrain
for the PUC.)
9. Brock
"Free Speech Where You Find It," Microtimes, May 15,
1989. (Meeks, a veteran reporter on telecommunications and computers, reports on an
emerging issue: Are publicly accessible computer networks like shopping malls? Are
their "visitors" protected by First Amendment rights of speech and assembly?)
10. Robert Britt Horwitz. "Telecommunications and Their Deregulation: An
Introduction," The Irony of Regulatory Reform. New York: Oxford University Press,
1988. (Horwitz is one of many young researchers reevaluating the wisdom of the FCC's
and states' deregulatory policies. His findings are not salutory.)
11. Mireya Navarro. "Powerful groups weigh in against Pac Bell," San
Francisco Examiner,
4, 1989.
fair summary of the positions of various parties in
the PUC's current investigation of
regulation.)

1

NRRI 88-11

TELECOMMUNICATIONS MODERNIZATION: WHO PAYS?

prepared for the

NATIONAL

LATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

by
Nancy J. Wheatley
Dr. Lee Selwyn
Patricia D. Kravtin
Economics and Technology, Inc.
101 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108
September, 1988

and Technology, Inc. under contract from the
This report was
National Regulatory
(NRRI) with funding provided by participating member
commissions of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). The
views and opinions of the authors do not necessarily state or reflect the views, opinions, or
or
member commissions.
policies of the NRRI,
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SUMMARY
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that telephone utilities are spending increasing
telecommunications network infrastructure that is
services. The modernization of embedded
regulators with significant policy challenges,
placexnel:lt of plant rarely coincides with the cost recovery of the
new facilities. Moreover. changes in the industry that have led
activities using common (rate base) plant have also led to
mu;ma,tcn between
parties who pay for the new plant and those who enjoy the
vu. ............ by- and profits derived from- that new plant.. Finally, a policy of
mcldermzat1on leads to increased retirements of plant prior to the date at which
,-----" expected based upon normal mortality curves for the
cost in the new plant, increases the effective capital
term. The increased capital costs must be weighed
~il•\A.Jl<u,.,u with the more modern facilities: decreased maintenance
responding to the pressures for modernization of facilities is
theory is clear and easily understood, an assessment of
straightforward. The introduction of new technologies often
new
along with cost efficiencies in the provision of
.,.., .....v •. u agreement among all parties as to the relative merits of the
customers or as to the benefits of the operating efficiencies
services. As the telecommunications industry evolves, it is
both to furnish existing services more efficiently and to
be furnished on an unregulated basis. Regulatory
costs attributable to new facilities should be
and new and/or "below-the-line"
rate base, and hence the rates, that customers pay for
that a telecommunications utility can justify for a
affects the economic viability of the modernization
......._,...,..., ----·---, many options becomes a policy decision of
competitors of the regulated telecommuniresoo1nse to the "who pays?" question exist Some would
..... ~... ,,.,.,.1r features should be assigned responsibility for the
as it is defined today, would bear none of the costs· of
"'"""""' ...'""' the concept of basic service would never expand to include
""......... ""~"'
available through the more modern facilities. At the
f'lPf"Wn1•1r enhancementS WOUld be 00rne by the general body Of
access to a state-of-the-an infrastructure.
............ u.vu of basic service as the network evolves, it

1
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e2\lt1atE~a and unregulated costs to ensure
also requires state
to coc:>rdmate
whatever cost allocation policy is
that neither ratepayers nor COlDOietitors
adopted.
State regulatory commissions have long taken the position that modernization activities
must be justified based upon demonstrable improvements in operating efficiency, either in the
shon run or over the longer term. Modernization for its own sake has not been allowed. The
cost/benefit analysis typically relies on a "discounted cash flow" study, such as the Bell
companies' CUCRIT, that compares
costs maintaining embedded resources with the costs
of replacing the older plant with more modern facilities. Among the factors that can be included
in the analyses are the savings in operating expenses anticipated with the newer facilities and the
additional revenues generated through sales of new services that becomes possible only with the
newer equipment and systems place.
Questions of attributing benefits of more modern plant between basic regulated services
and competitive or potentially competitive services had not arisen until until very recently. In a
proceeding before the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia (DC PSC),
regulators confronted the issue of how to allow the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone
Company (C&P) to compete for business customers with a digital Centrex offering. The DC
PSC fashioned a plan that would allow C&P· to develop "Individual Case Basis" rates for
Centrex service for specific customers in exchange for assurances that the risk of recovering the
investments made to satisfy those customers' needs would be borne by the shareholders and not
by the general body of ratepayers. Thus. the DC PSC has established a principle that. when the
utility gains flexibility in pricing and marketing new services in competition with other firms, the
risks and responsiblity for recovery of the investment needed to furnish that service should be
shared in proportion to the risk between the general body of ratepayers and the shareholders.
The California Public Utilities Commission (California PUC) has also recently reviewed
modernization activities of Pacific Bell. The California PUC Staff has recommended a penalty
in the form of a rate reduction against Pacific Bell because it found its modernization projects to
be unreasonably risky. Pacific Bell responded to the Staff recommendation by suggesting that
the Staff had not adequately considered the benefits of modernization such as maintenance
savings. productivity improv~nts, and additional revenues. These factors could have and
discounted cash flow analysis used by Pacific to analyze its
should have been included in
modernization program. Thus th California PUC may question whether there are benefits
associated with Pacific Bell's modernization program that cannot be translated into quantifiable
factors, and if so, how
policy issues associated with thse intangibles can be adequately
addressed.
·
Regulatory commissions will. be required to assess modernization projects involving
facilities that are used to furnish both regulated and unregulated services. A mismatch of costs
and benefits from these projects can occur if costs and revenues are not consistently allocated
between the ratepayers and the shareholders. A mismatch can also occur if there is a change in
the regulatory status
one of the
furnished using upgraded plant subsequent to its
acquisition. Finally, the cost of capital of a regulated fmn may change as the fmn takes on
increasingly risky activities. Each of these potential cost/benefit mismatches arises because the
telecommunications utility is no longer providing only regulated services. Since it is neither
possible nor
given
state the inr'.lstry, to return to an environment where
regulated
challenge is to devise a method to
reduce or
mismatches.
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risks and responsibility between ratepayers and
investment between "above-the-line" and
""'A'""'""u"''" is one with which regulators are
taken the position that economic benefits to
mc>demizatlOn if the modernization project is to be
.................... operating expenses and increased sales of new
................... should be maintained.
required to fund a portion of plant that is
activities, even if they would benefit from
mo~aeJrnt.zat.£on standing alone. Thus, a cost allocation should
is used for regulated services and resources that

•

is not overallocated to regulated services, the utility should
................~.., that had originally been allocated to regulated
without compensating the regulated services at a level that
been faced by a competitive firm acquiring those same
to determine the level of this compensation. One is
date on which the facilities were installed, with all
rh~IT'O'I'•.n to the unregulated activity. Because this may
occurs long after the initial investment, it
for the reallocation. Alternatively, investment could
with a
payment made to the relevant regulated
the unregulated activity would have paid
on a stand-alone basis,
w<Li,AV\o,QU,VU

allocation of the risks and responsibilities for
telecommunications industry evolves. The question of
become much more complex as the traditional
expanded their opportunities for competitive activities using
infrastructure. The report attempts to strike a balance
tnt......... .,t.,
ratepayers, more sophisticated consumers of
the traditional telecommunications carriers, and the
assure that the stakeholders who benefit from

•

programs to provide a cost/benefit
that clearly identifies the costs and the benefits
that assigns the costs associated with
distribution of the benefits. and also encourages
to accurately assess the impact of the

"

program and providing for
of costs continues to track the

Telecommunications Modernization: Wbo Pays?

Successful implementation of this policy will mean that as a nation we will continue to
enjoy high quality, low cost telecommunications services with the assurance that the costs and
efficiencies associated with a modem integrated infrastructure will be equitably distributed
among all stakeholders.

®
Executive Summary
This White Paper was prepared by the International Communications Association to
express its views concerning the future regulation of telephone services at the state level.
The ICA is the largest and broadest-based association of telecommunications users in the
United States. As such, the ICA sees an urgent need to respond to increasing pressures
from telephone companies and their advocates for fundamental changes to long-standing
regulatory procedures and the public policy objectives they embody.
These challenges prompt a reexamination of the past role and performance of
traditional regulation. Since regulatory oversight has proven to be a flexible and effective
tool in the past, regulators should continue to play a leading role in promoting the best use
of the nation's telecommunications resources.
• The U.S. public switched telephone system has made great strides forward
under the traditional system of rate base/rate of return regulation. The
quality. availability. and usage of telephone services has increased
dramatically over the past century. and telecommunications has assumed an
increasingly crucial role in the economic and social structure of the nation.
• These benefits have not come at the expense of the nation's telephone
companies. The dominant carriers have a history of steady growth and
robust financial health, which has actually improved since the breakup of the
Bell System
1984.

•
•

--

• Most proposals to reduce regulation can be traced to the telephone companies
So far, these proposals benefit the carriers far more than
themselves.
consumers. Vinually all of the plans submitted by telephone companies
move in the direction of lessened public oversight of their business practices.
Acceptance of these proposals would create increased opportunities for
carriers to further their own goals at the expense of the public welfare.
• While the proposals advanced by the telephone companies are not acceptable
as such, they do raise issues that regulators need to confront in order to
successfully adapt to changes occurring within the industry. These changes
include:
Major gains in transmission capacity, digitization, and network
intelligence that are allowing carriers to offer many new capabilities.
New technology. particularly fiber optics, that is pushing the costs of
service downward and the efficient size of a provider upward.
Development of alternative technologies for some telecommunications
services and several "niche" markets for specialized communications
needs.

• Despite these developments - indeed, perhaps because of them - the
monopoly nature of the local exchange is essentially unchanged. In fact, the
monopoly power held by local telephone companies will actually (ncrease as
interactive information services and other new offerings proliferate, since they
all must pass through the local exchange "bottleneck."
• Regulators need to find appropriate responses to these industty trends.
Above all, telecommunications regulation should pennit the benefits of
industty development to be shared equally by carriers and consumers. This
will require that regulators establish balanced policies in the areas affected by
industry change:

Competition.

Regulators need to employ objective standards to
assess the competitiveness of any market proposed for altered
regulatory treatment, on the basis of its potential for sustained,
Anecdotal evidence and speculative
effective competition.
economic theories that invoke potential competition as a market
force do not justify abandoning regulatory safeguards.

Pricing. Inadequate pricing policies leave dominant carriers free
engage in monopolistic pricing. Tariffed prices should be tied
underlying costs of service or some other stable standard. The
"just and reasonable" ratemaking principle should be the
benchmark against which any trial of alternative regulation is
evaluated. This requires that regulators continue to collect cost
and earnings data to serve as a baseline for evaluating alternative
regulatory methods.
to
to

Cost Allocation. Reducing regulation for selected services gives a
carrier the opportunity to subsidize those services by improperly
Moreover, ratepayers have been fmancing
allocating costs.
network modernization programs that will steadily lower carriers'
operating costs for years. A misallocation could work to deprive
ratepayers of those gains for which they have already paid.
Caniers should be required to detail how costs will be allocated
before a service is considered for reduced regulation.

New Services. To qualify for relaxed regulatory treatment, "new"
service offerings need to demonstrate a substantially new feature,
function, or benefit to customers; otherwise carriers could simply
repackage existing offerings to circumvent tariff or pricing
restrictions. Services expected to assume a key role in the public
network or in the nation's economic infrastructure - new or
otherwise - should in any case be kept ·under protective
regulation.
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Defining the Public Interest.
Some telephone companies are
attempting to impose their own doctrine of the public interest in
telecommunications services.
These companies would like to
limit the public interest, and thereby regulatory oversight, to
traditional switched voice service - leaving all other services,
including many (such as data services) that are becoming
increasingly important to the economy without regulatory
protection. In reality, the public utility role of the local telephone
company will be expanding over the coming decades, as the
public telephone network evolves into a comprehensive
information network.
The regulatory process has proven to be an effective and resilient tool during
the past century of progress in the telecommunications industry.
As
telecommunications services take on an even greater role in driving the nation's
economic growth, regulators will have to become even more vigilant to ensure that
this critical resource is managed wisely. To remain effective, regulators need to
cooperate with both consumers and providers to develop appropriate policies to
respond to today' s regulatory challenges. An uncritical acceptance of the regulatory
"reforms" promulgated by special interests would not only jeopardize the universal,
high-quality telecommunications infrastructure that regulation has helped to build, but
could also threaten the future growth of America's increasingly infonnation-based
economy.

A Regulatory Busy Signal Blocks Phone Progress
By SAM GINN
Californians are justifiably proud of their
state as the cradle of the electronic
revolution. That revolution is ushering in
t.he Information Age, an era of unlimited
oommunication that will surpass the Indus·
trial Age in its impact on global develop·
ment.
But five years after divestiture, California is hamstrung by a regulatory process
t.hat doesn't account for burgeoning competition and overlooks the time lag Involved in implementing new technologies.
We are trapped by an arcane process that
serves neither consumers nor businesses.
California's crucial telecommunications
infrastructure-the highways on which
information travels-is woefully lagging in
parts of our state. We trail some of our
oommercial rivals such as Japan, which
plans to spend $100 billion to modernize its
infrastructure by the year 2000. We're
losing ground to more than 36 states that
have revised their regulatory framework
and stepped up commitment to modernize
their telecommunications networks.
About 242 communities in California
don't have enhanced 911 service. While
some people can dial 911 and have their
home address flash on the screen of an
emergency operator who can direct police
or other rescue services to the scene,
others don't have this system.
In Humboldt County, Bakersfield, Morro
Bay, and even parts of Sacramento and the
San Francisco Bay area, businesses don't
have services such as "call forwarding"
and "conferencing calling." New businesses will not locate in communities hobbled
by horse-and-buggy communications.
What is at stake are jobs and the future
economic health of our state.
No one in these technologically impov-

1

eriahed communities will have the opportunity to use any future services ·such as
monitoring of the sick at home via telephone connections, access to electronic
libraries or special services for disabled
people and those not fluent in English.
Outmoded switching technology is the
culprit. Simple enough to aolve, one might
think. Yet. using traditional regulatory
criteria. It will be a long time before we will
be able to economically justify modernizing
the network in those communities.
Virtually every telecommunications service, with the exception of dial-tone to the
home, is competitive. But telephone companies in California can't price their services accordingly. Instead, they must endure
lengthy proceedings to obtain permission
from the California Public Utilities Com·
mission to raise or lower prices.
Can we recover from this telecommunications deficit? The answer is emphatically
yes. Our success will depend on our ability
to introduce a forward-looking regulatory
policy that provides an Incentive to telephone companies to increase operating
efficiencies and enables them to build a
communications system second to none.
The California Public Utilities Commission has an opportunity to approve soon a
plan submitted by Pacific Bell that would
go far toward providing Californians a
feature-rich telecommunications network
and more efficient regulatory process. The
plan was attacked by the California Cable
Television Assn. at recent hearings.
Among the association's arguments is
that Pacific Bell's hidden agenda is to enter
the cable television business. Pacific Bell
has no intention of providing cable programming but would seek to provide
distribution capability to cable operators.
Pacific Bell's California Plan for Rate
Stability does not propose deregulation, but

a different form of regulation. It would lead
to lower or stable charges for most users
and improved service. If it is approved,
Pacific Telesis stands ready to invest more
than $200 million a year to bring the state's
network up to standards within three
years-an investment that we are not
allowed to make under the current regulatory scheme.
Under the plan, the Public Utilities
Commission would still regulate all future
rates. The plan would freeze residential
rates through 1992 and expand the free
calling area and make TouchTone service
free. It would allow us to lower some rates
to business customers to meet competition,
while gradually raising other business
rates that do not cover our costs.
The plan would substitute a simpler
process for the 78-year-old system of
endless legal proceedings that minutely
examine costs (the current rate case has
dragged on four years). The commission
would set a benchmark rate of return, or
profit level. If the telephone company
operated so efficiently that it exceeded that
level, the extra profit would be shared
equally by the public and its shareholders.
If Pacific Telesis failed to earn the benchmark rate, it would absorb the shortfall and
not ask for rate relief.
Regulatory reform is a "win-win" situation. When the providers of telephone
service have incentives to improve efficiency and increase service, everyone
gains. If the regulatory process isn't
changed soon, many of us will continue to
be denied the full range of services
technology can offer, and California will be
hard-pressed to preserve its place as a
leader in the world economy.
Sam Ginn is chairman and chief ezecutive
officer of Pacific Telesis Group.

Telep one Services Fail to Connect
Analysts Blame
Poor Marketing,
Buyer Apathy
By Jum AHFAI&ANO LoPzz
~~~oJTw;WAU.S...._,..J-.u,

The regional Bell companies hope t11etr
latest generation of custornlZed calltllg tea·
tures will produce !lefty profits. But so far,

have generated more yawns aDd
shrugs than l1ng1ng endorsements.
Known as "class" services, the new tea·
:ures can accomplish a host of tasks. Sllcll
lS fo1'Wll!'dlng only "preferred" cans. dis·
Jlaytng the pbone numbers of incoming
:ails aDd gtvlng distinctive rings to calls
'rom certain numbers.
"We're gtvtng customers a personal
;ecretary," says F. Duane Ackerman. a
3el!Sooth Corp. VIce chairman. "We tl1ln.il:
he services will be extremely Sllccessful."
But slteptles abound. Many people say
lie features-aimed mainly at residential
:ustomers-aren't very useful and are
1ard to master. Some services anger cal·
ers. And marketers say the Bell compa·
lies' cypicaJ marketing approaches may
•ot be suited to the new products.

th~y

•

•

cllarge S3 to S5 a month for oue servicE
some cllarge less for additional serVIce:

New Services, Cool Response
GIOIII&fY of the !WI companies' new
llf!rvlcel

Cllillllllrilllll'll: &~~tllmlltiealb- dials the number
of the lut ineomifl#caiL A110 known u
mum call ud ~ callblek.
CIIIIIIIIIIIE: lliltmtll i~ calla from
specified pllalle lllllllberl to I ~
rebuff.

,.....l'8llilllad&l

- - ~ flldiaJa the Jut lllllllbef I
euatDmel' dialed. A!IO !mown Ill call queue.

.........

DlllltltMitlllil: letueatomerapeeify
11Ulllben from whieil ineomil'l# calla will
il&vw 11 diatilletivw rin4'. A!IO kiiOW'll u call
llllieetcr l!lld priori!)' call.
~ OllllfcoiNi_.

leta 1 euat.omer
forward calla from apeeified numbers. Allo
kiiOW'll u &elect fOI'Im'd and Hieeti¥1! call
forwarding.

c..... ID: display~~ l!lllllbers of ineomil'l#
calla before a euatomer IIIIPmS the pho11e.

Cllilll ~ an-. euatomel'lllll t.I'IICk dow!!
11umber of Jut incomiq eall.

states are lili:ely to follow.

As they dO, the

pbone companies Will liave more Incentive
to boost profits.

Still, class features strike many people
hard sen. Fredric Sawller, a
marketing commwllcations consultant and
HIR Penetration
coutrlbuting editor for the trade magazine
"The Bell companies feel this Is their Telepbony. calls tile newest services
echnologtcaJ gift to the world and that the
"really notlllng that anybody needs."
1orld should be happy," says DaVId Sl·
Joan Patsy, an accounting aide In Mun·
non, a telecommwllcatlons consultant In de, Ind., agrees, She notes, for example.
lew York. "Tile!!, they can't understand that the Bell eotnpanles pttch call return.
1l!y more people dOn't want the services." wll1cll automatically dials tile number of
The Bell companies, faced With a ma· the last lncontlng call. as the end of the
ure telephone market, see class services mad d.asll to the phone. "But an answering
s one of tlletr best hopes of generating a maclline records the person who caJ1ed
ig new revenue stream. and they have
you." Ms. Patsy says. "And you can deeen upgradlng their networks to make the ckle wlletber you want to talk to the perervlces avaJiable. But the early results son. With call return, you can't dO that."
ave been miXed at best. Bell Atlantic
Answering macll1nes also can be nsed to
m"p.'s New Jersey Bell subsidiary has screen cans, serving mucll the same func·
1ade class services available to more than
tlon as caller m- wll1ch shows the pbone
.3 million customers since It started roll·
number of each lncontlng call-aDd call
lll' out the features In early 1988, but only
block-wll1cl! routes calls from specified
.4% have signed up. Sootbwestem Bell
numbers to a reconllng that says. "Tile
orp. began testing the services last July party you are calltllg Is not accepting calls
1 Musltogee, Okla. Despite an ad blitz and
at tills tlme."
resentatlons In shopping malls and other
Bell offlclaJs say the class services are
~Cal spots, only 7% of customers have
more effectlve than answering macll1nes at
Jugllt any class services.
screening aDd catclllng calls-aDd can
The Bell companies will need to sign up
serve other uses bestdes. "If there's just
JOUt 25o/o of their customers for the serv· oue or two people you dOn't want to bear
es to be profitable. says Jack A. Grub- from, call blocker would screen just those
.an, a Pa.lneWebber Inc. telecommunica· • calls." says Joleen Meyer, a SOUtbwesteru
:ms analyst. For the services to have "a Bell prodnct·management official. Also,
taterlal Impact" 011 eamlngs. be adds.
she says, call return Is more reliable than
metratton would need to 111t about 50%.
an answering maclline because It doesn't
The Bell coucerns haven't approaclled
depend on the caller leaving a message.
tat level of penetratlou W1tll an earlier
Some eriUes questl.ou the Ben compa·
~neratlon of optional services, so-called
.tStom-calltllg features. After more than a Dies' marketl.n( tactics. So far. the compa·
Dies have relied mainly 011 bW stUtters and
~e. only 28.8o/o of Bell customers have
ill waJting, the leading custom.caJII.ng dlrect·mall fliers, With less emphasis ou
TV. radio and print ads.
•rvlce. Only lOo/o have call forwarding,
Tliat's the wroug way to sen these serv·
ld just T.4o/o have three-way calltllg.
Ices, marketers say, because they are
The Bell companies blame regulatlon:
ate agencies have limited how much the suited to narrower markets than the Bell
'ncerns cali earn. and because most are companies are used to targeting. Robert
or near their profit ceillngs. they Morris, a telecommumcatiOils analyst With
tven't pushed those services hard. But Goldman, Saclls & eo.• says bW stutters
may be a couvenlent way for the compa·
'W Yorll: and Vennont have adopted reg·
ltiOils easing the profit limits. and other Illes to send a message. but they aren't ter·

as being a

Mr. Grubman says the companies "overe.

Percentqes of custcmen who have
eicned up for the new 1111rviees in the
followinc mukets:
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-

timate bow much a cousumer will spend.
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rtbly effective because they aren't market·
specific: "Usually, they get t11rown In the
trasb Without even being read.·· Instead.
be says. the Bell companies sbould Identify
and make their pltclles to specific mar.'
kets. such as people working at home who
might want different rings for business
ratber than personal cans.
The message of the Bell companies'
current ma.rll:etl.n( efforts-such as Amert·
tecb ads focusing ou the "special powers"
of the star aDd pound keys aDd New Jersey
Bell's urging to "look at wbat your pbone
can dO now" -also Is wroug, marketers
say. Steven Pennut. a Yale University
marketing professor and telecommunica·
tlons consultant. crltlctzes such ads for
overempl!aslzlng "tile 'gee-wb.lz' element"
and not sl!owl.ng bow the features can
make life euler.
Tbe Bell companies. says Mr. Permut.
sbould go beyond terse descrtptions of the
services aDd portray more people using
them. or In situations where they migllt
benefit from them. So far, only BellSouth
has nsed clear examples, be says. One
BellSouth ad shows a woman-Without call
return-coming home With two bags of groceries aDd daslllng to the phone so site
doesn't mlss a call. "If you dOn't show
clear benefits.'' Mr. Permut says. "people
won't pay extra for It"
Mr. Grubman ofPa.ll..'I!Webber questiOIIS
the Bells' pricing strateo. Qenerally. they

He suggestS cllargl.ng low per·use fees
win c:usaomers who see themselves usln

tile servtces Infrequently.
Tile services themselves liave cause
problems. In some IDstances frustratl.n;
customers trying to use them. Jamie Re!
nick. a computer procranuner In EIW
beth, N.J., says be gave up trying to figul"!
out bow to procram his cousin's phones t•
ctve tnearnln( calls from cena1n number
different rings. "These days, no one hll:
time to figure out all these commands." hi
says. "It's too much frustration."

Help on tbe Way
. Some compardes are trying to make tll4

reatures easter to use. BeiJSouth. for exam

pie, proVIdes recorded Instructions as par
of the services to take consumers througl

the commandS. and many companies offe1
toll·tree help lines.
Caller
meanwll1le, has angerec
some callers who object to having theil
telepl!one nwnbers clisplayed-wtthoo!
their consent-to people they call who have
the feature. "What happened to my right
of privacy?" aslts Lee Alges, wllo owns a
consulting business In New Yark and has
an unJl.sted number. "The only way to pre·
serve my privacy now Is to use a public
pbone." Consumer groups are challenging
caller ID before regulators In New Jersey
aDd New York, aDd the Pennsylvania at·
tomey general's office has aslted regula·
tors there not to approve the service until
privacy Issues can be fully debated.
Pacific TelesiS Group In San Francisco
plans to offer a service that will allow ca.!·
lers to block their number from appearing
011 caller ID deVIces. But New Jersey Bell,
wll1ch says caller m "enl!a.nces the pri·
vacy of the called party," doesn't plan to
offer a blocking service. Other eotnpanles
say they will study the privacy Issues before deciding wbetber to offer caller m.
Despite all the problems, tllere seems
Dttle dOubt that the Bell companies Will
keep puslllng their new services. Bruce s.
GordOn, a Bell Atlantic marketing VIce
president, says the companies can't fret
over the older, custom-calling services, or
else "we'd never go forward." Bell Atlan·
tic, he says, Is applying the same principle
to the class services that Procter & Gam·
ble Co. uses to promote a new detergent.
"Procter & Gamble has six different deter·
cents." be says. "Each has a market seg·
ment P&G doesn't wait to see how one
Is doiDg before going after a new market.··

m.

PUBLIC NETWORK SERVICES

Capital Budgeting for Fiber
Many observers see telcos and CATV squaring off in a
fiber-to-the-home battle. However, as the author points out,
there's more to this issue than meets the eye.
• Bruce LEgan
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review of the communication industry's trade :press
ndicates some confusion
regarding telephone companies' intentions to deploy fiber optics in the
public network. The confusion is
often couched in terms of a "battle"
between cable television and telcos
over the future provision of entertainment video to the home. If the
telcos "lose" the legal and regulatory "battle" and somehow direct
provision of video services is denied, then according to the traditional argument, telcos will not aggressively deploy fiber to the home
since it will not be financially prudent to do so.
This interpretation of the situation
is erroneous. Telcos view fiber in the
network as a primary means to remain competitive in the future, regardless of the current regulatory
and legal restrictions on the direct
provision of video services. Being
first with fiber is very important to
them, as it represents a robust business investment strategy vis a vis
strategies of rival communication
service providers. Although growth
in the basic telephone business is
slow, providing fiber should help position telcos to at least share in more
high-growth service markets by
having high-quality capacity in
place to meet the future needs of
large customers· and vendors
whose services telcos may currently not be allowed to provide directly.
In addition, there appears to be
money enough to do it Consider
that the entire net capitalization of
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telcos in 1987 was about $200 billion and total spending for new construction was about $30 billion. The
average accounting life of network
plant is in the neighborhood of only
10 years. (Not only is capital spending high, but almost all of the funds
to support it are internally generated
- no borrowing.) In fact, the recent
rate of capital spending and depreciation for telcos rivals that of the
high-growth cable television industry. Thus, fairly rapid modernization
of telephone plant is already underway and most of the new plant will
be fiber or at least fiber-compatible.
Yet there are the nay-sayers.
Many industry observers point to
the massive amounts of money required to get telco fiber to the home.
Cost estimates vary greatly, depending on the source, from between
$1500 to $15,000 per subscriber.
This means that the entire cost can
be as low as $150 billion or as high
as $1.5 trillion! However, the most
oft-quoted numbers are in the range
of $1700 to $2000. This would put
the total bill at about $200 billion.
But is it really that unthinkable? In
the context of both revenue and
cost, of course not Rome wasn't
built in a day, and the same is true
for fiber networks. On a net present
value basis, $200 billion worth of
construction is only $30 per month
per subscriber over 10 years and
only $40 per month per subscriber
over 5 years. Furthermore, current
expenditures per household for
electronic communications services, including telephone, cable,
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and over-the-air radio and
total
about $100 per month and that figure is rising. If one were allowed the
luxury of abstraction, then clearly if
providing public fiber networks
were a priority, there would be
enough money to do it
In reality, the story is a bit more
complex. The telco capital budgeting process is a combination of
many cost and demand factors.
However, the flexibility of the process reveals why it will get started
and, in fact, will likely accelerate.
Realizing the magnitude of costs
to deploy fiber to the home, telcos
recently have concentrated on hybrid fiber I copper deployment scenarios where the subscriber loop
plant, dominated by aerial and buried cable, will be utilized via electronic/ optical conversion devices.
Such hybrid scenarios should develop sufficiently to lower the fiber
deployment costs significantly by
retaining and using the existing
copper loop and cable television
coax plant This is especially good
for customer acceptance since existing customer-premises equipment (CPE), CPE interfaces, and
premises wiring may stay intact The
new hybrid approaches will provide
some flexibility in selecting deployment alternatives. There is similar
flexibility on the financial side.
Large-scale and capital-intensive
projects like fiber deployment are
long-lived and construction intervals are extensive. This simple investment perspective is sometimes
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Fiber Deployment Costs
overlooked by those who wish to
deal in sensationalism. The total
cost of a fiber telco network is often
quoted as if the project requires a
huge lump sum financial commitment This, of course, is not the case
at all.

Being. first with fiber
is very important to the
telcos ....... .
By definition, the annual cost of a
large total expenditure occurring
over an extended period of time for
projects with a long useful life is
relatively small. In other words, total
cost should not be confused with
annual cost Investment for fiber is
a project which has any number of
acceptable deployment strategies.
The timing and construction intervals become strategic decision variables and may be varied according
to business conditions. No annual
expenditure is sunk until it is committed. Along the way, construction
may be postponed or stopped altogether. The cost stream is flexible
due to the spatial distribution of network plant Strategic deployment in
market niches is possible and depending on business and regulatory
conditions, certain subprojects may
be completed and others may not
Network investment cost streams
are more flexible than many other
expensive projects where, for example, only one large plant is contemplated.
There are a number of possibilities on the revenue side as well.
Currently local telcos receive about
$25 per month per subscriber,
which is expected to grow over the
next 10 years. With what limited evidence there is to date, cable television operators are willing to pay
about $8 per month per subscriber
for use of the telco loop plant Based
on these cursory numbers alone
there appears to be significant revenue potential to support recovering the cost of fiber deployment
There is also significant revenue

potential from new service vendors
and broadcasters. Currently, television advertising averages about $25
per month per household (however,
a large portion of this currently goes
to program production costs).
Broadcasters desiring to use the fiber distribution network would presumably have to pay for it and the
same is true for advertiser-supported cable television firms. In addition,
many new market opportunities
may be available to vendors of nontelecommunications services over
fiber, such as real estate and video
shopping malls. In other words, the
revenue potential of fiber networks
is measured not only in terms of
what customers are willing to pay for
service, but also what vendors are
willing to pay to get access to customers. In sum, there appears to be
significant increases in current subscriber revenue available to telcos
with fiber distribution networks.
In conclusion, if it is true that network integration is more cost efficient than many distribution networks, and therefore the total percustomer cost is less than the status
quo, then clearly financing and capital recovery for fiber deployment is
a reasonable proposition. The real
issue is the time horizon of the capital expenditure stream, which may
be altered to match the present
value of revenue streams. In any
event, telcos will aggressively
pursue fiber as long as they are
financially able to do so. For now, at
least, cash flow available for construction is at an all-time high. 0
Bruce L Egan is an independent industry
consultant and an Affiliated Research Fellow
at the Center for telecommunications ·and
Information Studies at Columbia University's
Graduate School of Business. From 19831988, he was District Manager-Economic
Analysis at Bel/core, and from 1976-1983, he
was an economist at Southwestern Bell. Mr.
Egan received a BA in accounting and economics in 1975 and an MA in economics in
1976 from Southern Illinois University. He did
post-graduate studies at Washington University and St. Louis University.
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Analysts Expect Prohibition,
Set to Expire in August,
Will Be Allowed to Lapse
By JOHNNJI L. Roans
Stl4/f ~·~ of THZ WALL Snuttn J ovaNAL.

NEW YORK-American Te.lepbone lc
Telep'aph Co. asked a federal judge in
Wasbtngton to clear It to enter the elec·
trontc publishing bilstness.
AT&T requested that a ban barring it
from electronic publishing be allowed to
lapse, as scheduled, In August. If the request Is granted, AT&T could provide a va·
riety of information on·line, such as flnan·
claJ and securities data, videotex and
news. It would be a potential competitor
against such major electronic publishers
as Cticorp, Reuters, Dun &: Bradstreet
Corp. and Dow Jones &: Co., publisher of
this newspaper.
Analysts predicted that the ban would
be allowed to expire. Moreover, they spec·
ulated. AT&T's subsequent entry would
have the potential to help attract the long·
elusive mass market to the industry.
AT&T made the request Friday in a motion submitted to u.s. District Judge Har·
old Greene, who continues to enforce the
1982 decree that broke up the Bell System.
The ban, imposed by the decree, prevents
AT&T from using Its own network to en·
gage in electronic publishing.
The ban was an outgrowth of Judge
Greene's concern that mammoth AT&T
could quickly dominate the industry. An·
other concern was whether electronic publishers would have alternative networks to
AT&T's for distributing their information
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But under the decree, the ban Is sched·
uJed to expire after seven years-on Aug.
24, 1989-uniess opponents of AT&T's entry
into the Market can prove that competitive
conditions warrant prolonging the prohibl·
tion. AT&T's motion, made under a provi·
slon of the decree, Is believed to be the
first official move to eliminate the ban.
In Its fiJing, the telecommunications
concern saJd that there are many alterna·
tlves to AT&T's transmission network. in·
eluding hundreds of regional long-distance
concerns and such national long-distance
carriers as MCI Communications Corp.
and US Sprint Communications, a joint
venture of United Telecommunications Inc.
and GTE Corp. "It Is beyond serious dis·
pute that these carriers offer ample alter·
natives to all of the AT&T Hong-distance)
transmission services used by electronic
publishers," AT&T saJd.
AT&T also maintained in the motion
that competition Is healthy. The leading
electronic publishers, It saJd, are "large
and financially strong corporations," in·
eluding Citicorp, Dow Jones and Reuters.
. In addition, Prodigy, a joint videotex ven·
ture of International Business Mach1Des
Corp. and Sears Roebuck &Co., Is expand·
lng nationwide. AT&T cited a recent report
enumerating some 500 U.S. vendors offer·
lng more than 3,350 on·line databases com·
piled by about 1,500 database publishers.
An AT&T spokesman saJd the company
doesn't have any specific products ready
for introduction If the ban Is allowed to ex·
pire. But the company has shown a keen
interest in the field in the past. In 1987, it
entered a joint venture with Telerate Inc.
to offer a service that allows International
money traders to execute trades electroni·
cally. Telerate Is 67'7o-owned by Dow Jones
& Co. In addition, AT&T was a potential
bidder for Quotron, the stock-quotes con·
cern eventually acquired by Cittcorp.
The ban posed a problem for AT&T in
. the joint venture with Telerate and in mak·
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a bid for Quotron. Reuters lnto·nnanon
Service Inc., a unit of Reuters Jfoldlap
PLC. challenged the venture on the
grounds that It violated the ban: But the
Justice Department rejected the challenge.
Because of its concern about the ban,
AT&T decided ap.1nst blddlnr for Quo-

tron.

Some analysts expect that the nation's
newspaper publishers, long opposed to
AT&T's becoming an electronic publisher,
are likely to challenge the cumnt efforts.
"Maybe a compromise w1lJ be Yorked out
as to what AT&T can do," Slid Robert
Morris III, telecommunicatloas analyst
with Goldman Sachs & Co. He and other
analysts predicted Judge Green• will allow
the ban to end.
In any case, Mr. Morris ex.,ects AT&T
to rely on internal developnent rather
than major acquisitions as Its vehicle for
entering the business. He &dad that the
company bas been spending Sdlle S2.5 bU·
non a year on research and ct.velopment,
wtth an emphasis on developrr.nt of com·
municatlons software. "I waul think that
the way AT&T w1lJ go Is mre through
joint ventures, where It woul. work with
established databases and bng Its soft·
ware enhancements," be sal~
Experts saJd that AT&T'S ommunica·
ttons prowess could open Uo way to a
mass market for electronic publishers.
"One of the big challenges othe Industry
has been that It has just bef hard to use
the information," saJd Mr. !orris. "With
the right mixture of softwarend informa·
tion, that should open the d()' much more
widely to the consumer."
U AT&T finds wide and aracttve uses
for information delivered ectronically,
"you could very easily see at the indus·
try could take off." saJd Bnell Wright,
vice president. electronic csmunications
practice, for the consuJtingirm Link Resources.
AT&T's motion doesn't rvolve the ban
on electronic information srvtces, includ·
ing on·line publishing, b}the seven regional Bell phone eompaies that were
born in the breakup.
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CHICAGO-Only two decades after tbey
decided television was their mortal enemy,
n~wspaper publishers are suddenly looking
suspiciously at an old ally, tbe telephone.
The question many of the people who
run the U.S. newspaper Industry are pon·
dering here at the annual convention of the
American Newspaper Publishers Associa·
tion Is this: If Congress and the courts give
telephone companies the green light to en·
ter the information-services business,
should newspapers welcome them and supply the basic Information product in a mu·
tually rewarding partnership?
"On the surface, a partnership Is appt>allng," said George W. Wilson. presidt:>nt
of the Concord !N.H.! Monitor and a mem·
ber of the ANPA's telecommunications
task force. "Nt'wspapers have lnforma·
tion; telephone companies have dlstribu·
tion channels. We're both mature busi·
nesses that could use new revenue
streams. Why not work together?"
While the questions of advantages and
disadvantages are complex, he said, there
is a basic worry for the publishers. "How
secure can we ever feel in a business
where we cannot exercise any real control
over the technical and marketing systems
on which it relies?" Mr. Wilson asked.
Electronic publishing Isn't a big field
yet, but newspapers see in It potential for
new revenue in offering audio and on·line
computer services ranging from direct-response advertising to sports reports and
capsule movie reviews. With traditional
print advertising growth rates
and
readership declining, many
see
electronic publishing as a way to Increase
market penetration while also establishing
more direct contact with potential new
readers for their newspapers.
The ANPA said
!t would
lobby hard to block
about to be
introduced in Congress that would allow
the seven regional Bell companies to enter
the business of directly selling Information
over phone lines. On another front. Amen·
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. Is in fed·
era! court asking that a ban barring lt
from electronic pubUshlng be allowed to
expire, as scheduled. In August. Newspa·
~r groups oppose Ufting the ban.
Both Initiatives are
good chances
of succeeding; and
pubUshers
are .beginning to
complex
problem of how to deal with an unprecedented phone company presence In the In·
formation-generating business.
"Watch the phone
" Frank
A. Bennack Jr..
execu·
tive officer of
warned his
colleagues at a crowded session on telecommunications.

Not to worry, says one regional Bt>IJ
company, Southwestern BeD Corp. The
company has been aggressivt> In staking
out a position In Information services since
a federal court ruled last year that the Bt>ll
companies could be(ln offering "gate·
ways" -electronic and organizational con·
duits for the tral!Sffiission (but not the or:.:lnatlon ) of Information.
Early this month, Southwestern Bell be·
gan a yearlong trial of a "gateway" system In Houston that offers both audio and
Videotex services supplied by others, in·
eluding Hearst's Houston Chronicle. The
company has "seeded tile market" with 30,·
000 low-cost computer terminals for reception or the videotex services, said Stuart
M. Katz, tile company's national sales
manager for gateway services.
Previous newspaper-Industry ventures
In videotex have failed, Mr. Katz said, be·
cause tile hardware was too expensive.
"You cannot have a gateway where the en·
try·lev~l terminal is a s:z.ooo PC," he said.
Nor, he said, will customers pay fee for
the telephone call, adding that the call can
be subsidized by advertising. He said
Southwestern Bell estimated that the ter·
mlnals used In Its trial can probably be
sold in volume for Wider SlOO apiece.
"A gateway Is
an alternative c.ba.n·
nel for your Information:· Mr. Katz assured the publishers, adding these entice·
ments: "You can get consumers to call in
and find out what's happening on the soaps
tomorrow. And then you add a tagline sayIng for further Information pick up tomor·
row's Houston Chronicle."
Whlle some publishers said they were
favorably impressed by the opportunities
Mr. Katz outlined, most expressed wan·
ness and said they adamantly opposed lift·
lng restrictions to allow tile phone compa·
rues to go beyond gateways and generate
Information services, whatever the enticements. "That's a genie best left In the bot·
tie," said one industry official.
The phone companies have argued that
restricting them from providing lnforma·
tlon Is a violation of tile First Amendment.
and that the information-services field is
sufficiently competitive. Among the major
electronic publishers are Ctticorp. Reuters,
Dun & Bradstreet Corp. and Dow Jones &
Co., publlsher of this newspaper, which has
a 67% sta.lte In Telerate Inc. Also, 39 U.S.
newspaper companies already have their
own local telecommunications services.
Most publishers concede phone-eom·
pany entry into the Information business is
Inevitable. "The flood of new electronic
products and services that Ithe regionals I
are creating will become nothing less than
for distributing infor·
tomorrow's
mation to
American home," said
Mr. Wilson of
Concord Monitor.
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. Olmm.llllon bas received steady com·
. plalllts. ud Ill repladons bave been un·

clef coaUaua1 NView, aysaii)Okeswoman.
'1'1» &&'fftC)' recently liked Padtlc Telesl.s
Group 10 Impale Dew rules that would,
amonr otber tblnp. require cert&ln dJ.scloIUI'el allout ctwaes.

Burda of PoUciDc

wwa little ICtioll rrom tbe state. tbe
llurdesl of pollctDr tbe 11ervk.es In Callfor·
lia baa fallell Cll dt)' attomey~ where tbe
llervicel operate, U)'l Consumer Action, I
Sill Frucllco-bued consumer rroup. omc:lals Ill SIJlta Monica, for example, bave
f1Jed laWIUitl Ill ltlte court there ap.lnst
two 11ervtces tbat chl.rre S'2 for job and
rental-bousiJIC Ustinrs copied from local
oewspapers, Tbe dty contends tbat tbe
11ervices Deed licenses 10 operate.
For tbelr part. tbe pbone companies say
that. they, too, are cooc:emed about traud
ud lbady tactics. But Uley clearly want
the services 10 fXll&ll4. ATU ays that In
tbe few weeu lts new 900 serviet lw been
available, customers bave requested more
tban 600 of tile numbers, Tbe telephone rt·
ant Is countlnl on sudl services to Increase
tts Jonc-dlsta..net pbone business.
MeanwhiJe, most 1oeal pbone companies
are deiMnf with c:oasumer complalnts by
enabUnr customers to block calls to t.be
~ervices. But such blockinr can also hurt
tbe business of lerttimate services.
"U's k1Dd of a flaky market these
days," uys ·James Garvey, rn.ana,er ol
tbe Information 11ervices of Newsday, a
New York·area DewSpaper tbat sells a
ttme and weather service. "Call bloc.kinf
baa really affected call volume."

ISSUES • BY BROCK N. MEEKS ~

Speech Is Where You Find It

•

Pakistani Airlines, Flight 1006-l'm en route to
Afghanistan via Peshawar, Pakistan, to cover the
war. strikes me as odd that as I am about to romp
through the Hindu Kush with 18th century warriors
who routinely shoulder 20th century weaponry, the
spectre of free speech haunts me even here.
As I write, the Afghan president. Nijibullah. has
declared a state of emergency that has essentially
stripped the citizens of Kabul of any and all basic
human rights-foreign journalists notwithstanding.
The state of emergency suspends a series of constitutional rights, including protection against confiscation of property, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and petition, freedom from compulsory labor, privacy of correspondence and telephone conversations, and foreign travel.
"That's all very interesting, Brock. But get to the
point."
OK. OK. The point is. although you expect such
drastic measures from a regime infamous for its
human rights violations, you don't expect some of
the same issues to play in the heartland of America.
But they are. Welcome to the war.

Battleground 1990
The issues of free speech and search-and-seizure are
under attack in the main streets of urban and suburban life: the shopping maiL It is a quirky kind of
guerrilla war that is taking a heavy toll on the First
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens.
Ana the connection with telecommunications is
that bulletin boards and computer conferencing
systems are the shopping malls and main streets of
the 21st century. Such electronic systems are the
digital metaphor to the analog world of validated
parking and 103 stores under one roof. And free
speech abounds, for now. But it might not later.
For example, in case after case, activist groups
seeking to gain signatures from shopping mall patrons have been told that the activity is illegaL The
shopping mall owners claim these groups are operating on private property and have no rights to carry
out such activities without their approvaL
"But surely these groups have taken legal action to
protect their rights lo exercise freedom of speech?"
you ask.
Certainly they have. And with all the fervor such
constitutional issues raise. But the courts have
sided with the mall owners.
In 13 states bringing these issues before the Supreme Court, nine have favored the mall owners,
finding that, according to their state constitution's
provisions for free speech and related activities,

Copyright 0 1989 by Brock N.
Meeks. Brock Meeks is a Son
Francisco-based journalist.
He's just completed an assignment for the San Fnmcisco Quonicle in Afghanistan. where free speech is
decided With a Kalishna.kov.
not a cursor.
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such as petitioning and passing out leaflets. the
guarantee of free speech doesn't apply to malls.

Electronic Main Street
It seems improbable that someone could be sued for
simply passing out copies of the Bill of Rights to
passers-by. But it's happened. Ask Keenen Peck. a
Milwaukee lawyer-he's been sued twice for doing
just this at two different shopping malls. His crime:
disturbing a place of business.
Wben Peck went to court, the courts sided with
the shopping mall owners and basically told Peck,
"Leave your constitutional rights in the car when
you go shopping."
It's not a great mental leap to imagine a BBS sysop
pulling the same type of action on an especially
provocative user, say one that uploads copies of the
Bill of Rights or text files urging the overthrow of the
American government or revisionist holocaust
"history" written by some hair-brained anti-Semitic
group. impossible, you say? No. And the similarities
are scary. Tbe shopping mall of the '80s replaces the
broad, casual main street of yesteryear. Also gone is
the "village green" where people used to congregate
for anything from a Sunday picnic to an ad hoc
concert. Shopping malls now play host to a score of
community activities. BBSs and computer conferencing systems (especially those such as CompuServe and Prodigy) do the same.
For example: informal socializing, "under one
roar· shopping, contests, all take place in shopping
malls and on hundreds of electronic systems.
In shopping malls the owners exercise complete
control of the "content" that gets presented to the
patrons. The same applies to the electronic world:
the sysop or system administrator .completely controls content.
The shopping mall that sued Peck for distributing
the Bill of Rights also sued a dance troupe for
distributing anti-nuclear leaflets, yet the mall owners later allowed military recruiters to set up displays of military vehicles, such as armored personnel carriers. ("Look at the tanks, Daddy!")
The same type of action occurs on various computer conferencing systems. On CompuServe Information Services (CIS) system your rights of free
speech are terminated as soon as you start to mention the benefits of a cvmpeting system. The system
administrators of CIS see sucb activities as intrusions that they have a right to bar. After all, they say,
CIS is private property.
"We pay for system upkeep and provide security," says a CIS spokesman. "If there's a problem or
disturbance or disaster, we have to take care of it and
pay for it. Certainly we have the right to decide what
goes on our system and what does not."
To sharpen his point. the CIS spokesman noted,
"There are plenty of free BBSes that people can use
if they aren't happy with CIS."
But what if those sysops also decide to play the
heavy hand? Is there any protection? (No.) Are we
then destined to roam the ethernet looking for a
sympathetic outlet for our discussions? (And
thereby end up "preaching to the choir"? No
thanks.)
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In· shopping malls
the owners exercise
complete control of
the 41 content" that
gets presented to the
patrons. The same
applies to the
electronic world: the
sysop or system
administrator
completely controls
content.
In 1980, the U."l. Supreme Court deferred
states on the issue of free speech in shopping
Bottom line for the courts: First Amendment doesn ·
protect speech in shopping malls-largely
its restrictions apply to the federal govemmellt
not to the owners of private property.
So, the big court cops out, but leaves this
hole: a state has the power to offer free
protection in a shopping mall (or electronic
if it chooses.
TheCalifomia legislature lost a big opportunity ! ,
assure these rights when it dumped ACA·36
trash last year.

Round Two
California isn't the only state grappling with
issues, although it is the only state to atlempt
electronic free speech issues.
In Washington the Supreme Court decided
malls function by design and purpose as
nity business centers, and that owners of
open to the public should have reduced expecta·
tions of privacy. (Recognize that last phrase? Memo·
rize it-it's likely to become an anthem
speech advocates.)
That decision upheld the rights of citizens
gather signatures in Washington shopping
Small victory. However, the court went on to
mall owner has the right to "reasonably regulate"
free-speech activities.
So, make sure you only exercise free speech
shopping malls where you know the politicai
ings of the owners.
Right.
In Wisconsin the high court likened sno)P1D!I1tl'!
malls more to "old-fashioned department

On CompuServe
1
Information Services
(CIS) system your
rights of free speech
are terminated as
soon as you start to
mention the benefits
of a competing
system. The system
administrators of CIS
see such activities as
intrusions that they
! have a right to bar.
After all, they say, CIS
is private property.
c'

than municipalities. According to the Wisconsin
court, a shopping mall "concerns itself with one
facet of its patron's lives-how to spend money."
The court added, "Many other areas are more public
and therefore more appropriate for the exercise of
free speech."
If you didn't jump on that last sentence, you're not
paying attention.
But what is "public?" Just how public are BBSes?
How public are computerconferencing systems that
charge for their services?
No one is exactly sure. Much hinges on the defi·
nition of the word "private." There is no single
acceptable definition,
That means that a sysop or system can define the
dos and don'ts in ad hoc fashion. One system says
"No foul language here"; another system says, "No
mention of other competing systems."
The procedure is fairly straightforward: you doc't
1
' like the rules, take your cursor elsewhere. That
seems acceptable, but why should I not be able to
pay my money and speak as I want?
What happens when civic governments move
more toward an online environment? What happens
when electronic democracy becomes a reality in·
stead of just grist for the columnist's mill?
What happens to free speech issues in those
environments? Do we have to wait until the fight
comes to our doorstep before we wake up and do
something?
That's what's happening in shopping malls all
over the country, People are fighting for free speech,
trying to push through legislation, There isn't a lot
of hope.
But in the electronic arena we don't have to wait,
We can address the issue before it actually becomes
an issue, And while we still have the right to do so,
'I' And that's a right the some 15 million people
below me. in Afghanistan, will never lcnow. But
they don't have a choice. You do. And the cursor's
in your court. •
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Telecommunications and Their
Deregulation: An Introduction
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The telecommunications revolution, we are told, bas arrived. Telecommunications
used to mean the telephone, a mature, rather dull, and highly regulated industry
dominated by the staid Bell System. For most of us, the technology of the telephone
was so good and reliable, and its uses so set and inflexible, that it was functionaUy
forgouen. for corporate users, telecommunications represented just another mundane cost of doing business. Telecommunicarions also encompassed broadcasting, a
more glitzy endeavor than telephone to be sure, but one primarily characterized by a
remarkable stability of three commercial television networks that aired mostly imitative and inoffensive entertainment programs, along with one poorly funded public network.
Today the very term telecommunications may be too confining. The once stable, noncompetitive businesses of telephone service and equipment manufacturing
have become dynamic and highly competitive. Telephone technology has merged
with that of the computer to vastly enhance the capabilities of bodl. The resulting
sometimes labeled "information technology," bas become a vit)rant, burreconfiguring business practices and permitting corporations to
slash operating costs and automate the wodcplace. Some government policy-makers
have
information technology the United States' most important industry.
broadcasting has been so transformed by satellites, the abundance of
cable
and videotape technology, that the tradilionally limited television
a thing of the past. There are now sports c!lannels, news
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channel~;, movie channels, "aduh" channel~;, Christian channels, Spanish language
channels, and so on.
While many of these changes reflect a grand profusion of technological innovation, perhaps the more interesting phenomenon is the Jess apparent transformation
of the state-deregulation-which has accompanied and abetted this technological
"revolution." 1lle changes in telecommunications have emerged as much from
changes in their regulatory treatment as they have from technological innovation.
This book. examines the framework within which the telecommunications industry
has been scructured, and how chat framework. changed. It seek.s to answer the
question: how and why were American telecommunications deregulated?
1lle American telecommunications industry is being deregulated after more than
fifty years of close government oversight. In broadcasting, some of the changes are
fundamental. Comcnercial broadcasters, once subject to many "public interest"
regulatory controls, such as a requirement for public information programming, an
obligation to ascertain the broadcast needs of the community, and recommendations
on the maximum amount of advertising, are no longer constrained by such rules.
lbe famous "Fairness Doctrine," which obligated broadcasters to air issues of
conttoversy and to be balanced in that coverage, is now officially moribund. 1be
period of license tenure for a radio frequency has been extended from three years to
seven; for a television frequency from three years to five. The ceiling on the number
of broadcast stations a single corporate entity may own bas been r.tised from a total
of seven AM, seven FM radio stations, and seven television outlets, to twelve of·
VJ each. By the mid-l980s talk. echoed in the Senate Commerce Committee and at the
,.J:::- Federal Communications Commission about complete First Amendment protection
:t> for any and all "publishers," pril'!l or electronic. The aim of such proposals is to
completely dismantle any remaining regulatory controls over broadcasting, particularly the rules which require broadcasters to operate as "public trustees."
Ancillary broadcast services, long restricted by regulations favoring conventional broadcasting, have been given a green light. The most important of these was
cable television. For years, regulations hindered the expansion of cable television
and restricted the type of signals 'lnd programs cable operators could purvey. These
restrictions began to be dismantled in the mid-1970s. Cable has grown quick.ly
since. Historic restrictions on pay television were removed, and new programming
sources have emerged. By the late 1970s the FCC went so far as to promote new
broadcast services.
Common carriers such as the telephone system have experienced even greater
changes. Long considered a "natural monopoly," the telephone system was closely
regulated under the watchful eye of the Federal Communications Commission and
state public utilities commissions. Regulatory controls made competition impossible. In exchange for monopoly status, telephone companies were obliged to extend
service to all. Tluough the control of telephone rates, regulatory policies facilitated
internal cross-subsidies to expand telephone service and k.eep particular rates low.
The telephone system was united by the giant, vertically integrated American Tele,phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), operator of the only long-distance neework. and of local telephone service in most major metropolises. But, beginning as
early as the late 1950s, the FCC allowed a certain amount of competition in spe-

s

cialized business services. liberalized entry extended to domestic communication
satellites in the early 1970s, and, most importanl, to long-distance telephone service
by the late 1970s. In 1982 the structure of regulated telecommunications was
massively tr.msformed by the break-up of AT&T. A divestiture agreement between
AT&T and the Justice Department severed AT&T of its local telephone service
companies. AT&T, historically confined to the provision of regulated telecommunicalions services, was now free lo compete with computer giants such as IBM
in global information technology markers. 1lle break-up of AT&T bas become the
single most important event in the deregulation of American industry.

The Context of Deregulation
Yea telecommunicalion is not alone in experiencing a fundamental change in its
regulatory treatment. It joins the ranks of several other industries that have been
wholly or partially deregulated since the late 1970s. These include commercial
airlines, railroads, trucking, intercity busing, banking, and (to a far lesser degree)
oil and natural gas. Given the widespn:ad growth of the regulatory state in the
twentieth century, how are we to understand this phenomenon of deregulation?
Deregulation I'UD$ against the traditional understanding of government regulation as
a means of rationalizing the economy and/or of safeguarding the public interest. We
commonly think. of government regulation as the modem means of coordinating
highly complex social activities in ways that the marker cannot. One traditionally
accepted argument is that capitalists. acting on their own, pursuing the logic of
profil maximization, cannot adequately safeguard the conditions which allow their
industry-when tak.en as a whole-to flourish. Some businesses are regulated
because their inordinate market power enables them to abuse other businesses
and/or the public. 1lle coercive, regulatory power of the state limits the choices of
individual capitalists in the long-term interest of both the industry and the public. Is
deregulation, then, a gross betrayal of the public interest, a strategy on the pan of
capital to reappropriate the power it once lost to democratic reforms?
Or is deregulalion a response to the dubious efficacy or even failure of government action? Govemmem interference in the economy is claimed to irreparably
disrupt the allocative benefccence of the self-regulating, self-equilibrating market.
Indeed, regulatory agencies often are said to be "captured" by the regulated parties, which then utilize the state apparatus for private ends. Regulatory agencies
protect businesses from competition. Does deregulaaion represent the • 'coming to
senses" of an increasingly bureaucraaized state apparatus, dismantling itself in
favor of more workable mark.et controls?
In another popular account, the deregulation of telecommunications is tak.en to
be a consequence of the revolution in technology. In this view, new technologies
such as cable television and satellite delivery overwhelmed the traditional formulae
of broadcast regulation. 1lle advent of digital encoding (a method of breaking down
information into a code of binary numbers) and the melding of the computer with
telephone switching caused the dissolution of the legal boundary between the regulated telecommunications industry and the unregulated computer industry. In other
words, the "information revolution" caused or necessitated deresulation. This idea
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is a variant of technological detenninism: it sees technology as self-generative and
social change as technologically driven.
In my view, all such theories of deregulation are decidedly incomplete. For
deregulation can only be understood in larger contexts. Telecommunication is just
one of several American industries to be deregulated since the mid-1970s. Hence its
deregulation cannot be explained with reference to internal telecommunications
issues or technological faccors alone. Deregulation went beyond telecommunications, but was confined co a specific type of industry under a specific type of
regulatory control. This poincs to the need to look toward regulatory structures.
Deregulation was a political process, whereby the economic and political problems enveloping certain industries (but not others) turned a surprisingly heterogeneous political coalition against continued regulation. Joined within that coalition
were two political logics usually diametrically opposed to each other-conservative
free market economic theory and a left-liberal theory of political pareicipation. Each
"logi.::" attacked regulation from the standpoint of its own theoretical position.
Liberals and public interest groups, seeing in traditional regulacory agencies evidence of "capture" by the very fanns under regulation, came to advocate deregulation as a solution to entrenched corporate power. Conservatives and free market
economists, seeing in regulatory agencies vast bureaucracies whose arbitrariness
engendered economic inefficiency and artificial protectionism, also came to advocate deregulacion. In various of these industries, the empirical example of an unregulated service provided the ideologically diverse regulatory refonn coalition with a
\.N powerful model that legitimated competition as a practice which fulfilled the values
Vl of both efficiency and equity. The industries under regulation fought hard for
)>
continued regulation, but could not overcome the politics of refonn.
It is only when the phenomenon is situated in this context that one can grasp one
of the greac ironies of contemporary deregulation. The prevalent business-inspired
rhetoric of "gelling government off the backs of the people" notwilhstanding,
deregulation has most strongly affected those regulatory agencies whose actions
historically have been least odious to business. The agencies long criticized as
having been "captured" by their regulated clients and serving those clients' narrow
interests are precisely the agencies which are deregulating. Deregulation has affected primarily the industry-specific regulatory agencies created during the New
Deal, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). Some induscries, like airlines and trucking, were deregulated
over the hostile and vociferous objeccions of the major corporate players and powerful unions of those industries. In contrasl, the agencies universally reviled by
business, such as the Occupational Safely and Health Administr.nion (OSHA), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administr.ttion (NHTSA), though cut back and to some degree subverted under a
hostile Reagan Administr.ttion, have not deregulated. In short, the conditions were
001 there for a heterogeneous political coalition to support the deregulation of the
•so-called "social" regulatory agencies. But they were there for deregulation of
~ce-and-entry regulated infrastructure industries.
The industries that have undergone deregulalion-airlines, trucking, railroads,
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telecommunications, banking, oil, and nacural gas-have something very important
in common. They are "infrastructures," the basic services which underlie all
economic activity. They are central to the circulation of capital and the flow of
commerce. Historically, regulatory agencies have exercised administrative controls
over infrastructure industries as pare of the state's effort to construct a national arena
for commerce and to stabilize the essential services upon which commerce depends.
The type of regulatory controls exercised over these industries are known as "priceand-entry" controls. Agencies detennined how anany and which finns would compete in a given market, and set the basic prices that ftrmS could charge. 1bey
substituted administrative decisions for market controls.
The deregulated industries share another characteristic. With the exception of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which began regulating the nation's railroads
in the late 1880s, all were brought under regulation around the time of &he Depression and New Deal. The agencies are industry-specific-each agency has jurisdiction over a pareicular industry only. While the main goal of New Deal regulatory
agencies was to safeguard commerce, they also secured basic social equity. The
"obligation to serve," a principle rooted in the old common law, was an essential
feature of the regulation of infrastruccure services.
I argue that the regulation of telecommunications, like that of other infrastructure industries, did serve the "public interest." However, the notion of the public
interest embodied in the policies of the key government player, the Federal Communications Commission, was so conservative and narrow, and its range of available
regulatory options so constrained, that these policies did indeed protect the principal
parties of the telecommunications industry, as many critics have charged. Traditional regulation of telecommunicacions exhibited a typically New Deal cautious
guardianship over industries and finns deemed central 10 commerce. 1be public
interest character of the regulation of infrastructure industries for the most pare was
exhibited in that facilitation of commerce.
The regulation of infrastructure industries has been inherently conservative in
other respects. The nature of price-and-entry regulatory structures is to construct
operating boundaries and barriers 10 entry. In theory this pennits existing fanns to
provide services essential to commerce wiUout experiencing the destabilizing effects of competition. In short, price-and-entry regulation creates cartels. In so
doing, the regulatory structures also facilicate socially valued "cross-subsidy" arrangements. For instance in telephony, long-distance rates supposedly were used to
keep local rates low in order to encourage the universal expansion of the telephone
network. Similar cross-subsidy arrangements were established in all infrastructure
industries brought under regulation. However, because of these very arrangements,
there always exist incentives for certain classes of consumers-primarily large
corporate users-to drop out of or "bypass" the regulated system, and for wouldbe entrepreneurial entrants to service those users. In periods of high, sustained
inflation, regulation generally exacerbates bypass incentives. 1be agencies grant the
regulated industries price hikes which, under traditional cross-subsidy arrangements, hit large corporate users proportionately more. Technological innovationspareicularly in telecommunications-provide potential bypassers with additional
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incentives and with the means to drop out of the regulated system. Oissatistied
corporate users and potential competitors may form an alliance that pressures the
regulated industry in the regulatory arena.
The regulatory agency generally responds to technological innovations and bypass demands as unwelcome challenges co the organizational "settledness," or
even to the integrity of the agency itself. The agency often responds to such
challenges conservatively, clinging to its tried and true formulae and policies and
acting to safeguard the regulated system. The regulated parties also act to thwart
challenge and to procectthe status quo. It was this conservative dynamic of protectionism that aroused the ire of both left-liberals and conservative free market ideologues in the period of the late 1970s, a period when the political agenda had
shifted from regulatory activism to one that questioned the efficacy of regulation.

The importance of regulatory structures might be appreciated by contelUualizing
the role of technological innovation. An important factor in telecommunications
deregulation, technological innovation was not an independent, abstract force, but a
concrete dynamic situated within entrepreneurial opportunities, political discourse,
and, most important, regulatory constraints. What is important about technology
was how specific innovations reconfigured the internal balance of entrepreneurial
interests-a balance created and maintained within regulatory policies and formulae. This dynamic of technological change within regulatory constraints became
crucial, for example, as the FCC attemp&cd to meet the demands of large telecommunications users for better service and freer options. The small policy changes
initiated by these users' demands chipped away at the AT&T monopoly and the
regulatory formulae which legitimized that monopoly. They inadvertently set in
mocion additional forces which culminated in the break-up of AT&T.
Hence I argue that an adequate understanding of deregulation must rest upon a
historically rooced theory of regulation that accounts both for the genesis of agencies
and for actual agency operations. Regulation emerged in the twentieth century as a
political institution to address new, systemic economic and social problems. Regulation in many ways is the hallmark of the modem "interventionist" stale. It is
part and parcel of the dynamic of national development by private enterprise bul
directed in some fashion by the state. The long regime of regulatory oversight of
infrastructures provided a rational foundation for economic growth and development-within a capitalist economic framewott, of course.
To begin to address the question of deregulation, one must understand why
regulatory agencies arose, what they do, and why they traditionally regulate particular kinds of industries such as telecommunications. The key is the role of the state in
a capitalist economy. And this role lies at the heart of the question of the meaning of
thai ubiquitous, but maddeningly vague tenn of regulation, the "public interest."
In all state action, of which regulation is one, the definition of the public interest is
crucial; it is a sort of black box whose meaning or representation is the terrain of
struggle.
The emergence of regulatory agencies constituted the building of nationol ad·
ministrative structures in a state which had been institutionally localistic and courtcentered. For much of the 19dl century, the dispersed structure of American state
power pennitted an active judiciary to direct the course of economic development.
Judicial activism facilitated the establishment of quasi-infrastructural services in the
early part of the century, largely by means of eminent domain law and the granting
of exclusive franchises to the builders of bridges, roads, or canals. Once the infrastructure was in place, judicial action favored business risk-taking (and consequently capitalist economic growth). With the exception of land grants and certain
ocher subsidies, the economy was established by mid-century as a sphere largely
beyond political intervention. This pattern changed by the 1890s, because the
triumph of laissez-faire had created a general crisis of social control. Regulatory
agencies grew in response to the needs and great changes fostered by the rise of the
large national corporation.
But regulatory agencies are not of a piece. Central to my theory is the notion that
agencies have different functions and different scopes of activity, which generally

II

Regulatio11: Elements of a Theory
This book examines regulation and deregulation through the prism of American
telecommunications. Most studies of American communications focus on either
broadcasting or telephone, rarely on both. Conventional studies tend to be either
economic or anecdocal histories of the respective industries, with an occasional bow
to law and regulation. Or, they are policy analyses, steeped in the byzantine complexities of agency decisions, but bereft of a larger theoretical context. Yet the
intemlation between the telephone and broadcast industries is not only important
\...N for an understanding of the process of regulation, but central to how deregulation
(J')
carne about in telecommunications. At another level, studies lhatlook only at the
)>
deregulation of telecommunications miss the links to other deregulated industriesand hence miss the broad reasons for the deregulation phenomenon. This book
examines both broadcast and telephone industries. It looks at regulation and deregulation in other industries. II situates the analysis of regulation and deregulation
within the theoretical context of the relationship between the state and the economy
in the American sening.
Telecommunication is a particularly interesting infrastructure because it not
only is crucial for commerce, but also constitutes the public realm of ideas and
discussion, and hence implicates the range of issues surrounding freedom of speech.
This leads to two important subthemes. The first relates to telephony, and involves
the tensions surrounding the benefits and drawbacks of a regulated monopoly infrastructure in a capitalise economy. The second relates to broadcasting, and deals
with tensions among private ownership of the means of communication, the notion
of a free and diverse marketplace of ideas, and the First Amendment quandary of
regulatory controls.
As should be clear already, this book analyzes deregulation as the consequence
of a mosaic of forces, of struclures in inleracaion over time. The key piece in that
moving mosaic (if such a mixed metaphor is pennilted) is lhe nature of regulation
itself, for it is through and in and against the traditional price-and-entry regulatory
structures thai the inlerplay of economic, technological, legal, and ideological
forces took shape. The interplay of those forces constituted the conditions upon
which political choices carne to be made.
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correspond to the historical conditions surrounding their creation. The particular
nature of inter-business and wider political conllicts dictated the emergence of three
dillerent types of regulatory bodies, generally corresponding to three historical
periods of origin.
Progressive Era (approximately from 1900 to World War I) legislation created
regulatory bodies largely in response to popular political activism. These bodies
were designed to relieve the economic and social instability caused by the large
corporation and its tremendous transformation of social and economic life. These
agencies were concerned mainly with the general character of economic activity.
The antitrust division of the Department of Justice (formed in the aftermath of the
Sherman Act) and the FederaJ Trade Commission (established along with the
Clayton Act of 1914) dealt with broad matters of monopoly and competition. The
Federal Reserve System sought to control the exchange and circulation of money.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, although literally an exception to this categorization (because it regulated a single industry), upon closer examination fits
rather well. This is due to the absolutely pivotal imponance of the railroad for the
conduct of commerce in the late 19th and early 20th century.
New Deal agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Feder.al Communications Commission sought to create strong price and entry controls in specific
markets, with the purpose of establishing stable cartels. This "industry-specific"
type of regulation grew in response to the anarchy of the market during the Depression, and was vigorously sought after by various industries. The form of regulatory
action introduced by the price-and-entry agencies is often labeled in the economics
literature "producer protection." Both Progressive Era and New Deal regulation
established federal political structures which functioned in two interrelated ways.
First, by providing an extra-market policing function, regulatory agencies helped to
rationalize corporate capitalism. Second, regulatory agencies provided an administrative fr.amework within which imponant interest groups, primarily large corporations, could bargain, settle conflicts, and legally collude under state imprimatur.
The agencies o(the 1960s and early 1970s, established in large part in response
to liberal reform movements during and just after the Great Society, dealt with the
social impact of businesses, not with their economic behavior per se. These new
agencies were to regulate all industries, not specific ones. In conlr'.asl to the producer orientation of the Progressive Era and New Deal types of regulation, the Great
Society agencies were oriented largely toward the values of consumers and the
interests of those left out of producer-oriented interest representation. The Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration are
the best known of the "social" regulatory agencies.
However, the origin of an institution is dille rent from the set of reasons and
structures by which that institution oper.ates or is maintained over time. I argue that
there is a fundamental distinction between genesis and operationality. Although
regulatory agencies should be differentiated according to the temporal political
alignment of social and economic forces reflected in their creation, and according to
their function, all regulatory agencies are situated within the same field of institutional power, and all regulatory agencies are united under the rubric of admin-
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istrative law. Similar forces of institutional constraint, bureaucratic organization,
and procedure affect all agencies.
Regulatory agencies constitute a new structure of federal political power in the
American political system; they represent a mixture of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions, able on the one hand to be flexible and informal and on the other
hand to formulate hard and fast rules. In theory this flexibility permits regulatory
oversight to be continuous and substantive. But regulatory agencies do not fundamentally alter the traditionally dispersed sysrcm of political power in the United
States. The agency is generaJiy the weakest player situated in an already constituted
terrain of political power-including the pragmatic fact of actual functioning of the
industry brought under regulation. Precisely because regulatory agencies do not
centralize political power-agencies cannot direct economic production and they
must vie with the many other layers of institutionalized governmental power at
local, stale, and federaJ levels-.. bureaucratism" is endemic to them. This bureaucratism is seen in numerous time delays, in wrangling over jurisdiction, and in the
multiple hearings at various institutional levels which any proposed regulation
undergoes. The forces which engender bureaucratism in regulatory agencies push
agencies to regulate conservatively.
Regulatory agencies may properly be seen as a mechanism of rationalization in
advanced capitalism, but they are only occasionally successful at this. Their overaJl
lack of power means they might serve as a forum to allow oligopolistic industries to
police themselves, or, alternatively, they might punish some corporations for "externalities" (indirect, or spillover effects of business activity, such as pollution), but
they usually are unable to act as planning bodies. Institutional and organizational
factors are of critical importance in Understanding how a regulatory agency actually
operates. This relation between the originally conceived function of a specifac
regulatory agency and the bureaucratic constraints that mold its actual operation
must be considered in any analysis of regulation.

Telecommunications as Infrastructure
Why are some industries, like lelecommunications, regulated while others are not?
Put a different way, why are some industries considered to be imbued with a public
function or affected with a "public interest?" Notwithstanding the fact that some
(perhaps much) regulation at farst glance seems to serve private, rather than public
interests, this is not true of all forms of regulation. Cenain industries, and certain
types of industries, appear historically always imbued with something larger, something more generaJ than private interest. This "something" is what we intuitively
understand as the public interest.
Telecommunication constitutes one of the four essential modes or channels thai
permit trade and discourse among members of a society, the other three being
transponation, energy utilities, and the system of currency exchange, or money.
Transponation, energy, and telecommunication industries provide the services upon
which all economic activity (beyond the level of self-sufficiency) depends. Money,
lU bottom a representation of value and the means of exchange of value, also is

12

An lmroduc·1ion

lUa, IRONY 01- RU-'UI.AfOKY IU:HlltM

crucial for economic intercourse beyond the level of baraer. These services are
"connective" institutions. They are lhe channels for trade and discourse which bind
together a community, society, or nation. They are central to the circulation of
capital and literally constitute both the foundation ami the limit for the overall
economic functioning of a society. This is why transportation, energy, telecommunications, and currency systems are called infr.lstructures. They are the structures below or underneath.
As I suggested earlier, the construction and maintenance of infrastructures usually have been the responsibility or governmenls. A central contention of this study
is that infrastructure industries are always the focus of direct state intervention,
whether by way of promotion, subsidy, or regulation. This has been true in the
Anglo-American context since 13th-century English common law courts declared
certain kinds of occupations to be possessed of a special status-the so-called
"common callings." Even in the United Stales, where the liberal tradition has
meant that energy, tr.msportation, communications, and even financial serviceslike all other capitalist enterprises-are private commercial ventures, government
has been closely involved in their creation, maintenance, and oversight. In the 19th
century, the state's involvement rested in acts of promotion and subsidy, and the
extensive use of eminent domain law in the effort to establish quasi-public infrastructur-.tl services. In the 20th century the state's involvement has been the
imposition of regulation and the establishment of complex systems of administrative
concrol over these services.
\..N
Both governmental assistance and the imposition of regulatory controls were
g? central to the establishment and ongoing operation of the American telecommunications system. Stale actions helped private corporations establish telecommunication
services. 'Throughout its early years, the telegr-.tph industry received critical infusions of feder-.tl and state subsidies. Congress legitimized telephony as a "natural
monopoly,'' and established regulatory oversight to facilitate both the expansion of
the nationwide telephone network and the reduction of business risk. Federal intervention facilitated the emergence of radio in the United States, first by constructing
a patent pool among the major corporate patent holders of radio technology and later
by engineering the formation of the Radio Corporation of American (RCA). The
Federal Communications Commission, established in 1934, was given a wide mandate to oversee wire and wireless communications. The FCC attended to the public
interest in telecommunications largely by protecting the existing structures of telephony and broadcasting (and the corporations which provided those services).
federal regulation stabilized the chaotic use of the radio airwaves for commercial
broadcasters and oversaw a system of guar-.mteed fair rate of return for wired
common carriers.
The legal principle upon whi .h state intervention in these industries has rested is
the commerce clause of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power ... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sever-.tl States . . . . " 1
This is important. U there is a general concept of the public interest informing state
intervention into infrasl.nllclure andustries, it is a commerce-based concept. State
intervention in infrastructure industries generally has meant the creation of a na~ooal trading area where good!' and services can circulate freely. To facilitate the

aclual circulation of goods and services, government imposed common carrier
regulatory controls on the means of circulation.
As it emerged in transportation law in the late 19th century, the main pnllll,;lplc:
of common carrier law was that a carrier must allow nondiscriminatory, that is,
and equitable, access to its service at just and reasonable prices. Nondiscrimination
would ensure that carriers would serve the needs of commerce rather than inhibit
commerce. Part or the provision or nondiscriminatory access to their services meant
that common carriers were mandated to interconnect their lines with other carriers.
Most often, common carriers were characterized by economies of scale and were
granted monopoly franchises. Among other things, such franchises granted the right
to take private property for public use, through eminent domain. These legal tools
facilitated the construction of an overall network. Regulatory oversight would en·
sure nondiscriminatory service and "fair" ralcs. Regulation thus took advantage of
certain efficiencies deriving from the monopolistic organization of capital while
presumably protecting against the abuses that monopoly power could bring. The
key ro common carrier law-and the regulation of infrastructure industries generally-rests in the fact that it satisfies the contradictory demand for a unified plan of
national development within a system of private property.

Telecommunications and the Public Interest
But state support and regulatory oversight did not simply help establish and protect
telecommunication corporations and their services. 1bcy also secured certain broader public interest goals, goals linked to democratically based principles of fairness
and equity. Telephone and telegraph companies were legally obliged 10 provide
service to ali, at fair and reasonable rates-known as "universal service." In part
because of such obligations, the American telephone network traditionally was
universal and efficient, and the service was comparatively inexpensive for the
customer. It is significant that telephony achieved these ends as a govemmencregulated monopoly.
Broader public inrerest or equity-based values were auacbed to broadcasting as
well. Broadcasters, though given licenses to monopolize a given radio frequency,
were not to view that license as a property right. The airwaves were deemed the
property of aU the people of the United States, and the holders of broadcast licenses
were required to operate as public l.nllstees. Ultimately, broadcast regulation was
founded upon a public domain argument, that the airwaves were a natural resource
held in common-much like waterways. The state acted to protect and safeguard
that commonly held resource. The public domain rationale rested upon a (now
debated) scientific judgment as to the limited nature of the electromagnetic resource. Because not everyone who wished to engage in broadcasting could do so,
government bad to select individual licensees from a pool of prospective applicants.
In a very real sense, the government endowed certain private parties with immense
public benefits. Because of this, the broadcast licensee technically was deemed a
"public trustee," and had to fulfill certain .. affirmative" obligations.
The common carrier principle is really little more than a commerce-based notion
of the public interest. As it was applied 10 telesraphy and lclephooy, common
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carrier law meant simply the guarameed a~.:cess 10 the means of transmission. Even
when common carriage entailed, as it did in telephony, a policy which obliged
carriers to extend service to all, this also can be considered lo some degree a
commerce-based policy. It allowed and encouraged the expansion of communication necessary for the free flow of commerce. TI1e fact that people were given
access to the telecommunications infrastruclure was essentially a logical extension
of expanding the marketplace.
Nonetheless, the fulfillmem of the commerce function was responsible for the
wider public interesl accomplishment of making the telephone essentially a public
utility, available (in principle) to all citizens. In this sense, even as il facilitates
commerce, common carrier law embraces principles broader than commerce. The
obligation to serve and not to discriminate among customers-rooted in the old
common law-clearly embody principles of social equily.
There is another way in which commerce is not the
fundamental pnnc1p1e
which underlies the regulation of telecommunicalions. Telecommunication
a
peculiar infrastructure because it is a primary medium for the circulation of ideas
and information, a realm where, in principle, political life can be discussed openly
in accordance with the standards of critical reason. The regulation of telecommunications is more complicated and interesting than that of transportalion, for
example, precisely because in principle it safeguards the democratic right of freedom of speech.
There is a historical and logical-but uneasy-connection between the capitalist orientation to the market (thai is to say, comractual freedom, lumped under
what I have called the commerce principle) and wider civil freedoms (for our
purposes here, the principle of freedom of speech and the creation of a "free
marketplace of ideas''). After all, classical liberalism soughllo carve out spheres of
behavior free from control by the state. This primarily entailed the freedom to
fashion comracts and engage in commercial activity. Contractual freedom rested
upon the legal privilege granted an individual to autonomously regulate his/her
relations with others by his/her own transactions. 2 This is why contracts are, in a
sense, private law-making. The recognized aulonomy of the individual in contractual behavior logically extended to the individual in other spheres of conduct,
including the sphere of speech and ideas. Indeed, for a time the bourgeoisie's
historic struggle for contr.tctt:al 1ieedom went hand in hand with the struggle for
individual rights of speech :md print. In Europe, the bourgeoisie promoted the
development of a public sphere in opposilion to the traditionalist and hierocratic
forms of feudal authority. The Bill of Rights to the United States Conslilution, cast
within the natural law theory so inlimately connected 10 the bourgeois revolution,
protected speech and press from governmemal intrusions. Both in Europe and
America, the spread of private, partisan newspapers and journals in the late 18th
and early 19th century constructed a sphere of public opinion which mediated
between society and the state. 3
· The abstract connection between early capitalism and free speech had a concrete
torrn as well. The marketplace in early capitalism oflen was both the site for lhe
discourse took place. Central
circulation of commodilies un.d the site where
to the theorv of freedom of soeech are lhe notions that onlv in a free and open
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"marketplace" of ideas can a citizenry exercise democratic prerogative, and
in
such an open marketplace can "truth" prevail. 4 The liberal separation ofthe state
from the private realm of ideas was indeed essential to the creation of an independent public sphere. But this separation facilitates a democratic public sphere
ro
a degree, a fact that underscores one of the great tensions between liberalism and
democracy. Just as concrete factors affect competition in the economic marketplace,
the marketplace of ideas is greatly affected, if not essentially determined, by the
available means of communication. The public sphere constructed by assembly in
marketplaces and by a profusion of partisan newspapers is far different from a
public sphere constructed by and within great and often centralized institutions of
mass communication.
The liberal model of freedom of speech stops at the limit of commerce. The
model assumes that a democratic public sphere will emerge consequent to the
unimpeded, private actions of speech-entrepreneurs. But the results of the stale's
noninterference in the public sphere is much less clear when the means of communication are complicated, consolidated, and not generally accessible. The
sphere constituted by media of electronic communication greatly extend the
sphere and vastly expand the amount of information available, but at the same time
create difficult problems of power. Because access to the modem public sphere was
(and is) restricted to those with the capital to own a newspaper or operate a broadcast station, this mode of communication is essentially one of expanded monologue,
with only indirect feedback. mechanisms. While those with wealth can disseminate
their views, the First Amendment ..right" of most citizens is merely to listen and
read. Yet a free marketplace of ideas implies dialogue. In short, the nature of the
media of communication and the terms of access to them greatly affect the actual
marketplace of ideas. If we take the liberal theory of the nuutetplace of ideas
seriously, the limited access to centralized media constitutes a limit on self-government and substantive free speech.
The dilemma of broadcast regulation was this: how to safeguard the use of an
important, technologically scarce, medium of commerce while maintaining the
separation of the state from the private realm of ideas, and at the same time also
facilitate a democratic public sphere? The solution was for a regulatory body to
license would-be broadcasters, and suggest (not impose) broad and vague (not
specific or concrete) principles of public interest licensee behavior.
The paradox of the liberal conception of the public interest in telecommunications, as embodied both in common carrier law and in broadcast regulation, is that it
is inescapably bound to the commerce origin. The free speech function of communications media was assumed protected by safeguarding the commerce function of
the telecommunications infrastructure. Because a free market in ideas is assumed to
result from the absence of government interference, there has never been a viable
ideology of positive governmenc action to facilitate the exchange of ideas. The FCC
assumed that a diversity of owners of broadcast media would result in a diversity of
ideas. And yet the commerce-rooted imposition of common carrier law in telecommunications did indirectly serve broader free speech interests. Because of the commerce function of the telegraph and the telephone, access to those services was to be
served free
The nondiscrimination principle
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interests by establishing the separation of the control of !he means of communication (the "conduit") from the content of lhe traffic which went over those lines.
Although less clear-cut and far less complete, the common carrier principle also
applied to broadcasting. The broadcaster was legally obliged to air programs on
controversial matters of public policy and to be balanced in that coverage. When a
broadcaster pennilted a candidate for public office to use the airwaves, that broadcaster had to open the frequency to all candidates. s These obligations might be
considered quasi-common carrier in nature.

The deregulation of various industries underscore:; an important contemporary
transfonnation of the concept of the public interest which goes well
the
technological changes in telecommunications. I have noted that it is the New
industry-specific, price-and-entry agencies which are deregulating. Traditional economic regulation created, at one and the same time, a complex system of producer
cartels and service-based entitlements. Congress established the price-and-entry
regulatory agencies to bring order, or ''rationality,'' to various industries during the
Depression. Such agencies were aiven authority over a single industry which was
burdened by some destabilizing condition. Railroads, trucking, and airlines were
beset by too much competition; telephony was burdened with problems of monopoly; radio broadcasting suffered from an absence of general technical opcratina rules;
speculative banking practices undermined financial institutions. Regu!aro.y agencies established how many and which ftrms could enter into business, set aeneral
pricing levels, and fonnulatcd rules spccifac to the operation of an industry, such as
which routes a certain uuckina fann would service or which radio frequency a
licensee would inhabit.
In fulfilling the goal to stabilize these various industries, the price-and-entry
regulatory agencies created structures of mutual benefit-or cartels-among the
major interests (often including organized labor) in any particular industry. Industries and markets were .. saved" precisely by not permitting marketplace coa&rols to
function freely. Regulation substituted administrative rationality and informal political decision-making for market rationality. Price-and-entry regulation constituted a
fonn of state intervention which not only stabilized certain key industries but, in the
process, fulfilled certain broad New Deal social policies as well. Rcaulation
brought order to these industries, faxing stable market shares and prices. In so
doing, it facilitated the broad unionization of those industries (which could be seen
also as fulfilling the Keynesian macrocconomic goal of stimulating aggreaate demand). LastJy, such regulation constructed a sort of service-based entitlement syslem. Regardless of profit potential, buses, trucks, and airlines had to serve out-ofthe-way areas; local telephone service was made cheap and universally available;
broadcasters had to fulfill (however nominally) the obligations of a public trustee.
Regulation compelled that rates be skewed to facilitate the expansion of service.
This generally entailed internal cross-subsidies that favored poor and out-of-theway customers. In :;hort, regulation constructed a reasonably stable system of
mutual compromises and benefits to major corporations, organized labor, and even
consumers. Deregulation undermines this complex SCI of benefits.
Deregulation serves to dismantle the easy functioning of regulation-enforced
cartels. h pennits the resurgence of competition and the anarchistic play of market
forces. How such a political phenomenon could come to pass is very surprising,
because the regulatory comrol of competition brought business certainty and relatively assured benefits to the parties of the various cartels. It is not generally in the
interest of the major benefiCiaries of an arrangement to seek: alteration of the
arrangement. Indeed, as if to underscore this point, the powerful interests of the
deregulated industries generally opposed deregulation. Another facror favoring
maintenance of the regulatory status quo is the bureaucratic nature of the reaularo.y
agency itself. It is ofacn asserted that resularo.y bodies, like mosl bureaucratic
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Deregulation and the Public Interest
I argue that it is largely a commerce-based concept of the public interest which
underlay the traditional system of telecommunications regulation. But regulation
had powerful equity-based ramifacations as well. Universalaclephone service came
to embody a principle that access to information and to the means of communication
is part of being a citizen. Universal telephone service allows individuals to be part
of the fabric of national life, if only due ao a legally embedded principle of mandatory access to the equipment at cheap rates. Likewise, the scarcity r~~tionale for the
regulation of broadcasting created a public interest goal beyond the technical problem of allocating the electromagnetic spectrum, to wit, that the diversity of viewpoints and speech opportunities is crucial to a good society and a democratic polity.
The principle of keeping content distinct from conduit, embedded in antitrust and
regulatory "separations" policies, is, in a sense, a technologically rooted protec..t::" tion of freedom of speech. Separations policies constructed institutional boundaries
0
)::>
between communications services: broadcasters were kept distinct from common
carriers, aclephone companies could not engage in telegraphy. AT&T could not
enter the data processing industry. Notwithstanding the original commerce-based
intentions underlying the sysacm. of telecommunications regulation, broader conceptions of the public interest~.:ame to be attached to that regulatory system post hoc.
Yet, historically, the application of the conceptions of "universal and nondiscriminatory service," the "marketplace of ideas," and "diversity of viewpoints"
was always tremendously problematic in the traditional regime of telecommunications regulation. Indeed, as the ensuing chapters will show, regulation barely secured these broader ends of eqa~ity and fairness. Sometimes, in attempting to secure
such public interest ends, regulalion actually sabotaged them. The irony is that these
broader noaions of the public interest were ''attached" to specific technologies and,
further, to the regulatory protection of such technologies. As the technologies
themselves change and the separation between them becomes more problematic, the
broader notions of the public in&erest lose their material and legal moorings. This
underscores the other great irony of deregulation. liberals and public interest
groups backed deregulation in large part because they saw "regulation as usual" as
a form of regulatory "capture." The dismlucion of regulatory protectionism and the
forces unleashed therefrom served, however, to undercut the historic connections
between particular telecommunications technologies and the broader notions of the
public interest. The broader public interest goals became subsumed and redefined
under the ideological rubrics of technological expansion and unbridled competition.
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organizations, tend not to shrink or dismantle themselves. Indeed, a frequent criticism aimed at regulators and agencies is that they try to expand !heir purviews and
budgets. With deregulation, however, regulators surrender their expenise to the
workings of the market. More shocking still, some agencies actually initiated the
deregulatory process themselves.
A key cause of deregulation is the divergence over time of administrative
mtionality and economic rationality. Regulatory structures and formulae tend to
rellect an internal balance of imerests within a regulated industry. This is largely
because the basic business and functional instilUlional patterns are set before the
advenl of regulatory controls. Regulation usually recapitulates these pauerns and
applie.s the coercive authority of the state to make them work. Over time, changes in
the larger economic environment and technological innovation may alter the balance of interests in and around a regulated industry, but the regulatory structures
and formulae may not adapt to these changes.
In theory, the informal, discretionary nature of regulation permits an agency to
adapt to new circumstances. In practice, regulation tends 10 be conservative. In the
case of the FCC, the Commission clung to familiar definitions and policies long
after their applicability had become ambiguous. The agency, beset with many
problems and conflicls, often clings to established rules and policies. Regulatory
rules may make administrative, but not economic sense. Moreover, if the regulatory
arena becomes too contentious, if the struggle between interests is too basic, the
agency experiences additional p"-essures to become more formalistic. Regulatory
.c- delay and imtionality reach a point where business decisions are made uncenain.
....... Regulated panies flee the regulatory arena for relief. New policy forums may then
)>
disrupt the senledness of regulatory conservatism.
To describe this process in historical terms, the liberal-lefl regulatory activism
of the Great Society period not only produced new regulatory agencies, but pushed
the older agencies to become •aore open to democmtic (or at least non-industry)
demands. The traditional regulatory arena, long protective of (if sometimes also
bothersome lo) the major regulated interests, waxed inordinately contentious and
politicized. This phenomenon pushed agencies to become more formalistic, more
prone to time delays and dntwn-out judicial challenges. In a period of high inllation,
regulatory activism helped modify rate increases such that large service users paid a
higher proponional share of the "cross-subsidy." These pressures magnified the
economic incentives for large users to bypass the regulated system and for new
entrepreneurs to offer unregulated services that would sidestep the regulated industry's delicate system of producer cartels and service entitlements. In response, the
traditional regulatory agencies enacted new rules to thwan such bypass.
Corporations, reeling under new obligations, costs, and time delays imposed by
the new social regulatory agencies, counterauacked. They formed lobbying groups
and foundations, and commissioned repons decrying the "overregulated" society.
Corporations attempted 10 tie the decline of US economic productivity to excessive
regulation. One effect of this corporate attempt lo alter the reigning political discourse was to open up a greater space for the analyses of academic economists of
regulation, who had been writing about the inefficiencies of regulation for years. In
I a strange sort of way, the corporate effort succeeded and failed. With the backdrop
of a crisis in public institutions consequent lo Waier!Hi.le and the economic "stludla-
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lion" of the 1970s, corporations largely succeeded in transforming a generalized
populist dissatisfaction with government (including regulation) to a critique of regulation. But the regulatory agencies most affectedwere not the new social regulatory agencies so reviled by business. Rather, they were those agencies mosc criticized
by academic economists-the New Deal price-and-entry agencies.
Notwithstanding the usual conservatism of regulation, political dynamics and
technological innovation and changes in political culture can alter the conservative
tenor of "regulation as usual." By the mid-1970s an ideologically diverse political
coalition-including free-market economists located in key positions in the Ford
Administration, historically pro-regulation liberals such as Senators Edward Kennedy and Philip Han, and consumer advocate Ralph Nader-had emerged co reform
regulation. Early reform stinings coalesced around commercial airlines and the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Despite vociferous opposition from the airline industry
and nearly 40 years of CAB precedent, commercial air transport was deregulated.
Early successes with airline deregulation (lower prices and reputedly higher efficiency) created further political impetus ro deregulate other transportation carriers
and other infrastructure services.
Telecommunication was affected greatly by the general environment of deregulation, yet in some ways both broadcasting and common carriage had already
experienced changes which made them ripe for the deregulation impulse. The
regulation of broadcasting had long been characterized by the protection of the
conventional services of AM radio and VHF television from competitive entry.
Although the FCC formulated various structural and content controls on broadcasters, their efficacy in securing "public interest" broadcasting was dubious. The
broadcast reform movement set out to change this.
The broadcast reform movement (the communications "wing" of the many
liberal activist consumer groups of the Great Society period, consisting of a loose
coalition of liberal, often minority-group organizations dedicated to altering the
broadcast system) utilized three identifiable strategies in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The m.>st widespread of these was that of conducting challenges io the
license renewals of existing broadcast stations. Petitions to deny license renewal
were filed on the basis that such stations had not fulfilled their obligation to broadcast in the public interest. Reform groups were greatly assisted in this endeavor by
the judicial expansion of legal ''standing.'' This expansion enabled parties without
propeny interests to argue before regulatory agencies. The second strategy entailed
a call for the right of limited, but mandatory citizen access to broadcast frequencies.
This included demands for airtime ro respond to "controversial" advertisements,
such as cigarette ads. Last, the reform movement initiated (or at least picked up and
gave loud voice to) a new discourse on the potential of "new technologies" ro
alleviate &he endemic problems of broadcasting. In particular, this discourse focused
on cable television as a rechnology that could create a •'wired democracy,'' able to
transcend the limited and commercial system of conventional broadcasting.
license renewal challenges and access demands caused shon-term but severe
regulatory problems for broadcasters, and caused them to flee the regulatory arena
toward Congress for relief. Congress took up broadcast industry demands for license renewal relief in hearings which by 1976 became bound to the broader
(uliimatelv unsuccessJul) effon to nowrifP ft.,. f"nmnmnl""*'""~ A ~• A • •h~ ~~-~
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time, !he broadcasl refonn movement's "new
~ohs~.:ourse, n.:sommu!l
wilh the material interests of non-broadcast emrepn.:neurs, slowly pushed the FCC
away from its traditional policies of protection. Broadcast deregulation emerged
from an unexpected combination of new technologies and mutually contradictory
rules designed to protect conventional television broadcasting. lbe advent of satellite-delivered programs to cable operators caused contradictions in the regulations
designed to restrict cable television. The subsequent inadvertent relaxation of conflicting regulations provided the FCC with a reaL-world case for judging whether
broadcasters were, in fact, being injured by cable. When broadcasters could not
show that they were injure>4 by the relaxation of specific cable rules, the FCC, now
taken with the general notion of regulatory refonn, relaxed more of the rules. In
addition, a crucial court case in 1977 established that certain other FCC rules
designed to protect broadcasters were unconstitutional. By the late 1970s, the FCC
had moved from abe New Deal cautious guardian model of regulation, to one which
woded actively to liberalize entry in abe broadcast business.
The common carrier area had been dominated by a venically integrated AT&T
monopoly which WlfS protected by the FCC. AT&T controlled long-distance telephony, was the local service monopolist in most metropolises, and supplied all of its
equipment needs through its own manufacturing subsidiary. By abe mid-1970s,
however. the internal balance of interests in the industry had shifted-partly due to
the entrepreneurial opportunities created by technological innovation and partly to
economic incentives to bypass t~ regulated system. Again, technology is not an
.J::- independent, abstr.tet force, but a dynamic situated wilhin contexts of en~ trepreneunal opponunities and regulatory constraints. Underlying this shift were
two important factors: one, longstanding antitrust problems over AT&T's venical
monopoly, and two, the needs of a powerful community of large telecommunications users which was inadequately served by AT&T and wanted freedom from
AT&.T-amposed options.
AT&T, so adept at providing universal telephone service, was always suspected
of using its venical monopoly to internally manipulate its prices in order to raise
profits. Such antitrust considerations resulted in the 1956 confinement of AT&T to
the provision of regulated common carrier telecommunications only. The large,
venical monopolistic structure also was responsible for abe company's inability to
satisfy the more specific needs of large telecommunication consumers in the postWorld War II period of business expansion. In response to the demands of these
large users, the fCC opened special small pans or the Bell monopoly's operating
environment to competition. These small entry "liber.dizations" were penniued
only because AT&T could not serve specialized users ade.fuately. They were not
intended or envisioned to open up AT&T's monopoly. Nevenheless, the FCC could
neither foresee nor control the consequences of its actions. Entry liberalization
encouraged the emergence of new technologies and new players into telecommunications common carriage, notably in "private lines" (special lines dedicated
between two points, used increasingly for data carriage) and "terminal equipment"
(tdephone instruments and switching systems). Over the years, these new players
(particularly the MCI Corporation) and large users would push continuously at the
borders of the Bell System witb new technologies and new services.
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Such developments had two inadvertent but serious ramifications.

raised serious issues of public policy regarding the appropriate boundary betweam
regulated and unregulated activities. And second, they placed AT&T's rate structure in potential jeopardy. These antitrust and liberalized entry matten became
inexorably intenwined in the mid- to late 1970s. In 1974 the Justice Department
filed an antitrust suit against AT&T, charging that the company bad used its regulated profits to practice predatory pricing in competitive markets.
faced with new competitive players and unclear regulatory boundaries, AT&T
found its external operating environment and ils policy arena, both for decades
remarkably stable and certain, becoming increasingly unstable and uncertain. By
1976, partly at AT&T's urging, and partly abe result of the deregulation environment, the policy-making arena opened to include Congress in an attempt to rewrite
the 1934 Communications Act. Soon, however, all branches of government were
engaged in effons to fonnulate new nalionalteleconununications policy-a process
likened by AT&T's Chairman Charles L. Brown to ..nothing less than a tbree·ring
circus."
What began as a complex antitrust case in 1974 inadvenently became by 1981 a
closed policy forum within whicb various economic and political concerns could be
joined. In the context of Reagan Administration Justice Department negotiations,
the need to solve pressing contradictions in domestic telecommunications common
carriage could be reconciled witb large users' demands for telecommunications
options, with AT&T's desire to be freed of regulatory barriers, witb national security considerations, and, finally. witb the growing concern to protect and enhance
American glol»>l interest in information technology.
The transfonnation of abe concept of abe public interest posed by abe deregulation of
these industries involves a shift away from a concern witb stability and a kind of
social equity to a concern witb market controls and economic effaciency. In this
regard, the deregulation of telecommunications commands particular attention. For,
again, it involves not only the usual issues of political economy in abe spheres of
commerce and antitrust, but is characterized centrally by issues of public utility and
free speech as well.
The divestiture of AT&T, and abe relaxation of regulatory controls over broadcasting in panicular, pose important questions about abe nature of abe modem public
sphere. The foreseeable outcome of abe divestiture of AT&T is increasing telecommunications options for business and the decline of the principle of universal service. The deregulation of broadcasting tbreatens to collapse the First Amendment's
protection of messages to mean complete fn:cdom for media owners only. Diversity
and a free marketplace of ideas are declared to be delivered by the unfettered
market. Telecommunications deregulation tbus creates a distinctly modem political
and philosophical paradox: how to guarantee meaningful freedom of speech in an
age or infonnation abundance. There are also basic questions about deregulation's
effect on commerce. Given tbat a planned and stable teleconununications infrastructure was crucial to economic development and the free: flow of commerce, will abe
opening of that infrastructure to competition secure similar results?
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As part of Pac Bell's proposal,

the five-member PUC will also consider whether to end the company's
monopoly as the only provider of
service for short-distance toil
within its market area: for example,
on calls between San Francisco
San Jose.
Long-distance phone compa·
nies, such as AT&T and MCI, want
[See PAC BEU, D-12
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Informational Hearing
of the
Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce
State Capitol, Room 437
Sacramento, California
Tuesday, June 6, 1989
"Don't Hang Up!: The PUC and Telephone Service in the 90's
Regulation, Deregulation, or Reregulation?"

CHAIRWOMAN GWEN MOORE: In 1910, after years of
strife between the utilities and their customers, the people of
California, by initiative,

create~

the California Public Utilities

'•

'
Commission [PUC] to create order
and protect their common interest.

Now, the Public Utilities Commission is engaged in one of its most
important assignments ever:

Determining how to regulate

California's telephone companies in the 1990's.
In December, the PUC significantly lightened the
regulation of AT&T, the largest long distance carrier, as it had done
earlier for MCI, U. S. Sprint, and the other long distance carriers.
Now, the local telephone companies are petitioning the PUC for their
own lightened regulation.
But there is a bigger issue.

That issue is how

telecommunications services will be provided in California m the last
years of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st.
Our hearing today is convened to discuss what our state's
telecommunications policies should be.

Ever-changing federal

policies and new techological possibilities require that we reassess
our state's policies on a regular basis.

1

For that reason, I'm asking the

witnesses, who represent almost every active player in
telecommunications arena, to concentrate their testimony on the Big
Picture:
these

IS

The policies that they recommend for the future.

Among

the appropriate role of the Public Utilities Commission.

I

don't want to reiterate the proceedings now before the Public
Utilities Commission except as they point the way to the future.
As Californians, we all have a big stake in our
telecommunications policies.

They will determine, more than we can

imagine today, how we will live our lives tomorrow.

Can we build a

social concensus for the 21st Century, for the "Information Age?"
Can we afford not too?

[Prepared Remarks, See Attachment A].

With this purpose in mind, I will call forward the first
witnesses.
I'd like first to come forward the representatives of
Pacific Telesis and General Telephone.

Their requests may shape

what our "Information Age" looks like, depending upon what the PUC
does.

The Public Utilities Commission can come forward at this time,

also.
Terri Murray, Bruce Jamison, and Tim McCallion.
I'd like for you to tell us what your vision is and what
you see changing.

Those of you who follow, I want you to tell me

what's wrong with what they are proposing.
MR. BRUCE JAMISON: Madam Chair and members of the
Committee, my name is Bruce Jamison, executive director for State
Regulatory representing Pacific Bell.

I plan to discuss, within the

context of the preliminary remarks that the Chair outlined, the wellbalanced nature of our proposal; second, the issue of deregulation
2

and the fact that Pacific is not seeking deregulation, and third,
respond to concerns about our proposal, that business rate mcreases
which are below cost should move towards cost over time, gradually
and predictably, and that those increases will not result in increased
revenues for Pacific.
However, I'd first like to correct an error in the paper
that was circulated by the Committee prior to these hearings.
Included in that paper was a statement that the Commission has
twice rejected Pacific's proposal.

That's not true.

that subject more fully in my written remarks.

I have addressed

[See Attachment B].

The first question in the list of questions that the
Committee sent to the various parties today listed a set of goals for
regulation: assuring just and reasonable rates, preserving the ability
of the utility to attract capital and reasonable returns, preventing
abuse of monopoly power and undue discrimination among
customers, assuring high quality service and adequate facilities.
Stated differently, these goals are very similar to the goals that the
Commission outlined m the notice that convened the proceeding that
is in progress today:

•

The OII on changing regulation for local

exchange companies .
Pacific's filing responded to that order.

Ours was one of

the few proposals that covered all aspects of the issues outlined in
the Commission's order rather than aiming only at the narrow selfinterest items one by one.

My prepared remarks contain a summary

of that proposal.
Hearings m Phase II were extensive, covering some 61
days of hearing room time, with 20 parties and 43 witnesses
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providing testimony in those proceedings.

Public participation

hearings were held in San Diego, Santa Monica, Long Beach, Pasadena,
San Francisco, San Jose, Fresno, Sacramento and Redding.

Now, the

parties have filed briefs in this proceeding, and we're waiting a
decision by the Commission.
In those briefs, parties identified some concerns about
the Pacific's proposal.

First, there was concern about our proposal to,

in effect, lower the rate charged on residential service by including
touchtone in that service and expanding the local calling area.

Some

of the other parties in this proceeding opposed that, saying it should
go lower.

"Those rates should be lower."

"Those rates should go higher."

Other parties opposed said,

This very range of opinion, I think, is

a good indicator that we have made a balanced proposal.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you a question.
Under your proposal, in the future,there will be no room for those
kinds of hearings, for the next four years.

If it was good for this

process, then what's wrong with it for the future?
MR. JAMISON: The Commission always has the option of
convening an

on

order instituting investigation on any subject that it

chooses.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Part of your proposal, as I
understand it, is to freeze rates for four years.

What reason would

they have to issue an Oil?
MR. JAMISON:

I'm sure many subjects might cause the

Commission to want to examine issues in the telecommunications
industry.

Some of those might have pricing implications.

procedures are still well intact.
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Those

Second, there was a concern about the need for
safeguards and about the adequacy of regulatory oversight.
reiterate Pacific is not seeking deregulation.
safeguards are available.

Let me

We believe adequate

Under Pacific's proposal, any rate increase

that would come about as a result of principals adopted in this
proceeding would have to be approved by the Commssion.
"Flexibility bands" that Pacific has proposed would have to be
approved by the Commission on an individual basis.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Once the range of the bands are
approved, is any further approval necessary by the Public Utilities
Commission?
MR. JAMISON: No. If the Commission approved a
flexibility band for a particular service, within that range we could
move the price.

We are proposing, for existing services, that the

highest price could be no higher than the current rates as they are
today or as they're determined by the rate proceeding that has to
follow this particular part of the

on.

With all of these PUC approvals required and integral to
our plan, this is clearly not the plan for a business seeking

•

deregulation.

I would reiterate, Pacific is not seeking deregulation .

We don't believe that's appropriate.
Some parties, the cable industry in particular, have
attempted to conduct hearings in the

on

and mischaracterizing Pacific's proposal.

and in the press, distorting
There have been expressed

concerns about our proposal that business rates are below cost and
should move towards cost over time.

It is important to note,

however, that those rates would not result in any new revenues for
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Pacific.

They will be offset by reductions to the long distance

earners for the services that they receive from Pacific, to connect to
our network.

I believe that those long distance carriers probably

will flow those reductions through to their customers, many of whom
are the very same customers that would see increases in the

below-

cost rates that Pacific currently provides.
A major intent of our proposal -- and let me stress that
the PUC still has to review those rates and the costs associated with
those rate increases -- is that if any services are to continue to be
priced below cost in this changing, more competitive communications
environment, it should be reserved for residential services.
That ts not everything that is contained in the proposal,
but I have tried to hit highlights.

I have attached a summary

statement of the proposal to my prepared remarks.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What's good for the consumer in
your proposal?
MR. JAMISON: First, the inclusion of touchtone in basic
serv1ce for the residential customers as we move into an era of more
and more information services provided by many, many providers ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You know how I feel about that.
It doesn't cost you any money to do it, so what's the big deal?
MR. JAMISON:

We're talking about the revenues.

We

recetve over $100 million a year from that, and we're proposing that
be included ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We are talking about moving
close to cost-of-service.

If you are telling me that it doesn't cost any
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more to cost that service than rotary, then we ought not

to have

been paymg that anyway.
MR. JAMISON:

Today, the way regulation is practiced, the

Commission allocates the revenue requirement across a variety of
services, expecting some to provide contribution to support others.
Touchtone provides contribution, and it is one of those very services
that keeps rates or basic services low today.
the customer should no longer pay for that.

We're proposing that
I think that is a separate

Issue.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, but I don't consider that a
gift.

Go on, give me another one.
MR. JAMISON: Extension of the local calling area is an

important item.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I think that is important.
MR. JAMISON:

We're proposing that what is now Zone 2

be included in the ZUM (Zone Usage Measurement) areas:

•

Zone 2 toll,

a second band of toll in the non-ZUM, be included as part of the local
calling area for both residentials and business.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But isn't that something you took
from the consumers when you went to ZUM in the first place?
MR. JAMISON:

No.

In fact, I think quite the contrary the

ZUM bands use to be multi-message-unit bands years ago.

Those

were created primarily because of the ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
spread over a much wider area.

Multi-message units used to be

I remember the people went nuts

when ZUM went into effect.
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MR. JAMISON:

That's correct, but the multi-message unit

function was a replacement for toll, not the other way around.

In

fact, the ZUM rates are tied to the toll rates in that they are today
currently pegged at 50 percent of the toll rate.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you're telling me that what's
good for the consumer in that package is :

First,f you're going to give

them touchtone service, which doesn't cost you any more to provide
than rotary; and second, you are going to give them a wider calling
area which is similiar to what they had before you went to ZUM.
MR. JAMISON:

No. They didn't have it before we went to

ZUM

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay.
MR. JAMISON:

Regardless what touchtone costs Pacific to

provide, the fact is that the customer will see a net reduction in their
bill.

If, for example, you have touchtone at home, we figure on

average --

know averages are risky to deal with -- but in the case of

touchtone, that is $1.20 a month that the customer will no longer be
paymg.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you're saying that basic
serv1ce now drops to $7 .20?
MR. JAMISON: No. Basic service stays at $8.35, but it will
include touchtone service as part of it instead of touchtone being an
extra charge.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Instead of it being $9.45 or
whatever, now your monthy bill will be $8.35?
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MR. JAMISON:
basis, residential customers

Yes, and on top of that, on a broad average
see about a $1.00 reduction because

of the expansion of the local calling area.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What we're talking about is
almost a 25 percent reduction for residential callers.

Is that what

you're telling me?
MR. JAMISON:

Right.

When you roll that all up together.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, the package for residential
customers represents about a 20 to 25 percent reduction in costs.
That is what's in it for the consumer?
MR. JAMISON:
customers, as well.

There are other things in it for residential

For example, in the area of flexibility, Pacific has

asked for services that are priced above costs.

I am speaking

primarily of toll services; we would like flexibility in that arena.

We

believe we are going to have to respond to competition in the future.
It hasn't been authorized on a wide scale yet, but authorized on some
incidental basis.

By having flexibility there (and we're only talking

about downward from current rates), I would expect that customers
will see lower toll rates as a result.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Who picks up the slack as we go

I

down?
MR. JAMISON:

That's part of this whole package:

we reduce rates through the flexibility proposal?

Should

That's a risk to us.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Are you telling me your
shareholders may eat your flexibility?
MR. JAMISON:

To the extent that we confront

competition and that requires us to lower rates, or we lower rates
9

because ... In some cases you may be able to make your money
depending on the price elasticities.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, there are other groups you
can shift the cost to.

Is that not true?

MR. JAMISON:

I don't see how, since we aren't proposing

to raise rates except those business rates tied specifically to a
program whereby the long distance companies are going to have the
rates they pay to us reduced.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. General Telephone, is your
program just like Pacific's?
MR. TIM MCCALLION; No, it is different. Morning,
Chairwoman Moore and members of the Committee.

My name is Tim

McCallion and I'm director of Revenue and Earnings Management for
GTE California.

Additionally, I was GTE California's policy witness in

the Commission's Alternative Regulatory Framework proceeding.
As you requested, I will limit my remarks to describing
the features of our plan.

Our plan is significantly different, from

both the proposal presented by Pacific Bell and the proposal
presented by the Division of Ratepayer Advocates [DRA].
GTE California is seeking a change in regulation.

We are

not seeking deregulation of any services that are currently regulated.
There are several features of GTE's proposal which I will briefly
described.

I might want to add that we have given to the Sergeant of

Arms a very short background paper which describes our plan in
slightly more detail.

[See Attachment C].
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First of all, under our proposal, we would divide the
services that we offer today into two categories which I refer to as
Category I and Category II.
The first category would consist of the majority of the
telephone services, the majority of the services which are required
for customers to have what I refer to as "POTS," plain old telephone
service.

That would include the residential network connection, the

single-line business connection, the multi-line business connection,
intraLA T A toll calling and access services.
Category I services would be subject to an index.

In the

future, prices for those services or the overall revenues we get from
those services would only change based upon this index.
would have two components.

This index

One component would recognize

inflationary changes which occur and the other component would
give recognition productivity improvements in the
telecommunications industry.

As we discussed at hearings before

(and this has been discussed at the Public Utilities Commission).
Productivity in the telecommunications industry has been improving
in recent years.

•

Therefore, there would be an adjustment to our

Category I index to recognize the productivity improvement .
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Does that means you would go
before the PUC for that recognition?
MR. MCCALLION: We would hopefully have the PUC
adopt a productivity factor in their Phase II order.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, it wouldn't be something that
they would review.
establish.

It would be a standard that they would

When you achieved that, then you would automatically be
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able to increase your rates or get your bonus for your productivity.
Is that the deal?
MR. MCCALLION: We would be able to adjust rates either
upwards or downwards only based upon that standard.

Another

aspect of our plan which you started getting into ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask this, if you had a
minus productivity, then would you reduce your rates?
MR. MCCALLION: Yes. If the inflation and productivity
netted out negative, which certainly it could, we would have to
reduce the rates for our Category I services.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How are we going to know you
did that?

Trust you?
MR. MCCALLION: We would make a filing to the Public

Utilities Commission at the beginning of each year to reflect the
change based upon the index.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So they would see whether you
were productive.

This change can only occur once a year?

MR. MCCALLION: Yes. It is an annual adjustment.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Bald?
MR. JIM BALD: Under your plan, do you foresee the
business community sharing in these productivity improvements and
whatever lower rates might be available because of that?
MR. MCCALLION: Under our plan, all of our customers for
these Category I services would share in that productivity
improvement.

That is the productivity improvement that is built

into the index.
Category I.

The adjustments would be made to those services in

That doesn't capture all of our services -- in a minute I
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will describe which ones it doesn't capture -- but it is the majority of
the services.

The single-line

customer and the multi-line

business customer

the benefit of that productivity

improvement.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Would that be a shared benefit,
so to speak?

You would share whatever the productivity

improvement was?

In other

you would give so much to the

customer and your shareholder would get so much?

Is that what

we're talking about?
MR. MCCALLION: You anticipated the next step of our
plan.

The next step of our plan is a sharing mechanism.

That is, if

the company's earnings are above the benchmark rate-of-return
established by the Public Utilities Commission, we would share the
earnings above that benchmark on a 50/50 basis between the
company and its customers.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That sounds familiar. Is that like
yours?
MR. JAMISON: Yes, it is. I did not try to include every

I

item in our proposal.

Those items are included in the attachment to

my prepared remarks.

The concept of sharing above a benchmark is

a key item in our plan.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you to differentiate
that kind of approach from rate-of-return, what we do today.

How

does that differ?
MR. MCCALLION: First of all, in today's environment the
staff of the Public Utilities Commission, the Division of Ratepayer
Advocates, and other participants take a very close look at our
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revenues, our expenses, our investments and go through an accountby-account line item review.
paying to our employees.

They review the wages that we're

They review how fast our operators are

answering telephone calls, and therefore, how many operators they
feel we need.

They review our instruction program to see if it is

beneficial to the ratepayers.
Under our proposal, that account-by-account, detailed
review would no longer be necessary, because utilizing the index will
provide us with a bucket of dollars within which to operate.

As long

as we operate within that bucket of dollars, there is not the necessity
to make any of these adjustments.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: No. My question was, when you
earn over your rate-of-return, how is the money adjusted?

I think

the Division of Ratepayer Advocates better tell me that all of that
goes back to the consumer as oppose to a 50/50 share.

Is that

correct?
MR. MCCALLION: Not necessarily.

During the rate case

proceeding, we are adjusted down to our authorized rate of return.
In the years between the rate case proceedings, the Commission has
an "attrition mechanism" to where they impute some productivity to
us today.

Based upon our recent rate case order and the one that

came out a few years ago for Pacific Bell, if the company achieves
more than the amount of labor productivity, we are required to give
50 percent of that additional savings back to the ratepayers, and we
get to retain 50 percent of it.

In the past, prior to this order, in the

years between general rate cases, the companies were permitted to
retain 100 percent of any additional productivity during those lag
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years.

So, we now have actually a little bit less incentive than we

had in the past to improve our productivity in those years betwen
rate cases.
MR. JAMISON:

There is a key difference between the

way ratemaking is practiced today and what is proposed by Pacific
and somewhat similarly by General.
forward ooking.
I

Today, revenue figuring is only

There is no backward reaching except for the

productivity element that Mr. McCallion mentioned.

So, if Pacific

does well in a year, the Commission does not take it away nor can it.
It can only base rates on forecasts of the future and set rates going
forward.

Those two items are important to understand relative to

Pacific's proposal

We are proposing now to put the company at risk.

Based on forecast, but based on actual outcomes, whatever that
benchmark is set to be, if it is exceeded, that outcome is shared
50!50 -- in effect a reach-back provided to the customer.

It also

provides an incentive for Pacific to do better.

•

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How does that differ from a bill
that I seem to remember that called for an annual ratecase?
MR. JAMISON:

As I recall, it described a procedure very

similar to which exists today.

That can't be accomplished in a year or

two years or three years.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's not true. It reduced the
revtew of the day-to-day, micro-management kinds of things.
looked at the big ticket items.

It

Very similar to the things you are

describing here, fas I recall.
MR. JAMISON: I don't recall it that way.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's hear from the Division of
Ratepayer Advocates.

What's wrong or what's good about what they

are telling me?
MS. TERRI MURRAY: First, let me introduce myself to the
Committee.

I'm Terri Murray, director of the Division of Ratepayer

Advocates [DRA].

(Prepared Statement, see Attachment D).

In terms

of what you heard from Mr. Jamison and Mr. McCallion, I would
agree they have both accurately described the differences between
current rate-of-return regulation and the proposals.

The Division of

Ratepayer Advocates is perhaps a little more enthusiastic about what
we have accomplished in the past, under traditional rate-of-return
regulation, then either Pacific or General.

But we, too, agree that the

changes in the telecommunications industry, technology, federal
policy and judicial action do call for some modification of our
traditional framework.
We are concerned, perhaps for somewhat different
reasons than the two companies that are represented here today,
that ratepayers may subsidize the entrepreneural adventures of the
local exchange companies by paying development costs for projects
intended for competitive ventures.

An example is the $20 million --

plus that ratepayers explicitly picked up for Project Victoria.

We are

concerned about the risk of cross-subsidization of new and
competitive services in a mixed marketplace where there are both
monopolies ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: $20 million on Project Victoria?
MR. JAMISON:

In the evidentiary hearings, the DRA's

own witness pointed that, had that money not been spent, it would
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have become profits to the business and not reduced rates to the
ratepayer.

That is a mischaracterization.

In fact that is one of the

ways regulation works today that demonstration that there is not
this reach-back.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Was the research done with the
subsidization from Pacific Telesis or in Pacific Bell?
MR. JAMISON: It was done in Pacific Bell.

•

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you get to the
shareholders out of Pacific Bell?
MR. JAMISON:

•

Had the research taken place, that would

have made more money available as dividends to our owner, which
Is, of course, Pacific Telesis.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So it came out of the
shareholder's pot and there is a clear paper trail to the shareholder's
pot.
MR. JAMISON:

That's correct, because had it not been

done, it would not have resulted in lower rates.

It would have

resulted m higher profits.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why are you so confused on that,
DRA?
MS. MURRAY:

I think the confusion here (because I agree

with Mr. Jamison) points to a problem, and that was my point.

In the

existing regulatory framework, between ratecases, there is no way to
reach-back and pick up access earnings that might be there.

They

become available either as shareholder profits or to finance
potentially competitive ventures.

I certainly did not mean to suggest

that Pacific Bell had done something that was impermissible under
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our existing regulatory framework.

I simply pointed out that there

are problems with traditional rate-of-return in a mixed marketplace,
this being one example.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you have some suggestions?
MS. MURRAY: We do have some suggestions for that and
for some of the other problems that we see in traditional rate-ofreturn.

DRA has put forth a proposal in the investigation that we

think more fairly balances the needs of ratepayers and shareholders
than the plans you have heard thus far.

One key element of our

proposal is to move competitive services into a separate profit center
-- to isolate them, in terms of cost accounting, from the regulated
monopoly side of the business.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Isn't that being done already?

MS. MURRAY: We think that it could be done. We have
not thoroughly gone through the kind of cost allocation procedures
that would be necessary to totally separate those services from the
monopoly side of the business.

That is part of our goal to separate it

out completely; to draw that line.

That is not an easy thing to do, but

we hope to do so through our proposal.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you regulate them if you
can't tell?

Not DRA in particular -- where's Pete Arth, the Public

Utilities Commission?

Is someone here from the Commission?

Welcome to the table.

You can help us to better understand this.

Terri is representing the Division of Ratepayer Advocates.
need someone from the Commission.
MR. PETE ARTH: Could we start over again?
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So, we

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Give him a hint, Terri,to what I
want to know.
MS. MURRAY: Let me, while Pete is gathering his
thoughts, just run down ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: He doesn't know what the
question Is.
MR. ARTH:

I actually was listening to the testimony.

It

seems like you're looking for an assurance that was missing from
Terri's tesitmony.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: First of all, I would assume
the PUC has been watching to be sure there is no cross-subsidy.
kept being assured that that's the case.

We

Now, we are being told that

there's no way to really make that determination, and that is a
problem.

In the past, I have always been assured that it wasn't a

problem, and it was being taken care of.

So, is there a problem with

cross-subsidy?
MR. ARTH:

I think that is one of the core questions in the

proceeding, and you are going to hear from all of those who give the
obvious answer "yes" that there is a problem.

•

Will it be adequately

addressed in either of the local exchange company proposals?

Is it

necessary to have the protection of the DRA or shall we do away with
the hands-on, full regulation that has traditionally existed to detect
these sorts of problems?

The answer on behalf of the Commission is

yes, there is a potential and yes, it is being addressed.

The

commitment is there, to do whatever comes out of this proceeding.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask you one of those
"Are-you-still-beating-your-wife?" questions."
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I have always been

assured in the past that cross-subsidy wasn't a real problem.
was clear.

That

We have talked about different accounting procedures

over the years, and you always disagreed with Sylvia Siegal that
cross-subsidy and the utilization of ratepayer funds is not a problem.
MR. ARTH:
to tell you.

I'm not going to preempt what Terry is going

Obviously, one of the problem is the resources available

to the Ratepyer Advocates and the major customers to go after the
paper trail, to be able to detect, prosecute and remedy what's going
on.

That is certainly one of the keys:

whether it is or isn't a solvable

problem.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. Go ahead, Terri.
MS. MURRAY:

A second element of our proposal would

index rates on the monopoly side of the house to automatically
assure that all cost decreases get passed on to the ratepayers without
regulatory lag.

In that sense, there are some similiarities between

our proposal and that of General Telephone.
and productivity indices.

We do look at inflation

The significant difference there is that we

have proposed to look at those indices on a company-specific basis.
We recognize the different starting points that each of the compames
comes from and recognize the unique cost differences in a manner
more similiar to the traditional regulatory framework.
Their own customers are entitled to benefits if there are, indeed,
very large productivity increases.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That more closely resembles the
General proposal than it does Pacific's.
Terri's proposal?
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Pacific, what's wrong with

MR. JAMISON:

What Terri didn't describe in the DRA's

proposal ts a mechanism which has yet to be laid out.
building an index

It depends on

on factors within the business rather than on

industry-wide or statewide factors.

To the extent that you build an

index that is ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, your proposal wouldn't allow
for that, if I understand your residential proposal.

Yours is a flat

freezing of the rates.
MR. JAMISON:

That's true, except if the company were to

exceed the benchmark rate-of-return, whatever that was set at, and
there were monies to be returned to the customers, it would be up to
the Commission to determine which customers those should be
flowed to.

We have said clearly that those customers are the

residential customers.

So in effect, you get the same return.

I think

you get a similiar outcome under each of those processes.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Only if you exceed your rate-ofreturn.

For years you have been telling me that you are barely

making it.
MR. JAMISON: That's true.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If you never get to your rate-ofreturn, the likelihood of there being any benefits to the ratepayers is
almost null.

Right?
MR. JAMISON: No, that's not true. On the other hand,

under current regulatory process. if we don't meet the authorized
rate-of-return, we have every right to come back in and ask for rate
increases.

Our proposal takes away that right.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay.
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MS. MURRAY: Let me just add a comment on that last
remark.

It is not ORA's perception that the Pacific proposal

eliminates their right or option to return to the Commission if they
are under-earning.
open explicitly.

It was my understanding that is an option kept

There is nothing binding Pacific or any other

company operating under such a plan to come back to the
Commission
Going on with the DRA proposal, I think one element of
great interest to all customers is our proposal to decrease local
exchange company rates, upfront, to reflect a fair return.

In order to

conduct this proceeding, as well as to handle the large volume of
telecommunications related caseloads in the past few years, it has
been some time since we formally reviewed Pacific Bell's rate-ofreturn.

As the briefing papers prepared by the Committee reflect,

Pacific is now earning quite a healthy return.

We believe that to get

a plan like this started off in a way that would be fair to all parties
concerned, we should get a start-up revenue requirement that
reflects current reality before we start indexing or freezing rates.

A

rate freeze is no great benefit to residential customers, if a rate
decrease is what they are entitled to.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Bald?
MR. BALD:

Can we have a clarification from somebody?

Pete, can the PUC come back in under this proposal or are you
prevented from doing so?
MR. MCCALLION: Under GTE California's proposal, we
could not come back in for a general rate case or rate case filing.

We

would be allotted a certain among of dollars in which to operate, and
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we would have no floor on our rate-of-return by which we could
automatically come

m.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Under both these proposals, the
currently know it, would be eliminated.

traditional rate case, as

But each does have a safety clause in case conditions change.

MR. JAMISON:

That's not correct.

exceptions included in Pacific's plan.
changes.

There are three

One, major tax legislation

I would remind everybody that the last major tax

legislation resulted in tax decreases which were immediately flowed
through.

Second, major accounting ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What did I just say? That there

are provisions built in for when conditions change.
MR. JAMISON: The implication of the question, m my
v1ew, was not outside event such as tax law or accounting rule
changes, but was a change in business conditions.

A change in

business conditions is not something ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: "Circumstances beyond your
control"

IS

essentially what ...
MR. JAMISON:

Business conditions, in a sense, are

circumstances beyond the control of the business, and they have to
cope with them.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Not necessarily.
MR. JAMISON:

I want to make sure we're not mixing

those things up.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Federal taxes or are things
beyond your controL

Business usually takes the responsibility for

business conditionss, within its own purview.
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MR. JAMISON:
responsibility for that.

That is what we're proposing to do, take

In effect, shift regulatory risks to business

risks.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Hill?
ASSEMBLYMAN FRANK HILL: Maybe I could comment on
that last comment of Mr. Jamison, about taking that business risk.

It

seems to me there is no business risk when, for years, PacBell
promised that if we put all this infrastructure into place, we will see
a decrease in basic customer rates.

Now, what we're hearing, "We

will go ahead and take the risk, but to let us freeze rates.
pass that benefit onto the consumer.

We will give you touchtone

service which doesn't cost us anything.
area.

We won't

We will extend your ZUM

We will go from an 8-mile to a 12-mile.

Undo what we took

back a few years, when we went to ZUM.
It seems to me this is all about taking money that ought
to be passed on to the consumers, coming up with less of a regulatory
framework .

"We will no longer be looking at how much we're

paying people of the cost of service.

Just give us some more

flexibility so we can spend that money in a competitive marketplace,
and have the advantage of using the monpoly subsidy against other
private businesses."

I don't see how else you can justify what you're

trying to put together.
MR. JAMISON:

In fact since 1986, there have been $975

million in rate reductions, in Pacific's rate, in large measure reflecting
those very efficiencies that have already taken place.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL:
anything if it ought to be $2 billion.

24

$975 million doesn't tell me
We can argue about that, but

wasn't this whole proposal, this whole infrastructure sold on "We are
going to see these continued decreasing costs;" and now, "We are
that?"

walking away

MR. JAMISON:

The question of whether or not there will

be continued decreasing costs in the industry or specifically in Pacific
Bell needs to be put in context.

It is true that we have been able to

had good productivity increases in the last several years.
or not that can be continued

Whether

the future, I think, is a very open

question.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: AU right. Tell me why we should
go ahead and find out for two, or three, or four years that cost is
going to continue to decrease, and that cost should be passed on to
the consumer?

What is the downside?

MR. JAMISON:
by saymg,

Let's find out.

I believe that is what our proposal does

"Let's share based on actual outcomes."

We also included

in our proposal a provision to review the whole, complex mechanism
in 1992.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Why the proposal to freeze rates?
Why don't we go ahead and drop rates and pass those on to the
consumer, and see if those costs continue to drop?
MR. JAMISON:
already below costs.

In the first instance, residential rates are

If we are going to reduce rates, and there are

rate reductions pending through the surchange accounts that exist
today, I believe those rate reductions should come in toll rates, not
residential rates.

Beyond that, it's not clear where the future will go,

either from a competitive sense or from the continued productivity
that everybody likes to point to, that Pacific has achieved.
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By basing outcomes on actuals, by basing the return or
the sharing of benefits above a benchmark based on actuals, the
Commission will have every opportunity to examine how well this
proposal, which we believe puts more risk and more incentive on
Pacific, and works over the years.

We would never make a proposal

like this without including in it some opportunity for the Commission
to review how the process has been working.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Tell me why we shouldn't come at
it from another standpoint.

That is, if we are going to take -- I think

the whole issue here is cross-subsidy -- if we are going to take those
profits from the monopoly and use them in entrepreneural ventures.
I am thinking, as an example, of an issue I am involved with, the
Yellow Pages.

Some of the profits from the Yellow Pages go to keep

the rate base -- why don't we go ahead and say, let's take all those
profits from the Yellow Pages and put them into ... ?
you are arguing both ways.

It

seems to me

Why don't we take all those profits from

those entrepreneural ventures and use all of them to keep the rates
low?

After all, we're talking about a regulated monopoly.

Although

I guess you guys -- it seems to me that you want the benefits of a
regulated monpoly.

You want a guaranteed customer base, but you

also want to take some of those profits and compete out there.
MR. JAMISON: On the contrary Pacific is one of the few
parties that has proposed that new, network-related services be
included in the regulated accounts.

To the extent that those are

profitable, those services will, indeed, provide revenues to help keep
other rates low.

I would add that the DRA proposal is a mixed bag, in

effect saying, "Pacific, you bear the risk, but if you do well, share the
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reward of those new products."
keep all of the new

We object to that.

We're saymg

are related to the network in the

regulated accounts.
There is another
not those new products

here that transcends whether or
a reasonable life or not.

That is to the

extent you put those things off, separate and unregulated, or as we
call it in the industry, "below the line," you run the risk that services
will not be integrated, not
kind of discussions back

of the network. Had we had these
the 191O's, 1920's, people would have

argued that dial tone was an enhanced service and ought to be
regulated and put below the

If we had this discussion in 1964,

people would have argued that touchtone should have gone below
the line.

I would remind everybody that touchtone today provides

about $200 million of contribution to keep other rates low.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: The reality is, we are not talking
about getting involved in touchtone or dialtone service.

We're

talking about PacBell competing in cable television.
MR. JAMISON:
cable television.

No, we're not talking about competing in

PacBell has said repeatedly that it is not interested

m competing in cable T.V.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Then, tell me what the benefit to
the consumer in freezing rates and going to a fiber optic network.

Its

sole purpose has got to be to transmit video.
MR. JAMISON:

That is not the sole purpose of putting m

fiber.
ASSEMBLYMAN HILL: Tell me the sole purpose is.
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MR. JAMISON: If we put in fiber, we will put it in for
telecommunications purposes.

In fact, fiber is becoming, more

quickly than anybody anticipated, the economic choice for providing
It will become the medium of choice for

service to people's homes.

providing telecommunications services to our customers in the
future.

That future is coming very quickly.

Fber has unique

property, almost unlimited bandwidth capacity, depending upon the
electronics that you put on at each end.

If a cable company came to

us and said, "Would you carry our signal for us?"
do that on a contractual basis.
business.

we would want to

We would not be in the cable

We would do what we do best, and that is transport for

somebody else.

I believe the real issue that the cable people have

raised is that they today ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Don't keep dwelling on the cable
people.
MR. JAMESON: They keep dwelling on us.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We are looking at the Big Picture.
Remember, Mr. Jameson?

We are trying to get the "whole thing" on

what telecommunications ts.

Everybody will get their chance.

I am

going to let you stay up here with me and give you a chance to
refute.
Now, we are gomg to get through this first part of the
proceedings.

Terri, I think you pretty much said what the position of

the DRA is.

Does everybody want to have one little parting shot on

what it is that you're asking for?

Just a quick one sentence from

each of you, and then we are going to have the people who think
there is something wrong with what you're proposing or who like it.

28

MR. JAMISON:

We're asking for regulation that is more

suited the increasingly competitive environment while it recognizes
that environment and which contains the safeguards necessary to
ensure that all of our customers have access to the full range of
services that a modern information-age network can provide.
MS. MURRAY: I think what DRA is looking for much the
same thing, but accomplished in different ways -- making sure that
the starting point for the entire mechanism gives ratepayers a fair
opportunity to share the benefits of the information age, and not
avoiding the responsibility of effective regulatory oversight in our
zeal to adopt a new framework.
MR. MCCALLION:

I would have to echo the remarks of

both parties.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's safe.
MR. MCCALLION: Just add that what we are looking for is
a change in the way which local telephone companies are regulated,
to streamline the process.

We feel that the plan we have put forth

does provide adequate safeguards against some of the concerns that
Mr. Hill and other people have raised.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: In the next group, I'd like to hear

I

from Sylvia Siegal, AT&T, MCI, Bay Area Teleport, Dun and
Bradstreet.

We will have a revolving mike kind of thing.

don't you come closer to me?

Bruce, why

Don't be shy, come on up.

Ms. Siegal, would you come up and take
"resident" seats?
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one of our

MR. BALD: Mr. Jameson, is it part of Pacific's proposals to
raise business rates?

I can't find that in here in your prepared

statement.
MR. JAMISON:

We are proposing that those business

services that are currently priced below-cost should move towards
their costs, over time.

We have hewed to that very carefully in a

revenue shift that the Commission has already ordered.

That is they

are requiring that we lower the rates to long-distance companies that
they pay access to our network.

That revenue is to be shifted to

some other services, within the basket of services that we offer.
That forms the basis of those rate increases to businesses.

I would

stress again that there would be no net revenue increase for Pacific
Bell.
MR. BALD: I may try and ask it again. How many
business customers might be affected, and how soon, by what you
just described?
MR. JAMISON:

If the Commission approves the principle

I just described, there will be amptjer proceeding required, either
the "Supplemental Rate Design Proceeding" or Phase III.

My

expectation is that it might last through the remainder of 1989 or
into 1990.

At that point, assuming that everything led to an order

by the Commission, we would see gradual rate increases for basic
business rates over the next several years.

Our estimate, and agam,

it is risky to deal in averages, but over time, this would result in, at
most, a five percent per year increase to business customers.

I

hasten to add that this doesn't reflect the reductions they would see

30

because of the reduction to the long distance earners.
probably see reductions in

rates as welL

MR.
IS

They would

have been talking about how everybody

going to share in the productivity savings from the techno1ogies.

What I hear you saying is, everybody
MR. JAMISON:

going to share but business.

that's not true.

proposed that business rates should move up.
costs today.

They are not

those costs.

It is true we have
They are priced below
However, we have

also said that if we hit some benchmark rate-of-return or above,
then it is for the Commission to decide how that is shared.

We have

said, generally, that it should be spread across the customer base.

To

the extent that we hit that benchmark or above, we would share.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's move on. Tell General
Telephone, the PUC, and Pacific Bell, everything you ever wanted to
say, in one sentence or three.

Identify yourself for the record, and

then tell me what's wrong with what's being proposed or what's good
about it.
MR. ROBERT STECHERT: Thank you, Madam Chair and
Members of the Committee.

•

My name is Robert Stechert.

I'm vice

president of External Affairs for American Telephone and Telegraph
Company.

(Prepared Statement, see Attachment E).

We appreciate

the opportunity to be here today, and to address the question of
alternate regulation for the local exchange companies.
Let me say at the outset that we agree with the goals that
were set forth in the statement that you distributed in advance of
this hearing.

Those goals of regulation should continue to be the

same for the future as they are today.
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Let me also add that we

believe there may well be other mechanisms besides tradditional
cost-of-service regulation that will better serve those goals for the
local exchange companies.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you like their plan?
MR. STECHERT: We don't like this plan, however.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Now, wait a minute. That's a
little inconsistent.

Bruce is trying to figure out what you're saying.

MR. STECHERT: I think there are a number of aspects to
both Pacific'sand General's plan that do make sense and which should
be adopted.

However, there are some frailities with those plans,

about which we have considerable concern about.
First of all, we think that any alternative form of
regulation should insure that rates would be lower than they would
be under continued cost-of-service regulation.
will be the case under Pacific's plan.

We don't believe that

Indeed, for the access charges

that we interexhange carriers pay to Pacific and General Telephone,
we believe that our rates would likely be higher under the plan
proposed by Pacific than under continued cost-of-service regulation.
That means that the long-distance charges that we charge our
customers would also likely be higher than they would otherwise be,
because our customers would have to bear the cost of the access
charges that we pay to the local exchange company.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Everything in their program is
designed to be able to give you break.
problem with that.
problem is.

I think Ms. Siegal has a

Given that, I don't understand what your

If there is anybody that they are being good to, it would

appear that the long distance carriers are those people.
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MR. STECHERT: I don't think so. What they said is, they'll
downward flexibility

freeze existing rates at
from there with

to the access charges they charge us.

That

doesn't mean that those access charges wouldn't even be lower than
that if we continue under cost-service-regulation.

In fact, we believe

the expansion of the local calling area and the free provision of
touchtone service to local ratepayers, that the revenue that they are
I

giving up in doing

will be reflected in higher access charges to

the interexchange companies.

That means higher charges to our

customers for long-distance service.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, you think there won't be a
reduction?

There has to be some reduction in the long-distance

service.
MR. STECHERT:
Chairwoman, as
current

will be reductions, Madam

as there would be if we continued under the

arrangement.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But you still take a risk. You

don't know what those costs would be, because you only get what
perceived.

•

IS

Even, if it were demonstrated in a regular rate case, they

can still retain it in the same manner.

So, there is no guarantee

either way.
MR. STECHERT: There's no guarantee, but we believe the
risks are greater under the plan that Pacific proposes than under the
current

arrangement.
Secondly, Pacific's plan would share access earnmgs with

ratepayers.

But they limit that sharing to local exchange customers,

not the interexchange carriers who pay access charges.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You are already getting a
discount.

So, why do you want to get greedy?
MR. STECHERT: We are not getting a discount. In fact, we

are paying more for access charges than the cost of providing those
services to us.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, you will. You have been
getting a gradual reductions every year.

I mean, don't give me that.

MR. STECHERT: Only for part of the access charges that
we pay.

There are a whole series of access charges that we pay to

the local exchange companies.

Only some of them are coming down

and they are not at costs or even close to costs at this point.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Just like your said, some of the
services have to pay to subsidize other things.
MR. STECHERT: We don't believe that is necessary. We
believe the services could be cost based.

Long distance ratepayers,

people who make calls long-fdistance within the state, ought to pay
cost based rates, as should local exchange customers.

We don't think

it is fair to limit the sharing to loca] customers and deny those same
benefits to long-distance customers.
Finally as far as Pacific's plan is concerned, we don't
believe it contains requisite safeguards to ensure against crosssubsidization of competitive ventures in which Pacific might engage,
with revenues obtained from the provision of monopoly services.
We think the plan should be revised to ensure that there is adequate
safeguards to prevent that kind of inappropriate cross-subsidization.
As far as General Telephone's plan is concerned, we
believe it is better than Pacific's, that is moves rates more towards
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costs.

there are frailities with General

But agam, we

monopoly services that

Telephone's plan.

which are included under its so-called,

General Telephone

services.

"Category

In conclusion, DRA's plan comes closer to providing an
alternate scheme of regulation that we could support.
DRA's plan is unusually

However,

If we are going to investigate an

alternate form of regulation, one of the principal factors of such a
plan should be to

regulation and get away from the
delays that exist under cost-of-service

regulatory inefficencies

think that DRA's plan will make much

regulation today.

progress towards that kind of reform.
considerable changes if it

We think it needs some

to be adopted.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Why don't we go to
MCI?

Don't repeat anything that AT&T has said.

something you want to

then feel

If there is

to do so.

MR. STEPHEN P. BOWEN: Thank you, Madam Chair. My
name ts Steve Bowen.
attorney.

I work for MCI in Washington.

I am a senior

(Prepared Statement, see Attachment F).
Generally, we agree with the points that AT&T has made

this mornmg.

I would add a couple of things that were not

addressed in AT&T's statement here or in their testimony in the case
before the PUC.
First of all, no one has mentioned that the purported
benefits to interexhange carriers, reduced access charges realized
through increases in business rates, are entirely independent of their
plan as it stands.

Those reductions m access charges were awarded
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by the Commission before either Pacific or GTE filed their plans.
There is really no reason for either local exchange company to claim
credit for lowered access charges to interexchange carriers.
Second, without going back over points Mr. Stechert just
made, I would suggest to this Committee that every one of the goals
that both Pacific and GTE has spouted in this case can be
accomplished by a less radical means than proposed in their plans.
What's missing in both Pacific's and GTE's plans is the recognition
that we have to get back to basics in the regulation of local exchange
companies.

We have to get back to looking at where is the

bottleneck?

We all know it is there some place.

bottleneck.

What services use it, and how do you regulate a

Where is the

company with one foot in the monopoly world and one foot in a
world which has become competitive?

That's a very difficult task to

undertake.
I would suggest that the solution is not, as both Pacific
and GTE propose; to simply walk away from regulation as it stood m
the past.

MCI believes there are aspects of that regulation which

have not worked very well.
rate cases work very well.

We don't suggest that three or four year
But there are ways to refine that process,

far short of the walking-away proposed by Pacific and GTE.
We also concur with the statements of Mr. Hill:

Both

Pacific and GTE face significantly declining costs.
(INTERRUPTION: COMMITTEE ACTION ON AB 901)
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Go ahead.
MR. BOWEN:

I was addressing the question of whether

the costs of local exchanges are declining or not, and if they will
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We believe, based on our knowledge

continue to do so in the
of how

a substantial

are

both for switching and

likelihood that
for trunking.

to us

not

both local exchange
regulation at a time when we

companies propose to
costs.

think they will

I think it

anybody would do,

something that

so.
that the Commission's order

Our
of things in this case

"the

Local exchange

before the horse."

for flexibility to price services

when there is no

The

doing so would be to

allow the local exchange companies to lock in, through pricing plans
and price flexibility and so

the very same customers who

would most benefit

introduced properly.

We think

it is very important for

Commission to recognize the proper

timing that is required

and to not grant flexibility to local

exchange companies for pricing services and in advance of opening
up the LATA's to competition and the benefits it could bring.
I was little bit disappointed during the case and during
the briefs m the case to hear that there were "three plans out there."
There are, in fact, more than three plans.

MCI has a plan which,

while we don't call it anything fancy like "CPRS," is an attempt to
address the need change regulation.

We believe that the important

thing the Commission should do right now is to look at what people
call "rate design" issues.

How do you prevent local exchange

companies from cross-subsidizing services, which they claim are
competitive, with monopoly revenues?
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It is a great difficult task.

The kinds of tools that are available are cumbersome, and little used.
Costing has been the chiefone.

People hate costing.

The

Commission's eyes glaze over when you mention the word "costing,"
let alone the eyes of people who don't do this for a living.

We have

tried to come up with a solution which we believe is effective and
simple.
Our solution would require that you look behind the
tariffs of local exchange compames.

Look at the pieces that make up

their network; that is, the building blocks.

Those are far fewer in

number than the actual tariff items: You've got a loop, you've got a
switch, and so forth.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why do you want to dictate how
the locals -- I mean, what's in it for you?
MR. BOWEN: What's in it for us is a desire to compete on
a fair basis.

We have no problem at all with competiting head-to-

head against anyone under appropriate and fair rules.
the rules will not likely be fair.

Right now,

The plan that we proposed is

designed to address that unfairness.

If you are a carrier like MCI

that basically buys at wholesale, being asked to compete with the
retailers, the local exchange companies, is not fair and should not be
allowed.

The retailers can pay less for the same service that we have

to buy and they can charge us to buy that service.

We're trying to

make sure that everybody pays the same thing for the necessary
bottleneck, monopoly input, which is switched access in the case of
toll service.
The way it works is that everybody pays the same
charge, whether you are MCI, AT&T, GTE or Pacific.
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That particular

situation does not now exist in California.
serious potential
easy, when

as "price squeezes."

It is very

the service from Pacific and GTE, for

to

them to squeeze

Until it does, there is a

retail rates and our wholesale

between

rates of access.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: AU right Why don't we hear
from Bay Area Teleport?

•

In a couple of sentences, give me your

concerns.
MR. LARRY KAMER: Thank you, Madam Chair and
Members of the Committee.

My name is Larry Kamer.

I'm

representing Bay Area Teleport.
Bay Area Teleport

a private provider of high-speed

digital network services operating in 11 counties in Northern
California.
The concerns we have raised before the Commission have
been echoed in part

the DRA, AT&T and MCI with regard to the

safeguards we believe must be imposed before any kind of rate
flexibility is granted.

We have been quite aggressive in pursmng

those safeguards at the Commission.

•

I'd like to look more to the future and see if I can lay out
a couple of new thoughts.
The existence of our firm suggests that the increasingly
sophisticated needs of business and government have given rise to
the large number of metropolitan area providers around the country,
all privately funded, to meet these needs.

We are quite concerned,

obviously, that the flow of capital which is now available to those
private networks will be reduced if the risks are judged to be too
39

great for investing in that area.

We're hoping that the Legislature

and the Commission do not propose or promote policies which gives
undue, advantage to monopoly providers in those services.
What do we think the Legislature ought to do?

We

believe that the concerns that have been raised by Assembly
Members Hill, Wright and Nolan of this Committee, and many, many
others in the Legislature on both sides of the aisle who have written
to Commissioner Wilk about this case, are absolutely on target,
raising legislative concerns about the possibilities of cross-subsidy
and anti-competitive behavior as a result of this case.
But beyond that, the Legislature needs to continue
looking at the way the Commission handles cases.

We're not faulting

any individuals or any organizations for promoting their causes and
views, under the rules, as aggressively as they can.

We do think that

in the long-run we need to have effective review, judicial review, of
the CPUC decisions.
Assembly Bill 338.

That is why we support Assemblyman Floyd's
We believe that, at some point, ex parte contacts

have to go, which is why we support Senator Rosenthal's SB 1125.
We believe that new legislation is called for to require the
Commission to identify substantial evidence as the basis of its
findings and facts of its decision.
338.

We proposed an amendment to AB

It doesn't look like that is going to happen this year, but we do

think that it is a legitimate interest for this Committee and other
legislators.

With that, I'll stop.

I have provided you with a written

summary of our remarks. (See Attachment G).
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right. Let's hear from Ms.
Siegal.

40

MS. SYLVIA SIEGAL: Thank you, Madam Chair and
executive director of TURN

Members of the

, on behalf of residential and

[Toward Utility
small business customers.
As I

here listening to all of the testimonies, there are

common threats and common objections.

I guess it is up to TURN to

provide the proper solution, and I'm happy to do that.
For your information, Committee members, TURN has
been overly active.

I never see our hard-working telephone

attorney, sitting there in the audience.

We have been overly active

m our -- sometimes I want to put a "b" in front of it -- and COP, in

the new enhanced program that is coming up.

In the AT&T case, we

have just appealed to the California Supreme Court, because we don't
believe in that kind of flexibility that gives them carte blanche. In
the special contract proceeding, workshops under the supervision of
the PUC can go on interminably.

•

modernization settlement.

We have been active m

We objected strenuously to DRA's

settlement on this very important and costly issue.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I am not going to let DRA get

•

away with that, and I will come back to that at some point.
MS. SIEGAL: We don't let DRA get away with much, but
sometimes they do.

After all, there are more of them than there are

of us.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay.
MS. SIEGAL:

Basic to all the testimonies I have heard

today, are pleadings for cost studies.
that before we

In our testimony, we proposed

anything, there should be a stand-alone cost study
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of the telephone system.

Once and for all we can determine what, if

any, subsidies flow from basic exchange customers to enhanced
services, to long-distance

-- to any of the other vertical services

currently in effect and being proposed.

Without this study, you're

just shooting in the dark, and you are shooting away our money
present and future.
Mr. Hill is gone, but if you are listening on the squawk
box, Frank Hill, you are absolutely right.
industry.

It is still a decreasing-cost

Particularly in the economic environment of California,

which assures continued growth of population and a fantastic growth
in traffic, PacBell and a11 the other telcos [telephone companies] in
the state can do nothing but make money.

The question is, how

much and how should they share?
Frankly, I'm not willing to share with PacBell, or General,
or any of the telcos their "excess profits."

As has been mentioned

since divestiture, PacBell and General have earned tremendous
profits.

Since divestiture they have had to give back around $800

million because of excess earmngs.

I see no reason for them to share

in excess earnings when customers are entitled to have it all
returned -- 100 percent, not 50 percent.

You're earning it because

the unlimited capacity the customers have paid for, the
intrastructure, is allowing you to exploit new services and heavier
traffic.
The truth is, Members of the Committee, that neither
fiber optics or digital switchers are really required to transmit voice
communication.

That can be done even with crossbar switches,

which we have in some of the rural areas.
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But PacBell is asking for

another huge down-payment

the customers, the venture

capitalists of

They are asking for

another huge

$640 to $750 million, for modernizing the rest of

California in order to allow the telco both to connect and to exploit
present and future information products.
There is no question that PacBell is on the brink on a
great information
is, do we need it

question in the customer's mind
I now?

don't need it all now.
poco, "little by little."

I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that we

We ought to go, as they say in Italy, poco a
Implement whatever it is based on economic

studies, on studies of

services, on the outside field

of what customers would want to buy.
In the packet you have an article that is very telling,
from the WaH Street Journal, indicating the hot prospects of the New
Jersey Bell Company.

I heard the chairman there testify the other

day, on cable television that they had 20 new products.

But then, a

couple of days later, I read that the saturation level is only 2.4
percent for the total package of 20 new products.

That indicates to

me that the customers are really not so hot for all of these new
I

products.
I don't want to be a wet blanket.

The telcos accuse me of

being a wart on the wheel of progress or worst things or whatever.
It tain't true.
I just want to point out to you that, for example,
customers in France were given monitors provided by the state
telcos to access whatever enhanced services the Minitel wanted to
bring on line.

Their saturation level isn't as great as it should be.
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I

think there is a lot in the marketplace right now, coming on line or
maybe developing, that we ought to look at closely.

We ought to look

at it carefully before we pull even one little string in terms of
regulation.
Now, I'm the one who's always yakking.
say something else, but I respect this forum.

I was going to

I'm the one who's

always yakking about regulation and how weak it is in California,
and believe me, it is getting weaker.

In spite of that, I don't think

this is the time to pull the string on regulation.
time to improve it, and I think we can.

I think this is the

The complaints you hear

about three-year rate cases are not the fault of the participants,
except the telcos who feel compelled everytime somebody challenges
a piece of their testimony to offer four or five more witnesses that
will take another two to three months to hear and examine.
kind of nonsense has to stop.

That

I think there are ways of limiting

fairly any excess that the parties project.

I think we have a

marvelous staff of administrative law judges who can control the
proceedings.

I think they ought to be permitted to do so.
I think some of the proposals that has been put forth

miss a lot of other problems that have not been solved and should be
looked at immediately.

One of them is the business about SPF to SLU,

which is strictly an arbitrary measure based upon arbitration ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's go back to this proceeding.
MS. SIEGAL:

I think we ought to reinvestigate the whole

SPF to SLU access charge which is adding cost to basic exchange
customers.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You're saying that there are still
some problems
are a

MS.

of problems that need

regulatory
The

a very senous one.

a basic cost study of stand-

you can't get anywhere
alone local service.
problems.

That

But

Then

can start addressing these other

to come first

That's the absolute predicate.

Thank you.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Don't go away. Let's go to the
next.

Dun and Bradstreet?
MR. JOHN P. MACDONALD: Thank you, good afternoon.

I'm John P. MacDonald, vice president and associate general counsel
for the Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, a Dun and Bradstreet
company. [Prepared
It

Attachment H].
understanding

focus of this hearing is on

the adequacy of telecommunications regulation, with a particular
concern for proceedings currently underway before the California
Public Utilities Commission.

We are participants in both the

Alternative Regulatory Framework proceeding and the Enhanced
Services proceedings.

We also have formal and informal complaints

pending before the Public Utilities Commission, and have opposed
specific telco bills and market test filings before the Federal
Communication Commission [FCC]
In each of these proceedings, we have expressed the
same concerns.

The holder of the local exchange monpoly franchise

has both the ability and the economic incentive to leverage its
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monopoly power into adjacent competitive markets.

Absent

legislative enactment authorizing an enlargement of the telephone
company monopoly franchise, such expansion of monopoly power
should be aggressively denied.
The divestiture of AT&T addressed the monopoly power
that AT&T possessed ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I'm not going to let you read.
Why don't you just give me the things that are of concern to you?

I

think Mr. Hill touched a little bit on it when he got to the Yellow
Pages.

We are trying to get a synoposis of what your concerns are

the future, and what impact that has on your business in particular.
MR. MCDONALD: Given the changes that are occuring in
telecommunications, we see the need for increased regulation, not
decreased.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why?
MR. MCDONALD:

The ability to cross-subsidize from one

business to another and the innerconnection of the business
themselves.

We have talked before about the ability of the

telephone company to deny access or control product development.
All of those things become more integrated in today's world.

To turn

a regulated monopoly loose, on what otherwise are competitive
businesses, it just asking for trouble.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. I apologize to you for
commg up and not getting the full benefit of your testimony, but I do
want to give everybody a chance to talk.

Although you have not had

a long opportunity to speak, if you have written testimony, I want to
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encourage you leave it and it will be published m its entirety m the
transcript.
I am

at responding to
sentences.

(DRA, PacBell & GTE) a shot

to

said, but you only have four

has

There has been an awful

I want to hear a little

said.

bit of rebuttal, but not a lot.
MR. JAMISON:
I

seeking deregulation.

In three sentences.

First, we aren't

We are seeking a change in regulation.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Isn't it funny that everybody in

this room believes that you are?
MR. JAMISON:

Well, I would suggest that they read our

proposal.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You think they haven't?
MR. JAMISON:

I think they have mischaracterized it.

(These responses don't count as my three sentences.)
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: AH right. Touch'e!

•

MR. JAMISON:
to do it "little by little."

Secondly, Ms. Siegal talked about the need

I would suggest that replacing switching

machines that are 40 or 50 years old is doing it very little by little.
Third, people have recommended "Let's not have any
flexibility for Pacific before we have entry."

I would point out that,

our proposal said, we want the principle flexibility adopted.

Any

specific flexibility for services, such as toll, would await a separate
application or would become part of the Supplemental Rate Design or
Phase II proceeding in this case.

I think that is an unfounded

concern on the part of MCI.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's hear from General
Telephone.

Do you want to make a comment?
MR. MCCALLION: It will be very short. I also want to

reiterate and respond to the gentleman from MCI:

We not proposing

a walk way from regulation, but rather to change regulation.
hearing those remarks over and over again.

I keep

I know the parties who

are making them just don't understand our plan or are deliberately
trying to create a misrepresentation of our plan.
A couple of the other points were brought up relative to
targeting our sharing to particular customers.

The reason we did

that was to make sure that our end users benefit from efficiency
gams.

It wasn't to deny a benefit to AT&T, but rather to make sure

that the end users in fact get the benefit, and also to somewhat
cushion the impact to our local residential and business customers of
long-distance rate reductions that are going on today (as Ms. Siegal
and Mr. Stechert talked about, relative to SPIF to SLU).

Its was

definitely by design to make sure the end users did receive those
benefits.
MS. MURRAY: Just a quick word about the chargs of
"fairness to the ratepayers" and "complexity."

We have tried to

balance those competing needs, giving our priority to the ratepayers'
interest, but recognizing the need for a streamlined regulatory
process.

We think we have done it correctly.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask the DRA, do you

consider what PacBeH and General Telephone propose as aspects of
deregulation?
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MS. MURRAY:

Not deregulation in the sense that they
Obviously perhaps

would

General plan, they drastically

more so the

believe that is going a

reduce the
little further or,

a

some

we're comfortable

further down that path than

our proposal.
So,

CHAIRWOMAN

would call it restricted or

limited
called it,

MURRAY:

our brief, "trust me"

regulation.
Obviously this group at the table

CHAIRWOMAN
doesn't.

me two sentences about what you think

Ms.
of DRA's proposaL
MS. SIEGAL:
to say.

Not much.

I'll

more when I have more

I think that summarizes

t

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You can bank your sentences.
All right, let's hear from the next groups of witnesses.
redundant.

If there is something that has already been said, just say

they speak for you.

Hopefully, we will have a chance for a little

exchange for this group.
attacked.

Don't be

I will save cable for last since it has been

You will have a little more time.
MS. DIANE MARTINEZ: I'm Diane Martinez with API

Alarm Systems. [Prepared Statement, see Attachment I].
Our view on this subject is fairly simple, believe it or not.
We believe that the Alternative Regulatory Framework proceedings
are a solution to something that seems not to be a problem.
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Right

now, the phone companies are saying that they need to have this
new regulatory framework so that they can operate, but their stocks
are up, their costs are done, their earnings are at a all-time high, and
it is real difficult to see what the problems are unless you look at

their a solution to the nonexistent problem.
In their version of a solution, they go out there and
compete, but they still want to hold on to those traditional things
that protect them from evil competition.

Things such as limited

They don't want deregulation, but they want to be

liability.

detariffed.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You've said that the impact on
the alarm system would make it almost prohibitive for you to
provide your service.
MS. MARTINEZ:

Absolutely.

They have consistently

asked for 100 percent increases on our services without even
beginning to prove that are below costs, as they allege.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You would be concerned about a
system that would not allow some input

That 's what this this

"trust-me" system would do.
MS. MARTINEZ:

Absolutely.

API currently has litigation

against both companies because the companies have told us to trust
them on their billing systems, and trusting them has just not worked
out.
today.

We have the litigation to prove it.

We have brought our briefs

They are very simple, easy to read, and they bring up some

very relevant points.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We will include them as a part of
the record.

All right.

Let's move on to the next witness.
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MR. PETER HOWLEY: Good afternoon. Peter Howley,
president of

Telemanagement,

I think I need about five

[Prepare Statement, see Attachment J].

sentences, Madam

something different from any other company here.
We are a management service company serving small businesses,
5,000 small businesses in California.
for them.

•

We

We are a single point of contact

to make their lives easy and telecommunications

productive .
We have made four proposals to the PUC that are critical
if the interest of small businesses -- and we all understand the role
they play in California and the economy -- if the interest of small
businesses are to be protected under any scheme that comes out of
the current regulatory hearing.

I'd like to review the four with one

sentence on each.
First, The local exchange company services must be
available on a nondiscriminatory basis, whether they are ordered by
an individual customer or by a management company like ourselves.
The services offered by the local exchange company must be offered
to all interested users whether they are big companies or little
companies.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you think that is not the case
now?
MR. HOWLEY:

Yes. that's correct.

I'm more concerned

about what will take place going forward than I am about today.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's just stop right now and let's
ask them:

Is it your attention in the future to discriminate against

businesses, whether they are big or small?
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MR. JAMISON: No.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: General Telephone?
MR. MCCALLION: No.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: They say "no." Why do you think
they would?
MR. HOWLEY: Let me hit my other three points and I will
come back to the original point.
Second, before flexibility of any nature is put in place, an
effective, timely, less costly complaint procedure must be put in
place at the Commission.

Centex has proposed that a workshop be

held to draw up the guidelines for such a procedure.
procedure penalizes small businesses.

Currently, the

Under any scheme that it has

more flexibility, that will be even more the case for small businesses.
Third, make every element of the local exchange network
available to the maximum extent technically possible, down to the
smallest component.

In effect, unbundle those services down to the

smallest degree based on the needs of customers, not on the desire,
whim, or needs of the utility or of large compames.

Unbundleto the

maximum extent technically possible.
And lastly, create procedures m the Alternate Regulatory
Framework hearing for cost-based pricing.
The reason I have those four points ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If you go to cost-based pricing,
they are telling us, small business are really going to take it on the

au.
MR. HOWLEY: We don't know if that is true or not
without a procedure.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How about the study that Ms.
Siegal is advocating?
MR. HOWLEY:

possible.

But, without the procedures

and safeguards that allow a
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But. if you don't know how much
it costs to begin with, no amount of procedures are going to make a

difference.

Are they?
MR. HOWLEY: You do need to determine the cost to begin

with, abso1utely.

That is the point of having safeguards in place, so

there is a means to determine how the cost was arrived at and to
assure that it was fairly arrived at.
Let me answer your original question, if I may.
realities today are driven by competition.

All of the

When you say

competition, you are really talking about big companies.

It isn't

purposely discriminatory against the smaller companies as much as
accidentally discriminatory, in the sense that the telephone
companies' focus is on protecting their business against bypass and
similar concerns.

Therefore, they tend to ignore smaller businesses.

We feel those four items are critical as safeguards to protect the

•

small businesses' interest in California .
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Fellows and Ms.
Siegal, I hope you take note of those four, because I would like you
to comment on them.
MR. ED PEREZ: Madam Chairwoman, Ed Perez, City
Attorney for the City of Los Angeles.

I'd like the opportunity to

submit a written statement in the future.
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I want to address one point that was not addressed
today. It is a legal issue.

Being a lawyer, I feel compelled to raise it.

That is, as a matter of law, the Commission can not adopt any one of
these plans.
The California Legislature, when it created the Public
Utilities Code, mandated that the Commission set just and reasonable
rates after hearings.

Nothing in that code allows the utilities to set

them without a hearing.
without further study.

We believe that nothing should be done

And, if the Commission does adopt one of

these plans, we will seek our remedy before the California Supreme
Court. (Prepared Statement, See Attachment K].
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask, are you going to sue?
MR. PEREZ: I don't know if "suing" is the right term, but
we are going to file a petition for review.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Assemblyman Murray looks like

he might sue.
MR. PEREZ: Well, we will see him in court.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right, go ahead.
MR. DENNIS LOVE: Madam Chairwoman, I'm Dennis Love,
president of the Extension Connection.

We have been involved in the

Oil 84 and related matters at the Public Utilities Commission.
The Extension Connection filed a complaint back in
November of '86 alleging that the utility companies were in violation
of federal and state antitrust laws, and were acting in anticompetitive fashion towards the competition.
so.

We still believe that is

There have been continuing efforts by the utilities to interfere

with our particular business.

We are the guys in the pits.
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We are

the maintenance crew.

We are the technicians that go out and do the
it funny that our

inside

I

phone numbers

or left out completely m

Pacific Bell and

over

last three years since

deregulation of the telephone

took place.

Yell ow Pages book that is sitting here, I have a

In

little thing I'd like to read real quick, and then I will get to the bigger
picture.
"Have a question about your telephone service?
something done?

Want

Can your telephone business office and ask your

service representative.

He will be glad to help you."

Can I get one of

those in there that says, "Call your Extension Connection service
representative, who will be glad to help you"? There are numerous
ads similiar to this throughout this book and every book in the state
of California where the utilities are putting free advertisements for
deregulated services and cross-subsidizing their own services.
don't have to look far, open your Yellow Pages.

You

It is all around.

The

time is not ripe for more deregulation.
We're looking at utilities talking about taking risks.

We

created utilities originally because it was economically unfeasible for
a number of companies to enter the telephone market and supply
wire, switches, and everything else throughout the entire state.
That's what a utility is.
community.

It's the company that does that for the

We're talking about utility companies taking risks?

That is not what we want for the people of this state, our utility
taking risks.

We want the basic nuts and bolts covered by the Public

Utilities Commission and the legislators of the state, making sure that
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we get what we're paymg for.

All of these special services that are

being brought up because of our technology. those things are open to
competition.
bedroom.

You can not put competition and regulation in the same

If you

do, somebody is going to start messing around.

That is what we have going on here.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I am not going to let yours go
unanswered, because I'm sure they are going to respond to your
comments.

They are not going to mess around, I'll tell you.
MR. ZACHERY PA VLIDES: I am Zachery Pavlides. In

1978, I founded the Talking Yell ow Pages, which supposedly was the
first in the nation.
Pacific Bell refuse dto give me service, and I had to go to
the court to get it.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: They refused to give you service
because they felt you were competition.

Is that what you're telling

me?
MR. PA VLIDES:

That's correct.

After a settlement, which

terms I am not in position to disclose due to confidentiality, I had to
file a new lawsuit m 1988 which is now pending in Superior Court m
San Francisco.

They show conspiracy in the Supreme Court here.

These people address the financial issue of Pacific Bell
and deregulation.

This is a different issue.

Pacific management is

not to be trusted.

They are acting criminally.

They have with me.

The position shown by their president of the Yellow Pages, who said
Judge Greene allows them to stop the Talking Yellow Pages.

With

this kind of behavior and people, I don't think there is a flat level
field to play with.

That's all I have to say.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's go to the next witness.
MR. HARRY SCHWEDOCK: My name

Harry Schwedock,

and I'm vice president and chief operating officer of Amvox,
Incorporated.

Amvox is a nationwide voice-mail provider that has

been in business for about two years.

We have 41,000 subscribers, a

little less than half of them in California.

[Prepared Statement, see

Attachment L].
I

We currently have a complaint pending before the CPUC
with respect to what we consider to be anti-competitive monopoly
abuses on the part of Pacific Bell's voice-mail activities.
interesting that they have been

It is

the business for just two months

and, as far as we are concerned, they are already engaging in
competitive activities.

It seems likely to us that Pacific Bell is gomg

to defend this on the basis of the fact they are buying services from
Pacific Bell, just like any other voice-mail company has to buy
services from Pacific Bell.

There

only one significant difference,

and the Bay Area Teleport mentioned it a little bit earlier.

The

difference is that when Amvox or any other voice-mail company
buys services, someone has to sign a check.

•

When Pacific Bell voice-

mail buys services from Pacific Bell, nobody stgns a check.
bookkeeping transaction may take place.

A

Now, I say "may," because

one of the things that led to the breakup of AT&T was the fact, which
the FCC essentially admitted, that cost accounting really, didn't work
as a method of regulation.
I've heard from the chairman,

"Well, this is the new

telephone company.

This is not the old Bell system.

changed his spots."

If we buy that, then we deserve what we get.
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The Jeopard has

In the years since deregulation, Pacific has been required
by the PUC to refund several hundreds of millions of dollars for over
aggressive marketing practices, unwise investments, and essentially
overcharging for service.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Since it is something that
continues to come up:

In the current proceeding, if there is some

question about your marketing, can that be looked at in an off-year,
during the rate freeze?
MR. JAMISON: Yes. In fact, that kind of issue that was
raised in the marketing-practices portion of the ratecase is exactly
the kind of thing that a normal complaint process or investigatory
process at the Commission would likely uncover.

Appropriate action

could be taken, of course.
MS. SIEGAL:

However, the burden of proof is on the

complainant, not on the company.

It is pretty darn hard to dig out

that information.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's the point that I wanted
made. Okay. Go ahead.
MR. SCHWEDOCK: The underlying purpose of these
hearings, I presume, is what is in the public interest.

I don't think

too many people would disagree that deregulation in the airline
industry has resulted in choice, higher fares, and poor service.
Deregulation in the banking industry has resulted in bail-out's that
are going to cost the taxpayers of this country several hundreds of
billions of dollars.
deregulation.

You can calJ it flexible regulation.

You can call it

You can call it by whatever euphemisms you want.

What the telephone companies in California are looking for is less
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oversight.

There are no two ways to slice that.
lack

concerned about is
you

What we're

oversight.
a competitor to whom you pay over 35

percent of your revenues (and Amvox indeed pays over 35 percent
of its revenues to the telephone company) when you have a
raise capital, when you have a

competitor who has no need

competitor who has more lawyers than we have employees, and
when you have a competitor that has a long record of anticompetitive abuses, we worry.

We worry about that competitor

using the multitude of advantages that they gained from their
monopoly position to dominate an emerging competitive market.
If the telephone company wants to enter competitive
markets, if that is what they want to do, then let them do it.
should be allowed to do it.

But,

circumstances as everyone does.
do it, not use ratepayer

They

them do it under the same
Let them go out and find money to

to

it.

Let them set up separate

subsidiaries so we can at least reduce the potential for crosssubsidization.

Give the PUC at least the chance to find it.

If they

dominate a market, if they end up dominating the a new market, let
it be because they provided better service, not because they had
more lawyers or more accountants and could out last any other
competitors in either the courts or the CPUC.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right.
MR. PA VLIDES: I have one more item.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: One sentence.
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MR. PAVLIDES: Pacific Bell for 13 years, they were
selling to the public a service that they didn't have, and they knew
about it.

I have sworn statements with me.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: There is a procedure to address

that, though.

Let's hear from Jim Martin and then to the cable

industry.
MR. JIM MARTIN:
the Committee.

Madam Chairwoman and Members of

I'm Jim Martin, regional director of the Western

Region of the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People].

I am here in these hearings today because the

NAACP clearly perceives a very urgent need for our constituency to
be heard, represented, and involved in the issues of
telecommunications.

We are very clear that as the technology

evolves and changes the society we live in, there are significant risks
and we must contemplate methods to deal with them.

Particularly in

an industry and generally moves rather slowly when it comes to the
kinds of changes needed to keep all the people in their various
communities and constituencies current with the changing times.
Discussion has centered around regulation.
the industry is clearly something that is needed.

Regulation of

I, as a former

utility employee in the telecommunications environment for
approximately 20 years, know that the corporation doesn't
necessarily seek to meet the needs of the people and keep the people
well informed, unless they need to manage an issue or to get
something for it.
We will be involved with this issue.

We will seek

communications with the industry and this Committee to a much
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that, should the telecommunications

greater degree.

lifted, we would see a

regulation we
greater jeopardy to
I might
in my regiOn.

that I represent.
we represent nine western states and Japan

I have approximately 150 branches.

We service over

3 million Black citizens and a broad range of low-income and other
people of color throughout this region.

•

telecommunications

I have approximately 121

in our region,

we are beginning in

California since over approximately 65 percent our constituency is in
this state.

We will

involved.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you very much for your
comments.

Let's hear from Sprint.
MR. DENNIS LOPER: We have to submit our testimony in

writing for Sprint due to the fact

Pongrancz was not available.

[See Attachment M].
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. Good enough. The Center
for Public Interest Law, are they still around?

No?

Okay, then we

will hear from Nick, and then to Spencer, and then we will give
everybody on my side of the table a chance for concluding remarks.

•

MR. NICK SELBY: Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman,
my name is Nick Selby appearing for the Information Providers
Association (IPA).

IPA consists of information providers who deliver

information and entertainment services via the telephone; relying
primarily upon the billing and collection services of the local
exchange carriers.
In brief, our concern is that there are already stgns that
the local exchange carriers intend to use their bottleneck control over
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billing and collection services to influence and control the amount of
content and information that will be available to the marketplace.
Pacific Bell, this week, filed document with the Public Utilities
Commission which said that as a private company it was not required
to provide any due process before it disconnected an information
provider.

There will be a need for continued regulation in the future

to ensure that this bottleneck monopoly, this control over basic
billing and collection services, is not used by Pacific and General to
favor their own information services which we know are coming
down the road.

Thank you.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Let hear from the
California Cable Television Association.

Those are great charts.

I am

sorry they weren't up earlier.
MR. SPENCER KAITZ: Madam Chair, I will be brief
because I know you don't want repetition, but I thought these charts
would be helpful to the Committee because they are in detail.

[See

Attachment N].
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The people can't see them.
MR. KAITZ:

I have copies that I will be glad to make

available to all parties.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, go ahead.
MR. KAITZ:

The charts illustrate what is really at stake

here,Madam Chair and Members.
understand.

The rate case is something that we

It provides for cross-examination of witnesses and

discovery of evidence.

What Pacific has proposed has been

characterized by one of their executives as "oversight capability."
don't think any of us fully understand what oversight capability
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I

means, but what we think it means (based on most of what we have
been able to

we

what we have under that proposal

characterize

competitors by schmoozing.

ratemaking and
been called "touchy-feely"

IS

It has also

on.

We all get together at a workshop,
and there is a little information
now view much,

If I may

on the chart.

a room, and we talk,

by Pacific, not very much.

They

not most, of their information as proprietary

because they have gone into competitive businesses.

Therefore, the

basic information that Sylvia and others need to evaluate their cases
is not longer available without the enormous expense of discovery;
and then often not available either.
From the standpoint of competitors, I would characterize
this as the classic 900-pound-goriHa-versus-canary syndrome.

What

I find interesting is that Pacific, under their proposal, wants to make
sure they only have one canary at a time to stomp on.

The only

remedy that a competitor would have, to deal with subsidy
problems, would be to file a complaint.

This isolates them from the

other parties that used to be in the rate case as a group, and forces
them to bear all the costs of going through discovery, perhaps -- or
perhaps not -- with support from DRA.

For any small businesses,

this eliminates any effective review of whether subsidy exists.
This leads me to the basic question that we have about
this.

Many questions that have been raised:

business or

it fair to small business?

its voice-mail services, data services?

Is this unfair to small

Is there subsidy by Pacific of
Are they creating a subsidy

situation ultimately for going into video transport for cable
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television?

is the $700 million plus proposal for fiber, $400 in the

four years of the proceeding, cost justified?
the rate case was designed to find out.

Those are the questions

The only way you can answer

those questions is look at their business and their business records.
Now, all of the elements that allowed anyone to do that under any
reasonable cost scenario are being stripped away.
Everybody who is concerned about the Pacific and
General plans is arguing for doing this carefully.

In a worst case

scenario, if the PUC really trashed Pacific's proposal, all they would
get to do is sit back and make $2.5 billion a year for the next few
years, and sulk about how badly they were treated by the Committee
and the California PUC.

This would be a situation where they could

not do anything other than continue to ride in their limousines.

But

we are asking, why can't the consumer, cross-subsidy, and
competitive issues be dealt with carefully?
case has offered all of these protections.

For 50 years, the rate

All of us are willing to look

at changes and modifications; speed it up a little bit; or this, that or
the other.

They are proposing to throw it all out.

dead wrong.

We think that is

We think that sets up a scenario for destroying a very

competitive sector of California's telecommunications economy.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The chart raises several
questions, and maybe it is a good way to end the hearing.

Let me

also recognize that Barry Ross from the California Telephone
Association is in the audience is going to submit his testimony m
writing, in the interest of time.

So is James Smith from CalTel.

indicated that he also would submit their testimony in writing.

He
I'm

sorry to really have to be so short because I have really been looking

64

forward to this hearing.

The budget dispute just kind of got in the

way of our
I don't

would disagree with what Spencer

described as rate case protections.

My rate case expert for
pretty much with what they

consumers, let me ask you,
set forth?
MS.
II

I

it is right.

I really didn't read

every word.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You're getting to be just like a
lawyer.

Do you know how cautious they are?
MS. SIEGAL:

After 20 years, I begin to think like them.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: She said she didn't read every
word, but it seems like it was in order.
and Pacific:

Let me ask both General, DRA

In exchange for the ratecase protections that we have

had, what does your program put in their place?
hearings, for the most

There are no public

your proposal, the protections that

come from cross-examination, and on and on?
Secondly. I have a question to ask and I want the four
that were up here to comment on it; things that were raised by
others.

This notion of shifting the burden of proof in a complaint

procedure, to shift the total burden to the consumer, the ratepayer,
or someone who wants to raise some issue or complaint -- I can
understand the need for that, because you can have a number of
frivolous kinds of things.

What about some shared responsibility,

where there is some regulatory framework or regulatory flexibility,
some kind of shared responsibility in terms of a complaint
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procedure.

Some method that would differ a little bit from the

current process?
MR. JAMISON:

Let me address that second question first.

I think two issues have been confused here.

Pacific, indeed, is

looking for an improvement, a change in the way that protests about
new products or services are handled.

Today, competitors complain

that we use the regulatory process, but I submit they can tie up new
products and services that Pacific would like to offer today.

We are

asking for some relief from that.
However, we are not proposing changes in the complaint
area whatsoever.

All of the complaint procedures should still be

available.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But the point is, under the
current complaint procedure, if there is not a rate case, then the
burden of proof is on whomever is bringing the complaint.

What I'm

saying is, if you're not going to have rate cases anymore, then there
ought to be some step between that allows for shared responsibility.
I can understand not wanting a bunch of frivolous cases every time
somebody wanted to make a complaint.

But with you having all your

information and Sylvia Siegal being outnumbered by 50,000 - one
attorney and everybody else you have, there ought to be some
balance.

Giving you certain flexibility is all bad, given the changing

environment, but I do think there have to be some safeguards.

I

think that is what everybody here is saying, recognizing that if there
are some changes, there ought to be some balance.
respond to that question.

Anybody can

Sylvia, you grabbed your mike, so why

don't you answer?
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I don't see how you can share that kind of

MS.

it

responsibility.

insufficient.

of having a full-blown

for borrowing

the PUC is that you

or even a
have the protection

the procedures.

right to get

from

The parties have rights:

sharing on a

The

company, the right to crosssome kind of nebulous

examine witnesses, and so on.

minutes.

Excuse me

procedure,

would be wiped out in two

You would have no

I'm for rights.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What I'm suggesting is some kind
of complaint procedure on an issue that would similarily situate one
as does a general rate case proceeding.

In other words, if you were

complaining, you would have the right to get the information.
would have the

to cross-examine.

some of the other things
MS. SIEGAL:
you know.

You

You would have the right to

you don't

now.

"no," then it's tough crunchies,

they

You have no recourse.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I'm saying there ought to be

something that can be worked out.

•

Some kind of complaint

procedure that would allow that to occur .
MS. SIEGAL:

We have to have "full-blown" procedures

with protection of rights for all parties.

We have, Madam Chair, some

really immense issues coming down the pike.

In fact, one is here

right now, and that is the whole issue of privacy.
into this whole new telecommunications world.
with it.
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That's wrapped up

Nobody is dealing

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Again, if we were going through
our normal cases ,that issue would be reviewed in the regular
process.
MS. SIEGAL: It's a policy issue, Madam Chair. I
respectfully recommend that the Legislature take this up with
respect to future services for telcos.

Secondly, I respectfully

recommend this Committee consider legislation to remove limited
liability provisions from telcos' protective devices.

They can put a

business out of business in two minutes if they leave the Dennis
Love's out the telephone book or if they do other things to customers.
There is a very protective limitation on
removed.

liability.

It has to be

If these guys are going to get into competitive businesses,

they have to observe the practices of the business community.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's not a bad idea. I see them
both frowning.

All right.

MR. KAITZ:

Mr. Kaitz?
Madam Chair, for a small business to lodge a

complaint, they immediately are up against a group of lawyers and
experts funded by the ratepayers and employed by a company that
does $8 to $10 billion of business a year. That is simply not a level
playing field, when you have subsidy flowing out of the ratepayers'
pockets to take on the fight in the first place.

The ratecase allowed

parties to at least intervene at a point in time m which the company
had enough at risk that it took seriously conduct that would be
offensive to the PUC deciding that case.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. I hear what you're saying.
DRA, did you want to make a comment?
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MS. MURRAY: What we have tried to do in the DRA plan,
of the

recognizing

Then, to have in place the

ratecase, is to
kind of index,

on companies' specific inflation and productivity

factors, that would, in many respects, simulate the results that
ratepayers might to expect of a full-blown ratecase proceeding.

Only

when all the savings of productivity have been appropriately
returned to the ratepayers,

we look

sharing of unexpected

revenues due to exceptional management efforts.

Let's get the

incentives right.

•

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you support this notion of a
cost study?

Basically that

you have to have the

numbers right to start with.
MS. MURRAY:

have to have the numbers right to

start with whether that entails the type of stand-alone cost study
that Ms. Siegal described is not necessarily the case.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How do you get the right
numbers without some kind of study?
MS. MURRAY: There is, for example, the simple fact...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The "trust-me" factor?
MS. MURRAY: Pacific Bell is on a regular basis earning
considerably more than its authorized return.
does not automatically give that back.

Our attrition process

If we had had a general rate

case, we would have reexamined the entire revenue requirement.
We hope to come up with some relatively simple way.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Of course, a "revenue
requirement" assumes that everything that has gone before ts

69

correct.

You still don't have a detailed study that would point out

whether these assumptions are correct or not.
MR. JAMISON:

Everybody seems to believe we are not

gomg to be submitting cost studies.

Mr. Perez from the City of Los

Angeles became very upset that there may be rate changes without
cost studies.

There is a Supplemental Rate Design to follow this

proceeding which will require all the changes we have proposed m
principle, except the inclusion of the touchtone and expansion of the
local calling area, to be subject to cost studies and review before
those flexibility bands are set, and before any increases of business
rates are linked to those other rate decreases could take effect.
I cannot let Spencer's signs go without a comment.
Because he has printed those words on those sign doesn't make them
right.

We have sat here and repeatedly said we are not proposmg

rate increases except for those business rates which will go through
that proceeding.

Those charts are not a fair reflection of our

proposal.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Point that out. I didn't see that
part.

Where is that?

Which one was it?

MR. JAMISON:

"Significant rate increases by advice letter,

effective 'conditionally' unless a protest can show 'irreparable harm."'
MR. KAITZ:

Once you establish the bands, then you can

do significant rate increases within those bands by advice letter.
What's wrong with that?
MR. JAMISON:
proposal.

That is a mischaracterization of our

The band, itself, is something that would be fully explored

by the Commission before it was established.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If we strike "significant" and put
" would that be

"rate increases and rate
okay?

sit here and try and correct his

MR.
misstatements.

Oh, that was good.

CHAIRWOMAN

can I correct the

MS. SIEGAL:
II

misstatement

PacBell?
Wait a minute, we are not going

CHAIRWOMAN
to keep beating up on PacBell.
MS. SIEGAL:

Why not? They're big and rich.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right, go ahead.
MS. SIEGAL:
submit cost studies wi

me just make this one point.
new services.

all

So, they

Those don't mean a

darn thing.
want independent cost

CHAIRWOMA
studies.
MS. SIEGAL:

They would be as flawed as every other cost

study they have submitted.

•

I can assure you that until we get a

stand-alone cost study. this is an poppycock .
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me ask Pacific and General
Telephone, if we are talking about getting the numbers right.

Do you

guys have any problems with an independent cost study?
MR. JAMISON:

Our cost studies today undergo great

scrutiny by this Commission.

People are able to ask for information

and make their own studies.

In the foHowup procedure that has to
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take place, the Supplemental Rate Design or Phase III, all of those
will happen.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, is the answer "yes" or "no"?
MR. JAMISON:

The answer is that the cost studies that

we produced will be provided.

Other parties can ask for information

and create their own estimates.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, the answer to the question is
"no."

You are comfortable with what you provide, but if anybody

wants to add or change, they can build on what you give them.

Is

that correct?
MR. JAMISON:

They can require information to be

provided to them by us.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Never mind, I got your point.
MS. SIEGAL:

I respectfuJly recommend, Madam Chair,

that this Committee order the Public Utilities Commission to
commission an independent stand-alone cost study.
Commission staffto do it.

I don't want the

They don't have enough staff to do it.

want an independent outside purveyor to do it.

I

An independent

purveyor selected by the parties involved.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay, you had three shots at the
apple.

We are going to close it out.

one last sentence.
final word.

I am going to give everybody

I will let General, Pacific, DRA, and Sylvia have the

Past the mike around and let's go.
MR. KAITZ:

You have in the audience right now a group

of smaller providers, telephone answering services, who find that
Pacific is able to use their thousands of service representatives to
market competitive voice-mail businesses.
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I think the closing issue

here should be a question to Pacific:

Given that the telephone
money to be involved in the

answering services

and these are small businesses

Alternative Regulatory

with small margins, now competing with the tens of thousands of
people on Pacific's

forces, how under Pacific Bell's proposal will

they protect themselves when

rate case is gone?

CHAIRWOMAN

•

Okay.

MR. SELBY: As you know, Madam Chairwoman, Pacific
Bell is on the verge of offering a host of new "information age"
services.

Not just voice-maiL

Pendi

right now before the

Commission, on a motion for interim approval, is Pacific's voice store
and forward service.

This will put Pacific Bell almost into a direct

partnership with certain selected information providers, and through
its control of the biHing and collection mechanism, as well as its
control of the local exchange bottleneck, the company will have the
ability, in subtle ways that are very difficult for an individual
competitor to challenge to control the marketplace.
Legislature will continue to fund the Commission.

I hope the
Give the

Commission the resources to ensure that discrimination is not

•

allowed to occur.

Thank you .

MR. SCHWEDOCK: Madam Chairwoman, today we have
listened to a lot of people argue about a lot of things with respect to
cross-subsidy.

I would suggest that there is a very, very simple

solution to this, and that is simply to have two companies.

There are

the regulated telephone companies with their monopoly services, and
there are the unregulated competitive services.
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If the telephone

companies want to be in those businesses, let them do it exactly the
same way as everyone else does.
It has to make any person in a business that is competing
with them feel terribly uncomfortable when the person that he has
to buy his basic services from is also his competitor.

There is no

amount of "trust-me," no amount of oversight procedures that are
going to get people past that.

If you want to play the game, then

play it the same way that everybody else does.
MR. HOWLEY: We don't compete with Pacific Bell. In fact,
we are one of its most effective sales ...
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: This is your parting shot. You
can't gtve me a whole history.

You have to do one or two sentences.

MR. HOWLEY: A quick sentence, is we don't compete. We
sell and manage their services very effectively.

And yet, we have

the same concerns, m some respects, as the other companies here.
think the reason ts obvious:

I

The impact this will have on the

industry for the next 20 years.

Not only the industry, but how

information products develop in that timeframe.

We outlined

Centex's four points which we thought.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We have those four points and
we will go back through those.
MR. HOWLEY: We would like to ask your Committee to
closely monitor the results of the hearing.

If those are not properly

addressed, to take legislative action to correct that.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me say this to you: Given the
fact we didn't have the kind of hearing that we really hoped to have,
with full discussion, we may end up having to do this another time.
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Once we sort through the testimony and the information we have,
then

may be a

to

so that we can
change.

maybe come

my belief is that no
matter how we

game, if we allow the

management group

years of monopoly cu1ture to
As I stated before, when the

be in charge, nothing

the

president of the company comes
nothing that you can hope for
You just change the players.

•

there is

changing the rules of the game.
They have done enough criminal acts so

far that it's justified .
MS. MARTINEZ:

API has one further comment. From

what we've heard from the DRA and witnessed in the proceedings,
with the litany of information that's been provided during these
proceedings, it's evident that the Commission's resources are
inadequate.

API

dog committee.

that
This ts not uncommon.

create an oversight, a watch
They have been established

m a number of states that are able to look at these issues and take
care of the general ratepayers, of which we are one.
MS. MURRAY: In looking at regulation for the 90's, DRA
seeks three things:

A regulatory framework that is (1) flexible

enough to induce innovation and efficiency on the part of the local
exchange carriers;

(2) stringent enough to guarantee that those

benefits flow through to the ultimate ratepayers; and (3) fair enough
to ensure that both the local exchange carriers and their competitors
have a reasonable opportunity to compete on equal basis, so that
California consumers are the ultimate winners.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I think that ought to be the goal
of everyone.
with Terri.

That sounds great.

Excellent.

That's where I am.

I'm

Go ahead.
MR. MCCALLION: I will make this very brief. In closing

we feel that our plan is good news both for the ratepayers and the
telephone compames.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You think it is flexibile enough,
stringent enough. and fair enough?
MR. MCCALLION: Yes. It was carefully designed to be
such.
I would like to add a comment relative to many of the
parties who spoke near the end of this session.

That is, we at GTE

California also have some concerns relative to our existing rate
design.

The last time we had a full-blown rate design decision for

GTE California was in 1984.

Certainly, conditions have changed to a

great extent and we need a new rate design.

So, we agree with some

of the concerns raised by some of those parties.
As you may be aware, we had a 1988 general rate case,
and the rate case has been concluded.

The rate design portion was

put on hold and rolled into the Supplemental Rate Design portion of
this proceeding.

So, we are anxious to receive a rate design decision.

I just want to point out the rate design portion of the Supplemental
Rate Design is more than supplemental for GTE California.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: All right. We recognize that. I
think that has a number of people concerned.
witness.
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Go ahead, next

MR. JAMISON:
change

I think Terri said it best as far as what a
I believe Pacific's

regulatory

discussion of the latter

proposal does that

proposal does exactly those

half of this
things.

to Pacific, and provides safeguards

It is fair to our

for competitors as we move to a competitive environment that is
going to come whether we Hke it or whether they

•

the DRA likes or whether
MS. SIEGAL:
residential customers.

•

forbenefits

Committee or

Legislature likes it.

but not least, Sylvia Siegal for the

While

customers look

really

bear in mind

it or whether

I

the Legislature must

the whole wrath of proposals currently under

discussion are not necessarily beneficial, prudent, or cost effective as
far as the larger

of

Further, we would

urge this Legislature to continue to

oversight over the

Commission.

helped the regulatory

Your

proceedings this year and stopped a
notions, and so forth.
We need you.

of "speed up", ill-considered

I won't go into those details.

We need you.

And we will be happy to provide whatever

information we can.
We look to the future and its benefits.

But, I'm not

entirely convinced that the only thing that our future citizens will be
concerned with is information.
all of our existence.
important.

Information is not the be-aU or end-

I think economic issues are a lot more

Thank you.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you very much. Let me

close by thanking everyone who came, and again, apologizing to
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those of you who came a long way and perhaps did not get to say as
much as you would like.
be included

Let me assure you that your comments will

their entirety in the recorded publication of this

hearing.
Secondly, once we can sort through the great deal of
information that you have provided to us, there may be a need to
come back.

There are some issues that are unresolved.

There are

safeguards that have been pointed out that perhaps have not been
adequately addressed, and there are some legislative suggestions
that may need a response.

I hope we can work together to come up

with a means of addressing the problems.
in the past.
again.

We have had a taskforce

There may be a role that such a taskforce could play

Most of you who have come here today would certainly be

invited to participate in such a task force.
Again, let me thank you.

Let me ask one final question:

What is the status of Phase HI of the OH?
MR. JAMISON:

Does anybody know?

It hasn't been set yet, as far as I know.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Okay. A lot is riding on that,
including the rates and competition and some of the other things
have been mulled over.

Certainly, we want to be aware.

It certainly

ought to be widely noticed in public so that people can participate.
With that, this informational hearing is adjourned.
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CORRESPONDENCE

•

ATTACHMENT A

Opening Comments of Chairwoman Gwen Moore
Utilities and Commerce Committee Special Hearing
June 6, 1989
Committee Members, Witnesses, and Members of the Public:
In 191 0, after years of strife between the utilities and
their customers, the people of California, by initiative, created
the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC} to create order
and to protect their common interests.
Now the PUC is engaged in one of its most important
assignments ever: Determining how to regulate California's
telephone companies in the 1990's. In December, the PUC
significantly lightened regulation of AT&T, the largest longdistance carrier, as it had done for MCI, US Sprint, and the other
long-distance carriers. Now the local telephone companies are
petitioning the PUC for their own lightened regulation.
But there is a bigger issue. That issue is how telecommunications services will be provided in California, in the last years
of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st.

•

Our hearing today is convened to discuss what our state's
telecommunications policies should be. Ever-changing federal
policies and new technological possibilities require that we
reassess our state's policies on a regular basis.
For that reason, I am asking our witnesses, who represent
almost every active player in the telecommunications arena, to
concentrate their testimony on the Big Picture, the policies that
they recommend for the future. Among these is the appropriate
role of the PUC. I don't want to reiterate the proceedings now
before the PUC, except as they point the way toward the future.

lB

•

As Californians, we all have a big stake in our state's telecommunications policies. They will determine, more than we can
imagine today, how we will live our lives tomorrow. Can we
build a social consensus for the 21st Century -- for the "Information Age"? Can we afford not to?

2B

Bell Prepared Testimony
of Bruce F. Jamison
Submitted

Assembly Committee

on Utilities and Commerce

June 6, 1989
I

Pacific Bell appreciates this opportunity to participate in
these proceedings as they explore alternatives to traditional
telephone regulation.

Pacific believes that the modification of

today's regulatory procedures is essential to the continued
development of California's telecommunications infrastructure.

This committee is well aware of the current proceeding before
the California Public Utilities Commission entitled Order
Instituting Investigation Into Alternative Regulatory Frameworks
for Local Exchange Carriers (or OII 87-11-033).

Pacific Bell,

along with numerous other parties, participated in the
proceeding.

Pacific Bell has submitted a complete proposal,

recommending revisions to the current regulatory system.

To

briefly summarize, Pacific proposes to:
•

Freeze the price of basic residence service through
1992, at rates already among the lowest in the nation.

•

Include Touch-Tone service for free as part of residence
basic service.

•

Expand local calling areas for residence and business
customers from about 8 miles to about 12 miles.

•

Modernize the telecommunications network over three
years so all Pacific Bell customers can have access to
same level and variety of services regardless of where
they live and provide a telecommunications
infrastructure that will support California's continued
economic development.

•

Continue regulation by the CPUC, with some streamlining
of procedures to allow downward pricing on services
presently priced above cost and to allow for more timely
introduction of new services.

(For example, pricing

parameters would require review and approval by the
CPUC.)
•

Share evenly with customers any earnings above a level
set by the CPUC.

•

Gradually adjust prices for business services so they
are closer to the cost of providing the service, by the
amount of reductions ordered by the CPUC for
interexchange carriers (IECs).

(The CPUC has ordered

that the reduction to the IECs should be offset in the
remainder of Pacific's business.

There will be no

revenue increase for Pacific Bell.)

As you can see, Pacific's proposal does not envision
deregulation, or even a radical departure from traditional
regulation. Rather, Pacific's proposal is a thoughtfully
planned evolution of today's approach to regulation to one
which offers greater benefits to customers and the company
and is fair to competitors.
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More specific responses to the Committee's questions follow:

Key

l.Q

of Interest to the Committee

The traditional

ion include:

of

a)

assuring just and reasonable rates,

b)

preserving the ability of the utility enterprise to
attract capital on reasonable terms,

c)

preventing abuse of monopoly power and undue
discrimination among customers, and

d)

assuring high quality service and adequate facilities.
Are these goals inappropriate for the 1990s? Should
additional goals be pursued in the 1990s?

1.A

The goals you have stated are

goals today and

for the 1990s and are similar to goals the CPUC has
articulated:

1.

Universal Service:

This goal directly correlates to

goals (a) and (d) above.
2.

Economic Efficiency:

This goal relates to (a) and (b)

indirectly, for as economic efficiency is approached,
customers will be further assured of just and
reasonable rates; capital will continue to be available
as investors remain confident about the level of return.
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3.

Encouragement of Technological Advances:

This is

related to (d) above, and is a goal that must be
pursued more vigorously if California is to remain
competitive in the new, worldwide economy.
4.

Financial and Rate Stability:

This goal has a customer

and a utility component, in that the stability of the
utility will enhance the stability afforded customers.
Thus, both (a) and (b) are addressed.
5.

Full utilization of the local network:

High quality

service and adequate facilities are the outgrowth of a
fully-utilized local network, or (d) above.
6.

Avoidance of Cross-Subsidies and Anticompetitive
Behavior:

7.

This goal is embodied in (c).

Low Cost Efficient Regulation ... an additional goal not
stated above which should be pursued due to the
increased competition in this industry.

Pacific Bell developed its proposal in support of all of
those goals, and we still believe these goals are
appropriate to pursue in the 1990s. A brief summary of our
proposal is attached.

2.Q

Traditional rate-of-return regulation ideally links rates
to costs (including the cost of capital).

It is the

principal method to achieve the twin goals of (a) capital
attraction on reasonable terms and (b) just and reasonable
rates.

Is a new form of telephone regulation recommended

-- or can traditional rate-of-return regulation still serve
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the public interest?

Please restate (briefly) your

position, if any, before the Public Utilities Commission
(PUC) in OII 87-11-033 ("Alternative Regulatory Framework")
and A. 88-08-031 ("Enhanced Services").

2.A

As used today, rate-of-return regulation may in fact work
to the detriment of both the customer and the Company.
Pacific is proposing a modification to correct the
deficiencies with rate-of-return regulation to make it more
appropriate for today's increasingly competitive
environment.

Pacific's plan enhances the ability of the current
regulatory process to achieve the goals outlined by the
Commission and this Committee in its first question.

The improvements we envision include:
•

more reliance on incentives to encourage greater
productivity, such as the shared earnings plan.

•

•

the ability of the company to lower prices so it can
compete more effectively when current prices are above
cost.

(For example, the Commission would determine

that a price range is reasonable, taking into account
the costs of providing the services in question.

The

costs, as determined by the CPUC, could serve as the
price floor in some cases.)
•

the simplifying of some regulatory processes so new
products can be introduced more quickly.
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Pacific is proposing to move toward a regulatory structure
more appropriate for the current environment and more
capable of accommodating further change.

Under the

structure proposed by Pacific, the Company will be
encouraged to perform at its best because there are better
incentives for excellence, as well as greater risks for
failure.

Pacific also has proposed in A. 88-08-031 ("Enhanced
Services") that enhanced services should be detariffed, but
still be part of the regulated business.

Not only will

this help ensure the continued evolution of a robust public
network, but also money earned by these services will help
keep the price of basic service low.

There should be

flexible pricing for such services, but the Commission
should retain oversight of the services.

This is

consistent with what Pacific has proposed in response to
OII 87-11-033.

3.Q

Are current regulatory procedures adequate to identify and
consider, in a coordinated fashion a full range of issues
that should be of concern to policymakers?

These issues

include, among others:
a)

Maintaining and enhancing universal service.

b)

Improving the efficiency of the public
telecommunications network.

c)

Competitive access to telephone company facilities.
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d)

Conditions under which telephone utilities may compete
in unregulated markets.

e)

Privacy of telephone subscribers' personal information.

f)

Consequences of activity in the telecommunications
sector for state and local economic development.

3.A

The commission currently has many procedures through which
it may examine issues. The "Order Institutuing
Investigation" <OII) in which we now are involved,
obviously is one such procedure. It formally began more
than one and one-half years ago, although the issues it
examines really took shape and were defined over several
years prior to the issuing of the OII. And the process
clearly will continue for some time.

The OII process, rule making procedures, audits, and the
complaint processes provide other ways to identify
potential or actual problems and resolve them.

Pacific believes the current procedures, such as the OII,
can and do deal with the full range of issues that are of
concern to policymakers.

That is not to say they cannot be improved upon. While some
procedures may be "adequate" to consider issues, they often
require more resources and time than would be considered
reasonable. Pacific believes we should not close the door
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to new ideas on how to make the current procedures more
efficient.

4.Q

Does the existing regulatory environment encourage the
presentation of points of view that represent the interests
of Californians at large?
encouraged?

4.A

Should greater participation be

If so, how?

The Commission's investigation into alternative regulatory
frameworks provides perhaps the best insights into this
question.

The Commission began examining these issues even before
divestiture of the Bell System was completed.

In 1983 and

1984 the Commission conducted investigation concerning
competition and regulatory structure.

In 1986 in response

to questions asked by then Commission President, Donald
Vial, Pacific first proposed modifying the regulatory
process.

Commissioner Vial said the proposal " ... merits

further consideration."

Because of the nature of Pacific's

proposal, Commissioner Vial said a separate proceeding was
the appropriate way to assess the proposal.*

Pacific's

current proposal, the California Plan for Rate Stability,

* The paper distributed by the Utilities and Commerce Committee
entitled '"Don't Hang Up!": The PUC and Telephone Service in
the 90's -- Regulation, Deregulation, or Reregulation?' signed
by Robert Jacobson is in error in its characterization of this
subject. That same paper also contains other errors of fact.
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evolved from that earlier proposal is similar to it, but is
enhanced from that first proposal.

On August 11, 1987 the Commission formally commenced its
investigation into alternatives to cost-of-service
regulation by issuing its Notice of En Bane Hearing to
publicly announce its intention to hold hearings.

•

The

Commission invited 23 participants, representing a wide
cross section of utilities, competitors, consumer
representatives and academicians to participate by
responding to specific questions during the September 24
and 25 hearings.

After reviewing the written comments filed by the parties,
and after listening to the discussions and debate during
these two days of open hearings, the Commission issued

•

Order Instituting Investigation 87-11-033, on November 25,
1987.

In this OII, the Commission set forth a procedural

framework for considering changes in the regulatory
framework for LECs, and divided the proceeding into three
phases:

Phase I to examine pricing flexibility for

services subject to competition; Phase II to look at
alternative approaches to ratemaking for LECs; and Phase
III to consider lifting the ban on intraLATA competition
for toll calls and related services.

(Note:

Considerable

competition, both authorized and unauthorized, already
exists in Pacific's service areas.}
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To date, the Commission has completed Phase I and has had
61 days of evidentiary hearings with 43 witnesses
testifying on behalf of 20 parties of Phase II of this
OII.

In addition, 13 public participation hearings were

held throughout the State to provide an opportunity for
members of the general public to express their views
directly to the Commission.

These comprehensive proceedings have developed an extensive
record (literally a stack of papers about 10 feet high)
upon which the Commission can base its Phase II decision.

The Commission also has the proceeding in progress on
enhanced services (A. 88-08-031). And Pacific anticipates
there will be further action by the Commission on billing
issues and on Open Network Architecture.

It is clear that the Commission has gone to great lengths
to encourage californians with many divergent interests to
present their views in its proceedings. In addition, many
groups and individuals send letters to the Commission
explaining their views. Pacific believes that those who
want to participate in Commission proceedings have ample
opportunity to do so, and the record shows they do take
advantage of those opportunities.

From this discussion one can easily see that the Commission
has taken and continues to take comprehensive measures to
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encourage presentation of various points of view from
Californians with many different interests.

Furthermore,

many special interest groups also communicated their unique
perspectives direct

to the Commission in letters

ensuring their voices were heard.

Pacific does not believe

that such an extensive process needs to be expanded still
further.

5.Q

What would you recommend to the Legislative and the PUC of
the 1990's as an

approach to telecommunications

policy?

5.A

Pacific already has offered a comprehensive, balanced
proposal to the Commission on this

, and it

probably is not necessary to review that here. We believe

•

our California Plan for Rate Stabil

does provide an

appropriate approach to regulation through the 1990s. But
if after some experience, policymakers believe some further
changes should be made, a review process is appropriate.
That's why we proposed such a review in 1992.

It would be

an opportunity to evaluate our initial experience under
whatever regulatory framework the Commission adopts, and
fix whatever may not be working.

13B

Pacific has proposed holding rates for basic residential
service at their present level through 1992. The review
process we have proposed at that time would be the logical
place to consider any changes in rates that may be needed
beyond 1992. It also may be reasonable to link any such
changes to some kind of adjustment factor, such as a price
index. That would be an evolution of the regulatory process
worth considering.
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Pacific Bell's
California Plan for Rate Stability (CPRS)
• Enhance services; hold residence basic rates constant.
Guarantee no increases in basic residential rates through 1992;
no extra charge for Touchtone fo: residence customers; expand
local calling areas for both residential and business
customers.
(In Zone Usage Measurement (ZUM) areas combine
Zones 1 and 2; in non-ZUM areas eliminate toll band 2.)
• Give all customers -- rural and metropolitan -- access to a
network which meets the needs of the Information Age.
By 1992, replace older equipment with digital switches and
transmission facilities. Perform this replacement program with
no increase in rates.
• Gradually move business rates priced below cost toward cost.
Match the increases toward cost with the annual revenue
reductions, already authorized, for long distance access.
results in no net revenue increase for Pacific.

This

• Continue regulation, but make it more streamlined and
responsive to market demands.
Replace rate case and associated annual attrition filings with
incentive-based regulation based upon actual performance that
will allow Pacific to operate as efficiently as possible.
Establish downward pricing flexibility for all services now
priced above cost. Review Plan in 1992.
• Share profits above a benchmark rate of return.
Divide equally with customers earnings over a proposed
benchmark of 12.37%. Pacific commits not to ask for higher
rates if earnings fall below the benchmark.
• Continue high-quality service to all customers.
Provide the same standard of service quality as measured by the
criteria set by the CPUC as well as from the customers'
perspective.

158

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)

•

In the Matter of the Application of
PACIFIC BELL (U 1001 C), a corporation,
for authority to increase intrastate
rates and charges applicable to telephone
services furnished within the State of
California.

________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
))
)

And related proceedings.

_______________________________________

)
)
)

Application
85-01-034

I. 85-03-078
Oil 84
Case 86-11-028

OBJECTIONS OF CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
OF PHASE 3 OF APPLICATION 85-01-034
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

March 16, 1989

James R. Wheaton
Center for Public Interest Law
University of San Diego
Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110
(619) 260-4806
(415) 431-7430

Exhibits A through I are not appended to all service copies.
Exhibits are available upon request made to the Center for Public
Interest Law.

168

The

Center

for

Public

nonprofit academic center.

Interest

Law

(CPIL)

is

a

private

The charter of CPIL is the education

of students in public interest law, focusing on state regulatory
law issues.

CPIL publishes

the

California

Regulatory

Law

Reporter, an academic quarterly journal detailing the actions of
the sixty business and trade regulatory agencies in California.
CPIL has participated extensively in Phases 1 and 2 of the
instant
phases

85-01-034
were

proceedings.

adopted

by

the

CPIL' s

contributions

Commission,

to

both

including proposed

policies for the application of curvilinear drivers in attrition
formulae and the development of a defined policy for prudent cost
calculation of utility advertising.

Intervenor compensation was

awarded for these and other CPIL contributions.
The major concern of CPIL expert testimony and crossexamination concerned the lack of a

clear conceptual framework

guiding prudency cost and "used and useful" rate base standards.
Most important has

been the

failure

of the utility to gather

adequate information in categories necessary for the regulator to
make proper decisions.

Information

concerning

the

impact

of

proposed rate,changes and investment decisions on the utilization
of

current

fixed

plant . committed

to

monopoly

power

loop

facilities was an example of basic information lacking outside of
the outside plant
and central

(OSP)

matched pair utilitization percentages

office utilization

(COU)

measures

used by ORA to

measure lack of utilization for penalty purposes.
CPIL' s

continued examination of the rate process

our concern about the

lack of

increased

relevant information absolutely

necessary to enable the regulator to make proper decisions.
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As

the proceedings carried over into the Modernization, Utilization
and Productivity

(MUP)

phase--which is the predecessor of the

immediate pr.oceeding,

CPIL increased its participation and

developed an outline proposal of the information appropriate to
require

in

the

case

regulated utility,
newly

of

major modernization

commitments

either in the monopoly power

deregulated

competitive

sector or

That

sectors.

of

a
in

information

requirement was formalized in a proposal for an "Economic Impact
Statement"

(EIS).

require a

supplemental proceeding as

modernization,

It was not the purpose of the proposal to

but merely

to

a

precede

prerequisite

those

major

to

major

commitments

(which are difficult if not impossible to unwind once made) with
very basic information from which a regulator could accurately
judge

important

consequences

central

to

this

Commission's

purpose.
During the MUP proceedings, CPIL gathered evidence in major
document discovery efforts, produced expert testimony, and crossexamined witnesses.
a

The cross-examination of PacBell experts was

particularly important part of

this

proceeding,

since

they

admitted that the information to be required in CPIL's EIS
proposal

is

in fact

appropriateness
substantial

of

evidence

-

important

to a

investment
that the

proper evaluation

decisions.

information

CPIL
in

its

of

the

presented

proposal

is

capable of presentation; is not included in any required form by
the PUC;

is not received by the

PUC;

and that,

lacking such

information, the Commission operates without knowledge about the
most

critical

consequences

of
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substantial

modernization

investments

in the complex economic setting of mixed monopoly

power/deregulated competition.
Opening Brief of CP IL in

Exhibit A
that proceeding.
summarizes

and

That
cites

sets forth the legal arguments and
evidence

adduced

by CPIL.

Exhibit

B

Both of

presents CPIL's Reply Brief filed in that proceeding.

these exhibits are part of the official record of 85-01-034, as
is the evidence cited therein.
On December 22, 1987, the Commission issued Decision 87-12067 covering the MUP proceeding.

The 339-page opinion decided

most of the issues before the Commission.

However, the extensive

record laid by CPIL on the issue of modernization was temporarily
deferred by ALJ Lynn Carew.
of the decis

Exhibit C contains the single page

n concerning modernization and addressing the

proposal of CPIL.

Although consideration of the A.D.

Report and the SRI

Little

was deferred to the instant Phase 3,

the decision promises a "separate modernization decision" within
the next several wee
acknowledges

that

on the

" ... an

developed during Phase 2,
decision

to

assist

in

modernization review.

issue

extensive

of

modernization,

evidentiary

record

and
was

aimed at issuing a policy-related

framing
Pacific

the
Bell,

issues
DRA,

for
and

the

Phase

3

CPIL presented

evidence on these Phase 2 modernization issues, and filed opening
and reply briefs,

containing extensive arguments and analysis"

(D.87-12-067 at 288).
As Phase III began, CPIL expressed concern.

No decision was

rendered by the PUC, as the D.87-12-067 indicates was intended.
CPIL was in a quandary.

CPIL is a "soft money" public interest
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law center required to be self-supporting.
compensation,

instead of

"multipliers~,

enhancing market

PUC intervenor
value

fees

with

divides those fees where any portion of the

advocacy is not adopted and attributable to the intervenor.

CPIL

had committed over $200,000 in market value time to two years of
proceedings and had no result, notwithstanding a contribution it
believed to be meritorious and necessary to the process.

If its

proposal were to be adopted, it would devote its energy in Phase
If it were rejected,

3 herein to its refinement.

such efforts

would be moot and further exhaust its limited and by now depleted
resources--a depletion which may jeopardize its future.
Meanwhile, the PUC embarked upon its related "In the Matter
of Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers"
(87-11-033).

Many of the questions raised in this initial g_n

bane proceeding and then in its subsequent Phase 2 before the
Honorable Administrative Law Judge Charlotte Ford raise the
identical need for the information advocated by CPIL in MUP.
CPIL decided to participate in order to buy time while the
MUP

decision

proposal.

was

.
Exhibit

forthcoming

and

to

broaden

the

amplify

its

D attached hereto includes the January 11,

1988 testimony by CPIL's Professor Fellmeth.
include

and

Opening

and

Reply

Testimony,

Professor Fellmeth in that Phase

2

Exhibits E and F
respectively,

proceeding.

of

Exhibit G

includes a reprint of a feature article outlining in another form
the CPIL EIS proposal, as published in the

C~lifornia

Regulatory

Law Reporter.
When the instant proceedings covering the identical areas
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began,

we wrote a

involved:

letter to

Carew 1

the Administrative

Charlotte

Amaroli,

Geo

Law Judges

H attached

respectively.
hereto.

this

CPIL

proceeding.

le ALJ Amaroli

schedule a

16,

kind

enough to

(See Exhibit I

1988.

attached.)
As a

agreed hearing

was

that the instant

e the consequences

not

of the de

•

was

instant

on the

the Honorable ALJ

•

Ford,

ALJ Carew scheduled for

PUC adoption,

on the

CPIL wou

subject before

87-11-033.

arranged the
additional

exhibits and

the
informat

n

to

ce

support

commitments

its

provision

proffered EIS proposal
requirements as

CPIL has

icates to major

rnization investment

a party, we relied upon that

PacBell.

decision and did not present the extensive body of evidence and
Nor were we in a position

analysis in the instant proceedings.
•

to litigate for a third time the same point.
Now

we

are

presented

with

a

comprehensive

proposed

"settlement• which violates the instruction of that hearing and
which would render moot both the prior and current proceedings of
the Commission on this subject.
proposed settlement,

We object to the terms of the

and request a

hearing thereon pursuant to

Rule 51.5 of the Commission's Rules.
We have reviewed the Little and SRI reports.
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They fail to

address the issues raised by CPIL' s

They generally

proposal.

·fail to see the forest for the trees.
The instant proposed settlement scheduled for conference on
March 22, 1988 appears to provide the final insult to CPIL before
the Commission.

PacBell

and

ORA

propose

to

stipulate

to

conditions that avoid gathering the basic information absolutely
necessary for the Commission to do its job competently.

Instead,

PacBell agrees to pay $36 million in an annual revenue reduction

in each of

four

This

years.

percentage of gross revenues.
SRI

(a private concern)

process"

(whatever

that

amount

is

not

a

significant

PacBell agrees to negotiate with

in an
means)

"interactive,
an

"evaluation"

nonadversarial
of

appropriate

modifications of Pacific's investment decisions in these areas:
"1) Non-guideline driven investment justifications;
2) Engineering guideline justification;
3) Documentation standards and their enforcement;
4) Training/professional development needs; and
5) Peer reviews including feedback process."

.

Leaving aside the substanceless jargon to which professional
consulting firms are

addic~ed,

gathering or presentation

~

this proposed procedure avoids the

review of the basic information the

regulator must have to evaluate a major investment:
its

impact

on

the

utilization

of

current

fixed

(1) What is
plant

in the

existing monopoly loop upon which ratepayers must rely and which

is the most fundamental concern of the regulator?

( 2) What is

the impact in terms of marketplace intrusion from monopoly power
sourced financing?
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CPIL has
history

the nature of these concerns,

esent

information which

and a

by the regulator.

CPIL argues
The cost-benefit

modus operandi

is here badly misplaced.

the consulting firms

consu

private concerns

firms can easily advise

the marketplace

of such schemata by a publ
is

inappropriate.

The

utilization.
issue.

systems
not

external

reduction,

lation,

utility obtains

commonly at

their

omission

from PUC

ible.
and easily manipulated-away revenue
modernization review to a

and the privatization

conulting firm-

measure

s with anticompetitive

both baff
a

costs

not

abuses which led to divestiture and

which drive the need

In return

sue do

at

measure

Since these are

consideration

to measure

very different duties

They do not concern themse

impacts.

how

But the substitution

benefits and costs

'

their

11 be thereafter financed by PacBell, the
a

"There

check.

will

be

no

audit

or

follow-up audits of modernization investment decisions which are
implemented 'by Pacific ..•• "

It is

unclear

to

CPIL

how

a

government agency can constitutionally enter into a binding
agreement not to regulate so long as

the utility follows

the

instructions of a private concern the utility will thenceforth
pay.
Exactly whose idea was this?
whistle when

the

utility decides

Who
to

is

going to blow the

cross-subsidize

from

the

monopoly sector into a major competitive investment which meets
B

all

cost-benefit

criteria--except

for

the

fact

that

it

is

a

predatory effort violative of the principles behind the RobinsonPatman Act and

gratuitously

destroys

business entities competing in that

more

efficient

small

Who is going to

sector?

measure the higher rates which must be borne because monopoly
loop modernization

investment

utilization of existing plant?

expands

fixed

costs

and

lowers

Presumably, we'll ask PacBell to

renegotiate its contract with SRI and lower their commissions.
If the

PUC wishes to consider seriously this proposed

settlement, CPIL asks that it be approved without prejudice to
the EIS proposal of CPIL still pending before ALJ Carew and now
before the Commission in 87-11-033.

A failure to allow for the

modification of this settlement to require that information and
its evaluation as

a

predicate to any modernization investment

approval would create a procedural problem making the settlement
and ancillary PUC proceedings subject to court reversal.

Two

separate proceedings now affect the subject area of this proposed
stipulated agreement.

Both are s ti 11 pending.

This agreement

would bind the Commission to terminate or limit both not through
the mechanism of those proceedings,

but through a

separate

proceeding which did not have available to it the evidence and
advocacy before the other tribunals.
regulator at war with itself,

Such a posture creates a

with related proceedings binding

other proceedings based on partial information.
Respectfully submitted,

Interest Law
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FEATU

ICL
Utility
Proposal to Require

AT&T and its subare technologically feasible
from the rights of way and lines
formed their high fixed cost
. These advances are still largely
but they do portend possible
for America's telecommunica-

INTRODUCTION:
DEREGULATION,
COMPETITION, AND THE
REGIONAL BELLS

t

A "natural
subject to maximum rate
Such a monopoly exists when economies
of scale for a single
structure exist across
range of
expected demand for that structure. 2
Such a structure
involves
initial fixed costs, as
a railroad or
power
In other words. there is
room for only one
to operate
efficiently. It is uneconomic to repeat
rights of way, tracks, or lines where a
single system accommodates all of the
anticipated traffic.
Maximum rate
by state public
cessive prices. and also to assure the
owners of the monopoly a fair rate of
return on their investment.l The
pose of regulation is to
for the absent marketplace. The ideal
market-which would
allocate
resources according to const;mer preference through purchasing decisions, and
improve competitive performance
through the natural selection of the most
efficient-accomplishes neither function
where a natural monopoly exists. The
regulator must somehow set fair prices
and prescribe conditions of operation to
satisfy consumer preference and stimulate efficiency improvement.
But what happens when the monopoly enterprise wishes to enter into areas
where there is competition-where there
is clearl~ room for more than one
entrepreneur? What happens when the
structure of the industry begins to
change so that the fixed cost structure

The author IS a tenured
al
the Lnnersttl o( San Dter;o School of
Ll11
and d1~eC1or
the.
~
Cemer (or Public /meres/ UJ\1. and is
.1ernnl? as an expen w11ness
the
Bell General Rate Case
the
Public
l'11i111es Commuswn.

continue to
when
fixed
thus
from

enter-

These are basic

Commerce
of rail-

state
have
monopoly 1competitive sector interaction
in a host of contexts:
companies
with
(non-regulated) suppliers operating in the competitive sector:s and protection of a natural
monopoly structure from competition.6
But no area presents these questions
more starkly than does the continuing
technological revolution in telecommunications. Cable television
by
state and local authorities involves local
companies often given effective monopoly franchises. with extremely crude
and scandalously deficient arrangements
for rate regulation.' Here, a new enterprise raises
and serious
natural monopoly
in the control of information distribution, not
merely as to
issues of
free speech access! but in the ignored
area of rate review.'
In our more traditional telephone
and data commumcation
are
somewhat away
has been an
natural manstructure. Substitutes
some
serv1ces heretofore
to be the

tions
The interaction of competitive business sectors with our telephone monopoly
not new, except historically it has
occurred
abuse from the monopoly
side into
competitive sector rather
than by competitive challenge to the
monopoly. AT&T has a long history of
incursion into the competitive sector
beyond the scope of its monopoly responsibility. h has used iu monopoly
power to eliminate competition in areas
of non-monopoly enterprise in which it
was involved.IO For example, consumer
phone equipment may be manufactured
by any number of entities, and the activities of then-AT&.T regional phone subsidiaries in prohibiting connection to
their loops of
equipment except that
manufactured
its own subsidiary or
affiliated companies have been documented in antitrust litigation over the
past two decades. And there are other
abuses one might expect, given the verity
of Lord Acton's sage dictum that hpower
corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely."
There proved to be a check on the
abuses of AT &T: the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice." In
ordering the divestiture of AT&. T and
the break-up of the Bell operating systems into separate regional companies.
Judge Greene in United Stares v. AT&. T
dramatically reshaped the industry. The
concept was not complex: structural!~
inhibit monopoly power abuse: allo,..
competition where new technology
moots the natural monopoly structure:
and confine the monopoly to its minimum territory. The brunt of the monopoly power was left with the spin-off
independent regional Bell companies .
They control the high fixed cost "loop"
of
of
and lines upon which
for our telephone
name for the pro-

FEATURE ARTICLE
\iders of this local loop (the Regional
Bells and other small providers which
exist outside the previous AT &T suucnne) is "local exchan~e carriers.~ or-in
the
of telecommunications-lECs.
, with the devolution of these
lECs. we are left with a new version of
old questions, except the
is
two-sided. New technology may challenge these local monopolies, injuring
the monopoly power strucwre upon
which essential services still
And the local Bells are anxious not
to meet any such challenge, but to
expand imo areas of eomrqerce clearly
subject to competition and which do not
necessarily require any natural monopoly connection.
Some of the parameters of LEC entry
into competitive sectors will be set by
Judge Greene as he refines his U.S. v.
A T&.T order, but in the long run they
are likely to depend more substantially
on re~lation by state public utility commissions, which now have what is for
many of them a newly
problem:
what to do about the proclivities of
these LECs to use their still-existing
monopoly power structure for advantage
in the competitive sector?
This question is a great deal more
difficult than the traditional maximum
rate regulation questions, such as the
definition and calculation of proper rate
base, prudent expenditures, anticipated
revenue. and fair rate of return at a
sensible debt, equity ratio on invested
capital. Now we have additional variables: antitrust concepts and concerns;
issues of cross-subsidy; protection of the
monopoly fixed
from underutilization: and others.
Moreover. we have regiona.l Bells and
other lECs singing a consistent song: if
competitors are going to cha.llenge us,
let us challemze them. The LECs insist
that a new
is
upon us-that
their monopoly power system is being
bypassed by new technological challenge;
and that COMSAT, microwave relays,
and private fiber·optic networks are
skimming the cream off their high-profit
commercial data and other traffic. The\'
argue that in this era of
-;.
they should by deregulated as well, and
should further be allowed "rate flexi~
bility"-that is, the right to lower rates
for specific customers to retain
and
efficient traffic levels where those customers are presented with competitive
alternatives. They want to invest heavily
in modernization to maintain that same
traffic or to attract new traffic. That
modernization will
already or

day

compeuuve sector sources. The lECs
seek latitude to compete.n
An examination of these issues is
nrl••ru""' in California as applied
the regional
Telesis.
Bell lEC subsidiary of
As part of its initial post-divestiture rate
review, the California Public Utilities
Commission
to its credit, has
entertained a separate yearlong phase
on questions of Pac:Bell's modernization,
utilization and productivity (MUP)."
Growing from this proceeding (which is
still ongoing) is a November 25, 1987
order of the Commission to consider en
bane Pac:Bell's request for "pricing
flexibility" for services subject to competition, and certain other related
questions. 1'
The Center for Public Interest Law
(CPlL) has participated in these hearings
and has had the opportunity to conduct
regression studies on the cost and traffic
features of the Pac:Bell physical plant as
it is evolving. CPIL has also had the
opportunity to engage in substantial discovery into PacBell operating documents
and internal memoranda. CPIL has offered its own hearing testimony and exhibits. and has cross-examined at some
len~h those experts provided
PacBeU.
These proceedings serve as a useful
forum to examine the basic regulatory
issues, precedents, and policy alterna·
tives applicable to the regional Bell
companies and other LECs.
Based on that examination. and on
the information
available from
which
CPIL has lnn·nn'l.;~d
Of Ill

'N't:111li1rM

.I::.C,OiliC>mJC

ment

ment program.
.would
a clear Structure, con~
sonant with sound
the proper evaluation of
And iu principles are I:V!I:Ilic:able
only to modernization
increase
but also
posed "rate flexibility"
reductions toward
without overhead
proposed for a
tomers to meet

PACBELL'S MODERNIZATION
PLANS AND CRITERIA
During 1986, PacBell spent some $2
billion for new construction.•~ Expenditures for both growth and moderniution
will consume many millions of dollan
in additional rate base funds. upon
which a rate of return
debt interest

payments will be assessed from ratepayers. Over the past decade. much of
this "modernization" has involved the
replacement
existing switching facilities with more advanced electronic technologyY Much of this aspect of
PacBell's modernization program has
been eompleted, 1• and PacBell now pr<'poses to enter into a "market need
concept," with emphasis on profitability." The electronic switchin{! modern1·
:uti on was justified under a WCUCR IT"
formula (discussed infra) where direct
cost advantages in comparison with existing equipment allegedly justified the
investment made.20
The utility now proposes, often under
the misnomer of "revenue factors,'' to
advance a modernization program with
implications far beyond switch upgrading justified by lower maintenance costs.
The LECs are now advancing fiber-optic
tecbnolol)'.2 1 The alteration of baste
transmission equipment has implications
beyond a simple .. the maintenance cost
savings pay for this improvement~ kind
of calculation. More important, the
LECS are now proposing major ventures
into areas subject to unregulated competition, from alarm services to modular
phones to data transmission services.~=
And the lECs are focusing system
changes in areas where they believe bypass threatens loss of businessn Further, they are entering directly into the
offering of products and services available from competitive sector sources.2•
PacBell (as with regional Bell LECs
generally) has confined modernization
criteria substantially to the use of its
CUCRIT formula_ This formula calcullues the net present value of alternative
technoloSY or equipment stratetztes based
on discounted cash flows.25 h purports
to calculate whether or not a .. modernization" investment is more cost-effective
than present equipment or alternative
proposals. The value of such a calculation is undeniable.
But PacBell is interested in directinf
its modernization dforts not mere!~
where more efficient equipment can de
the same task more cheaply. but in area5
where it can offer new services altogeth·
er, particularly where competition threatens the lou of existing customers.l6 In
PacBell testimony during current Pl'C
rate
witnesses consistent)\
stressed a
to return to market con-cepts to maintain the ntisfact 1on of
lon~·term extsunJ.! customers.:• Pac:Bell's
expert wuness Sullivan contended lh
PacBel! bad ~~ific &rell ~vulnerab~;
to compcuuon
P&~eBell witness B d
ler testified thai ~modemiz..a. ·
. an ·
•1 0 n ts the

or

2
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~---

1

I

MISSING

tween
those

•

PacBell's CUCRIT benefit-cost computer modeL
The 3'""'"''-a ..... ~

severe nr~•hl~·m~
that costs are
powth. In Decision
mission specifically put the
notice thai uncritical

on

Msizing

drivers~
to
through and allow more revenue
on a percentage incre!ISe in new traffic
or NALs added) a
of the
At the urging of CPil,
for the first time refused
assume any straight line •"'"'"""'~mp
tween net access lines and costs, and
instead demanded a close

future nne

t

Pacific Bell,
address in their direct
relation between their various
drivers and incremental
changes. ":!l In other words, if the
calculates that an lEC
needs
$800 million in revenue to operate in
1987. the LEC
10% more traffic
(or 10% more
in !988, and the
next rate proceeding is set for 1990, how
is the revenue requirement for 1988
be figured? LECs will propose, in an
abbreviated "attrition"'
that
rates be set 10
straight-line siring driver. But if there
are economies of scale. the unit costs
should decline with additional traffic
and costs should be
at less
than S880 million.
The California Commission hilS 1'jected the notion that there is a direct
correlation between "expanding the customer base" or "incre!ISing traffic" and
total costs. Economies of scale must be
considered. Regulators should be careful
not to inferentially readopt, in the context of allowing modernization investment to protect unit costs, what
have rejected in the context of traditional monopoly ratemaking.
CPIL has presented to the PUC four
threshold sub-tests of utilization which
should be considered in making a modernization investment decision. These
factors are quite beyond the CUCRIT
considerations of PacBe!J.S6 These four
tests form the "utilization" element of
CPIL's proposed EIS
and
should provide the
for PacBell
justification and PUC review of a proposed modernization investment.
First, the PUC must determine thai
there is in fact a natural
structure appropriate for
If

Tilt Califomill Regulalory Law ihpmur

new investment
must be
to the cross-subsidies which

using
out-ol-l:l>oc~~:et

uu.""''"' investment to
!IS noted
have been

the data
may be

part of

be marshalrelevant
to utilization: that of "indivisibilities."'
To the extent il finds
utiliution or substantial
of scale
whal extent can

or services pay
costs.
on outside entre-

and the competitive marketbe evaluated. These
concerns form a part
"'"IP"'"'' of antitrust law
monopoly I competitive
sector interaction hilS given rise to a
restraints of trade by
series of
and others, which have
resulted in extensive
and courtordered divestiture. &I
As in the area of
ever, the lECs have been
defidem in
or gathering the
mosl basic
data needed to
assess the
of their

evaluating
with

FEATURE ARTICLE
in\·estmerll decisions.
first. the LEC must measure the
and
cost stnu:wre of
capitlll
market and will then evaluate the present and potential
capable of
most
mentality.
measin makinj! their
investment decisions:
their own internal cost factors. and external factors
as they affect
They
ignore the competition.
They simply fail to recognize that the
environment is not a benign one which
is static: on the contrarv.
will react to the LEC's 'entr\'
the
market. and customers will react to both
the
and the LEC. ln the
simplest terms. the
will im·
mediately begin to drop their prices to
best the LEC. The LEC must therefore
also begin to lower its
to stay
competitive. or offer
incentives
that raise the lEC's cost to retain the
customer.
In either case. the cost and revenue
ligures calculated in the vacuum are no
longer relevant. A vigorous competitive
marketplace ensures that this kind of
move and countermove will continue, as
each side drops its prices toward its
long-run marginal costs. Neither side
can long continue in the market once
the price drops below its marginal cost.
However. the lECs simply fail to assess
their competitors' cost structures to
determine whether thev have an inherent
cost ad'l.antage that
necessarily result in the competitor undercutting the
lEC. 6 ~ This most basic information that
every shopkeeper needs before he opens
his doors-how low can I go and how
low can the fellow next door go-is
utterly lacking in one of the largest
companies in the state.
In addition to
basic competitive data. the
must be required
to calculate cross-subsidies. To the
extent cross-subsidies mav be involved
within the lEC in order. to carrv the
competitive enterprise. they shouid be
revealed. It is possible that this crosssubsidv m1v take the form of low utilization livels ·of new modernized plant, to
be carried b\' lower levels of utilization
and his:her ·averas:e cosu by existing
ratepayers. If so. the analysis urged
above as to utilization should reveal
that
There may even be
subtle cross-subsidies
which are

will

. the

be conthe
utilisector.
are in a
to commit what
'll.ould otherwise be antitn.1st violations
in the
These violations
mav include
or anv of the •-••-···•-·.
of behavior ·traditional where
an entrepreneur possesses substantial

market

and in communications. anal
eJtisl 1.\ hich suppor
w'"'""'"t1 review of the
1m
outlined above. A
case 1

RCA Commumctzllom. Inc.'
Franlduner rn iewec

in <me market and in-

trudes
another:
(Sherman Act Section
man Act Section I.
3);
Patman Act, "'"'"":n""
and' or unfair extension of M(lnCJPO
power (Sherman Act Section
The problems of
to a utiliunbridled discretion as it operates in
competitive sector
U.S. ''·
of the
A T & T. and occupy a
archives of antitrust abuse.
of
law stretches from the 1922
, .n1rnnm & N. W. R. R. caseM to the cable
under

tion.""'

of facts

in these cases. and
thousands of
lower court progeny. should make any
regulator cautious about countenancing
monopoly entry into the
sector without maximum information
and at least a modicum of nr•rn,;rw•
safeguard.
In addition to monopoly power abuse,
a natural monopolist intruding into the
competitive sector raises the same
!ems as those which exist in the
regulatory law known as
tween affiliated enterprises." Problems
commonly arise where a
monopolist buys and sells. not to obtain
maximum service at optimum cost. but
in a setting of ancillary interests and
motive~. PacBell's dealings from monopoly to competitive challenge sector
include the same imprudence and crosssubsidy dangers as do dealinl!S with
affiliated enterprises (which may also be
directly involved as well). These seen·
arios traditionally demand cost review
and impact assessment-'s In fact, the
most pernicious modernization abuses
involving negative utilization and competitive impact implications are
to
be cloaked thn::Jul!h affiliated '""l, .. n~n!~es.
making this analysis and ,....,,.,,.,,.:al
vant to the examination
tion projects of affiliated
critical
of r ....nrrm~ a"'""' .. '"'"'
pany
As noted above. the
monopoly
not m:mers of

3

intrusion int r
areas is to be presumed f.
then instructed the Commi>sion to evaluate in detail lhe interaction
between
and competition m
t>euing its
ln American Comrmtrcial Lines. Inc
Louisville tJnd I'•ashville Railroad."
Justice Marshall explored in detail the
kinds of cos1 comparisons which should
be evaluated
the Commission in deter·
mining regulatory policies. The issue
there turned on whether the railroad
should be allowed to compete agaimt
water carriers. which are not a natural
mcmo,oo!\·, in the carrial!e of ore. Related to the issue of the monopolist ·s
desire to invest in modernization of the
sector in order to capture
now carried
another. the
railroad
a
in rates to
allow it to compete. The first area of
detailed consideration was the "inherent
of the railroad's monstructme seeking entry into the
area of the barges. Justice Mar·
shall discussed the ICC's computation
of both modes'
distributed and
costs per ton, 7o and then
the history and meaning of the term
"inherent advantage."
The entire context of the Amtrican
Commercial Lines decision-and. indeed, the entire body of law in this
aru-is the fundamental examination
of buic
and full\ disnibuted cosu
the monopolisi and
those with whom the monopolist might
Yet the behavior of the nalECs to dale voids this critical
line of
which has been mandated
the couns on re1.1ulators. Adoption
the
EIS would ensure that
the
repeatedly demanded
the couru remam
th•... co mpeu·.

or

telling language

B
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company oneuno
sector:

rather broad conis a dtminished
to intimately tn·
management of the

costsl;

IMPACT StATEMENT

viewpomt. It
the investment is
as the case~ discussed
above make dear, th~: regulator has an
affirm111tive
to oversee the competithe actions are undertaken. Post hoc decisionmak.ing will
suffice under a [leneral rubric of
for the LEC. the
before the
u"''""'""" by relued

a required EIS
three elements. We note
data and minimal required
information in each category may be
further refinement. But the
for initial in-

•

resources as oooo:sed
sector: (4) the cost
of that new

output
demand.
Strueture
11.1 520 1970}.

2.

SS9 at 22.
561 at !0.
S72 at S.
r~~nsentn at 12122·23.
Exhibit 561 at 23-24.
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·[~______________FE_A_T_U_RE
___A_R_T_IC_L_E____________l•_]~~
50. Transcript at 17461-62.
51. /d. at 17464.
52. Exhibit 565 at 4. The same witness testified that "OSP utihzatiOll is
not an appropriate indicator of outside
plant capital deployment efficienc)·." /d.
He contends that "fiber-optics" cannot
be measured by traditional utilization
measurements at all. /d. at 14.
53. Exhibit 580 at 12.
54. Decision 86-01-026 at 110-12. It
is worth noting that PacBell had routinely used sizing drivers for many of its
costs that applied direct ratios derived
from net access lines. In effect, these
simple multipliers presuppose that as
access lines increase, so will costs. That
is. there is no economy of scale. This, of
course. directly contradicts the assertions used to justify new investments to
retain and add customers: that the retention and expansion will result in decreased average costs. As is so often the
case. the argument useful in one context
is turned on its head in another context.
55. /d. at 112.
56. Exhibit 541 at 12-15.
57. See Market Street Railway v.
Railroad Comm 'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1944).
58. Transcript at 17216-22.
59. Exhibit 541 at 30.
60. /d. at 16.
61. See supra notes 10-12.
62. See Exhibit 2 of Exhibit 679;
Transcript at 17202-04. Note that
PacBell's position through its witnesses
throughout Application 85-01-034 has
been that its formula measuring PacBell
revenue based on current competitor
prices (not costs) is sufficient; see discussion infra.
63. 260 U.S. 156 (1922); see also
U.S. Navigation Co. \'. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); U.S. v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Federal Maritime Board v. lsbrandtsen Co.,
356 U.S. 481 (1958); PanAmerican World
Airwa1•s. Inc. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 296
( 1963); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1963); Silver\'.
J.iew York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 ( 1963 ); Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213
(1966); FMC v. Seatrain Line Inc., 411
l 1.S. 726 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v.
TWA, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Otrer Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973); Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange. 422 U.S. 366 (1975); S.S. W.
v. Air Transport Assn, 191 F.2d 658
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied. 343 U.S.
955 (1952). For an FCC communications case, see U.S. , .. Radio Corp. of
America. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
64. See, e.g .. Preferred Communica-

The California

lions, supra note 8.
65. See Smith ~·. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930): see also
In Re Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Co.. 53 P.U.R.3d 513 (Cal. P.U.C. 1964).
66. 346 u.s. 86 (1953).
67. ld. at 93-95.
68. /d. al 95-97.
69. 392 u.s. 572 (1968).
70. /d. at 577.
71. See also ICC Cost Evidence Proceeding, DoCket No. 34013 (sub. No. I)
(May I, 1973). For a similar analysis of
the factors relevant in another area of
monopoly I cbmpetition interaction (cable
television), see Boies and Verkuil, Note
on the Regulation of Cable Television,
Public Control of Business 88-97 (Little
Brown & Company 1977); for another
interesting discussion, see Hjelmfe1t,
Retail Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 60 Denver L.J. I (1982).
72. 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
73. ld. at 854-55 and nn. 19-20.
74. ld. at 873; see also id. at 865-73
for detailed justification of confinement
of regional holding companies to decreepermitted local telephone service provision. For a similar analysis regarding
the Operating Company's past and likely
abuse. see U.S. v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp.
1336, 1373 (D.D.C. 1981).
75. See, e.g., Application of PacBell
for Rehearing of Decision No. 87-10075, filed November 30, 1987 in PUC
Application 85-01-034.
76. See Exhibit I of Exhibit 679.
77. See Data Request 3 USD #I.
78. See PacBell 1986 NOI Generic
Overview of Methodology at 1000410006; IC:I to IC:3, September 1984,
Vol. 3, Exhibit 80 at 43-90; see especial~~· Volumes 3 and 10 of the Scholl workpapers.
79. See Exhibit 2 of Exhibit 679;
Data Request 3 USD #14.
80. Data Request3 USD #15.
81. /d.
82. See sealed Exhibits attached to
Exhibit 679.
83. Transcript at 12122.
84. Transcript at 12123.
85. Transcript at 12633.
86. Transcript at 17432-64.
87. Exhibit 541 at 10-11.
88. Of course, many investments are
made not only to meet competition, but
also to achieve cost savings in existing
plant. Where a new investment does not
intersect with the competitive sector, but
is likel\' to affect traffic volumes. the
utilization element of the proposed EIS
should be required. Where there is competitive sector entry or interaction, the
full EIS should be required-in advance.
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89. These threshold fi~res were selected after reviewing PacBell's new product-sen·ice projects from 1984 to the
present (contained in sealed exhibits in
Exhibit 679). De minimis or marf!inallyimpacting projects appear to cluster
below these levels. These size parameters
may be adjusted to a lower level for a
smaller LEC. The regulator must also
take care to scrutinize under-threshold
initial proposals which may "get in the
door," only to expand past these limits
after implementation.
90. If the competition is for existing
customers or service, the analysis would
shift from new products or service to
making investments designed to retain
existing customers.
91. The Memoranda of Understanding were signed with Integrated Technology, Inc. (ITI) of Plano, Texas, and
Tandem Computers of Cupertino, California. The Memoranda of Understanding provide for both PacBell and
Tandem to buy a 24.5% interest in ITI,
with each company given a member on
ITI's board.
92. See CPIL's Motion to Compel
Further Responses from PacBell to
Document Request, Exhibit C, filed
November 3, 1986 in PUC Application
85..()1..()34.
93. At least eight of CPIL's twentyfive data requests submitted to PacBell
on May 30, 1986, would require disclosure of these Memoranda of Understanding.
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ive an that would meet these
a
would automatical
benefit financially
and product vity.
two categories
ictable rates for
greater

(detail
basic
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services

(Category I),
n phones, to
revenue
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In 1988, the PUC
price a limited

flexib
services.

GTE's plan would
other existing
II services are:

several
the Category
1 forwardi

Pricing flexibility
marketplace. Under
percent annually, but
the prices do not fall

•

respond qui
to the
imited
10
ncreases would
ces at any time, so long as

If the company increases i
overall earnings through pricing
flexibility, basic service cu
would benefit through GTE
sharing earnings.
Sharing Earnings With Customers
Under GTE's plan, the telephone company would channel a portion of its
earnings directly
• When
company's annual earnings
PUC, half of the additional earnings
exceed the target set by
would be paid to basic service cu
through a credit on their
monthly bills.
Shareholders would
ve
company more effi ently. The
profits from all regulated

f

B

as an incentive to run the
earnings would be based on

GTE s proposal is good news for the customers. When GTE's increased
efficiency and new technology leads to higher earnings, customers
gain a share of those earnings.
Meanwhile, customers are protected by revenue caps on basic services
and price increase limits. The telephone company bears the risk for
new services, but ratepayers share the rewards.
In the long run, customers win with modern, high quality
telecommunications service, increased choices of products and
services and reasonable prices.

##II

B

D

WRITTEN RESPONSES OF THE DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES,
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
TO THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND COMMERCE
"KEY
OF INTEREST TO THE COMMITTEE"
JUNE 6, 1989
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regulation
(b) preserving
capital on
power and
assuring highthese goals
goals be pursued

QUESTION .l:
include: (a)
the ability
reasonable terms
undue di
quality
inappropriate
in the 199

s
ut ity regulation
ANSWER .l:
the 1990s. The emergence of
indeed are
1
competition
some markets
not mask the fact that the vast
majority of LEC
to
provided
a monopoly
must continue to promote the
firm. DRA
traditional
ace. The emerging
competitive
ace for some
calls for additional
goals,
environment for
all
ratepayers
and (c)
encouraging
new
in the
compet

z:

QUESTION
Traditional rate-of-return regulation ideally
links rates to
(
cost of capital). It is the
principal method to achieve
twin goals of (a) capital
attraction on reasonable
and (b) just and reasonable rates.
Is a new form of
recommended -- or can
traditional
regulation still serve the public
interest? Please restate (briefly) your position (if any) before
the Public Util
Commission (PUC) in OII 87-11-033
("Alternative
Framework")
A.BB-OB-031 ("Enhanced
Services").

B

ANSWER ~:
Traditional rate-of-return regulation has served
us well over the past several decades. Universal, high-quality
service has been achieved, and the telecommunications system in
California is among the finest in the world. However, the world
has changed in the last several years. Decisions by Judge Greene
(the breakup of AT&T, lifting of some line-of-business
restrictions), the FCC (competition for CPE, payphones and inside
wire; ONA) and the CPUC (high-speed data services competition;
pricing flexibility for competitive centrex services) have
fundamentally changed the LEC from a pure monopoly to a mixed
competitive/monopoly firm.
ORA believes a modification of the existing regulatory
framework is necessary in qrder to meet the traditional and
emerging goals of regulation (discussed above). To this end, ORA
has proposed the following plan, which would continue to align
rates with (declining) costs and allow the LEC a fair opportunity
to earn a reasonable return:
o

Move competitive services into a separate profit center

o

Index monopoly rates to automatically capture all
expected cost decreases for ratepayers without
regulatory lag

o

Decrease LEC rates upfront to reflect a fair return

o

Allow limited pricing flexibility to respond to
competitive markets

o

Share any excess profits with the LEC as an incentive,
and use the balance to lower rates for captive
customers
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service

0

to

0

the separate

center at
QUESTION J_:
identify and cons
of issues that
issues include,

adequate to
the full range
These

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

handle

Current
matters.

to
the
access to all
1 be able to
question and
every appropriate

pertinent
address
advocate for
proceeding.
I

QUESTION ~:
Does
the presentation of
of Californians at
encouraged? If so
ANSWER ,!:
interests
allows

DRA

environment encourage
represent the interests
greater participation be

representation of
regulatory environment
of view, as evidenced

by over a dozen active parties and several dozen interested
parties in the Alternative Regulatory Framework Investigation
(I.87-11-033). Undoubtedly, however, the extensive discovery and
hearing process that characterize any major proceeding can
discourage some parties from participating in CPUC proceedings.
Our intervenor funding program is an important step in
encouraging representation of varying viewpoints, as is the
availability of the CPUC's Public Advisor office. DRA has no
recommendations to offer at this time regarding other measures to
encourage public participation.
DRA does note that those parties with the greatest resources
-- predominantly utilities -- have the ability to present their
case more effectively than most other parties due to their large
in-house legal and regulat.ory staffs, access to decision-makers,
and control of vital information. As the advocate for the
ratepaying public, DRA must continue to have complete access to
all utility records and information, as well as adequate staffing
to analyze data fully and to determine the consequences of moving
into this new era.
QUESTION 2:
What would you recommend to the Legislature and
the PUC of the 1990s as an appropriate approach to
telecommunications policy?
ANSWER 2:
Telecommunications pol
must focus on effective
regulatory oversight as protection for captive ratepayers. In
some respects, the emerging mixed competitive/monopoly firm
requires more oversight of financial records, costs, pricing
policies, and competitive interactions than ever before. The
opportunities for cross-subsidy and unfair competitive actions
grow by the day. DRA's proposal for modifying the CPUC's
approach to telecommunications regulation should not be construed
as an endorsement of a "trust-me" form of reqt1lation which

438

allows the LEC to act as it wishes in this rapidly changing
environment. Some changes are appropriate to the current
regulatory system, but the focus on regulatory oversight must not
be sacrificed under the guise of a "simpler" form of regulation.
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However,

advances and

to meet customers' needs have

changed the

, necessitating

significant

manner
The

regulation

to
these

Looking

of

1990s 1 an

regulatory

to

regulatory constraints on AT&T
inter exchange

will more

goal of
ete the removal of
not apply to other
competitive market for

interexchange
intervention.

goals are

regulatory
An

interexchange market
of a

telecommunications infrastructure that best meets the needs of
Californians.

There are compelling reasons to seek alternatives to rateof-return regulation.

It is widely recognized that rate-of-

return regulation was instituted to ensure that ratepayers pay
reasonable rates and receive adequate supply of monopoly
services offered by a regulated utility, while providing
utilities with an opportunity to recover their costs of
operation, including a fair rate-of-return.

Although rate-of-

return regulation has always been difficult to implement, it
has been justified as a substitute for marketplace competition.
Conversely, where competition is present, as in the
interexchange telecommunications markets, rate-of·-return
regulation or any alternative regulatory framework is not
necessary to ensure j

and reasonable

and should be

eliminated.

Rate-of-return regulation is also
because it requires complicated

to implement
including

detailed cost studies and extensive hearing processes -- and is
necessarily a resource-intensive activity for all parties
involved.

Moreover, rate-of-return regulation is inherently

inefficient because at best it fails to reward regulated
businesses for providing

more
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or

the worst instance it encourages

efficiently and

Presently,

inefficiencies
regulators must devote

resources

time to an

ongoing and
s of investment

through
and expense to be
service.

of

Because

if ever

perfect, rate-of-return
lowest poss

There are

to ensure the

rates.

so 1

reasons to

alternatives to

rate-of-return
The local

some areas, and

need fl

environment.

Furthermore
for consumers and
higher earnings
of non-competitive

their provision
However, as an interexchange

carrier, AT&T has concerns which must be addressed under any

•

alternative regulatory framework that might be adopted for the
local exchange carriers.

First, AT&T needs assurance that

1 be able to obtain

reasonably priced facilities needed to originate and terminate
long distance services for its customers.
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These facilities,

which are obtained almost exclusively from the local exchange
carriers, connect AT&T's offices with its customers'
offices throughout the State.

homes and

Only the local exchange carriers

have these ubiquitous and essential facilities, and the prices
of these facilities significantly influence the rates for
services provided by AT&T and other interexchange carriers in
California.

For these reasons, any alternative to rate-of-

return regulation must provide mechanisms to assure that local
exchange carriers cannot reap monopoly profits through
excessive rates for the provision of these essential facilities
to interexchange carriers.

In 1985 the California Commission

adopted a seven year transition plan to bring the prices for
these facilities more in line with their economic cost.

That

program must be continued, and the prices interexchange
carriers pay for all access facilities should continue to be
driven towards cost.

Second, under any alternative regulatory framework, there
must

assurances that local exchange carriers cannot use

their control over those essential facil

to obtain any

unfair advantages in their provision of competitive services.
Because the local exchange carriers continue to provide
essential facilities under tariff to their competitors it is
imperative that the prices they charge their competitors are
s

reflected

the rates they charge the
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customers

for their services.

potential for leveraging

In

will be

of essential
minimized.

California is

Final
essential under

framework.

Currently, the 1

a nearly

exclusive franchise

service.

Interexchange

customers want

and need that have

And the interexchange

carriers' customers
the full

allowed to realize

of

e

as they are in

other states

In the
Framewo.rk

CPUC (OII 87-11-033)

AT&T suggested that an

cap plan for

Pacific Bell and GTE
arrangement would

•

Such an
low

1 customers to reap the benefits of

the companies' efficiency gains through sharing of increased
earnings or through a so-cal
arrangement.

"consumer dividend"

AT&T proposed that the CPUC separate Pacific's

and GTE-C's services into market
individual price indices

of services subject to

each market basket; establish

effective cost allocation mechanisms and other competitive
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safeguards to ensure against cross-subsidization of competitive
services; develop realistic productivity adjustment factors;
and monitor results with periodic reviews of the plan.
However, AT&T also suggested that such a price-cap plan should
become effective only after the completion of a combined Phase
III and Supplemental Rate Design proceeding that would resolve
the issue of intraLATA competition and establish the
appropriate revenue requirement and cost-based rate design
which will constitute the starting point for price caps and
pricing flexibility.

Regarding the Enhanced Services proceeding (A.88-08-031),
AT&T strongly believes that the development and deployment of
enhanced services will be beneficial to consumers, businesses,
and the California economy.

Although AT&T has not actively

participated in the Enhanced Services proceeding, AT&T has
advocated to the FCC that competitive safeguards, such as
unbundling and cost-based pricing

monopoly elements

required by competitors, be adopted with respect to these
services.

More specifically, the monopoly building block

components for enhanced services, which are available only from
local exchange carriers, must be made available to all
customers through exchange and access service tariffs.
Further, the building blocks must be made available on equal
terms and conditions and at equal rates to competitors and the
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so elect

local exchange

become enhanced
components must be

service
reasonable to ensure

do not
are made available

reap monopoly
to the publ

rates

at

The

for identifying

issues of concern

lend itself to
and

expeditious cons
Considering the

such issues.

of technological change and the

development of new

, one of the most
regulators today

significant chal
and appropriately respond

emerging

The

to be adequate

to address the

and enhancement of

universal service.
programs adopted
process appears

•

how to rapidly

service
the CPUC.

now guaranteed by

Similarly the present regulatory

address

issue of the privacy of

telephone subscriber's personal information .

The CPUC is

considering the issues of

telecommunications infrastructure improvements,· competitive
access to telephone company facilities, local exchange carrier
competition in

markets, and impacts of
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telecommunications sector activities on state and local
economic development in the alternative Regulatory Frameworks
and Enhanced Services proceedings.

A wide range of interested

parties representing the local exchange carriers, interexchange
carriers, consumer groups, individuals, large business users,
and enhanced service providers are making their views known to
the CPUC through the regulatory process.

Most of these

interested parties, including AT&T, yearn for a prompt
resolution of the issues, but it is clear that the CPUC is
considering the issues in a measured and coordinated fashion.
Once this proceeding is concluded it should produce more
streamlined regulatory processes that will better meet the
needs of todays telecommunications marketplace.

As reflected in the listing of parties participating in the
Alternative Regulatory Frameworks and Enhanced Services
proceedings, the existing regulatory environment ensures that
anyone can provide input to the regulatory process.
Californians have numerous vehicles of participation in the
regulatory process, including:

complaints or letters to the

Commission, Open Forums held by the CPUC Commissioners, public
witness hearings, working with the Commission's own Public
Advocates Office, participation in consumer groups such as TURN
or The Consumer Federation of America, and customer advisory
counsels of the utilities.

The means of participation depend
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upon the time and energy any individual is willing to dedicate
to the issue, but the process enables even those who work
during the day or who are confined to their homes to contribute
to the process.

In sum, the Commission has taken a forward-looking approach
to telecommunications policy in California.

•

It has

methodically moved forward to address needed change in the way
the telecommunications industry is regulated both for local
exchange and interexchange or long distance companies.

It

should continue on this path to increased flexible regulation
in the competitive areas of the telecommunications industry and
let market forces provide the benefits of this competition to
California .

•
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STATEMENT OF

P. BOWEN ON BEHALF OF MCI
CORPORATION
and Commerce

June 5, 1989
MADAME CHAIRWOMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, MY NAME IS STEVE
BOWEN.

I AM A SENIOR ATTORNEY WITH MCI'S REGULATORY AND PUBLIC

POLICY DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SPECIALIZING IN CASES
INVOLVING REGULATION OF LOCAL PHONE COMPANIES BEFORE STATE
UTILITY COMMISSIONS HERE IN CALIFORNIA AND AROUND THE COUNTRY.
I REPRESENTED MCI IN PHASE 2 OF THE CPUC'S HEARINGS ON.
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANIES.
I AM HERE TODAY TO ADDRESS THE
MOORE'S LETTER OF
THE PROPER MANNER OF

POSED IN CHAIRWOMAN

25, 1989, AND TO

YOU MCI'S VIEWS ON

FOR LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE, IN HER MAY 25 LETTER 1 DESCRIBED FOUR OF
THE TRADITIONAL GOALS OF UTILITY REGULATION, AND ASKED WHETHER
THOSE WERE STILL APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1990S.

THE GOALS

IDENTIFIED IN THAT LETTER INCLUDED:

ASSURING JUST AND

REASONABLE RATES, PRESERVING THE UTILITY'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT
CAPITAL AT REASONABLE RATES, PREVENTING MONOPOLY ABUSE AND UNDUE
DISCRIMINATION, AND ASSURING HIGH QUALITY SERVICE AND ADEQUATE
FACILITIES.

MCI BELIEVES THAT THOSE "TRADITIONAL" GOALS ARE

APPROPRIATE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO IN THE '90S.

BUT, AS

MCI TOLD THE CPUC IN ITS TESTIMONY IN PHASE 2, THE COMMISSION
WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE MORE OF ITS ATTENTION AND RESOURCES TO ONE
OF ITS STATED GOALS -- PREVENTION OF MONOPOLY ABUSE AND
AVOIDANCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT BY MONOPOLY LECS -- THAN IT
HAS IN THE PAST, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, IT ASSURES THAT THE
OTHER GOALS ARE MET.

THE UNDERLYING PREMISE OF THE CPUC'S INQUIRY IN PHASE 2 IS THAT
~EC

SERVICES ARE NOW, OR SOON WILL BE, SUBJECT TO COMPETITIVE

PRESSURES, AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THE LECS HAVE TO BE GIVEN
GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO ADJUST PRICES FOR THOSE SERVICES TO
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ADJUST TO THE COMPETITIVE
THAT NOTION

MCI HAS NO QUARREL WITH

AND HAS TOLD THE COMMISSION SO.

MARKETS ARE PREFERABLE TO REGULATION.

INDEED, MCI

HA~

BUT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT

COROLLARY TO THAT PRINCIPLE, WHICH MCI FEARS MAY GET LOST IN THE
SHUFFLE IN PHASE 2.

•

WHILE COMPETITIVE MARKETS, IF THEY TRULY

EXIST, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE CHANCE TO WORK, REGULATORY AGENCIES
CANNOT FORGET THAT ONE OF THEIR PURPOSES FOR EXISTENCE IS THE
PREVENTION OF MONOPOLY ABUSES.

SO, MCI WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE

FIRST INQUIRY WHICH MUST BE MADE,

DETERMINING WHETHER ANY

MONOPOLY'S RATES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY, IS
WHETHER COMPETITION IN FACT EXISTS.

•

NEXT, ONE NEEDS TO

DETERMINE HOW EFFECTIVE THAT COMPETITION IS OR CAN BE.

IT IS

NOT ENOUGH TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A COMPETITOR OR A POTENTIAL
COMPETITOR FOR SOME OR ALL OF A LEC'S SERVICES.

ONE NEEDS TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THOSE COMPETITORS CAN EFFECTIVELY OPERATE SO
AS TO CONSTRAIN THE

1

S MARKET POWER.

B

A RELATED INQUIRY

IS WHETHER THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE IN PLACE WILL ALLOW
COMPETITION TO DEVELOP.

STATED OTHERWISE, ARE THERE ANY ASPECTS

OF THE REGULATORY SCHEME WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE INCUMBENT
MONOPOLY PROVIDER TO GIVE ITSELF AN ARTIFICIAL ADVANTAGE OVER
OTHER POTENTIAL COMPETITORS?
REMOVED.

IF THERE ARE, THOSE MUST BE

MCI SUBMITTED A PLAN TO THE CPUC WHICH ADDRESSES THOSE

KEY QUESTIONS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE PLANS SUBMITTED BY THE TWO

LARGEST LECS IN CALIFORNIA -- PACIFIC BELL AND GTE OF CALIFORNIA
-- DO NOT.

FURTHERMORE, THE ORDER IN WHICH THE CPUC IS TAKING

UP THESE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS CAUSES MCI A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN.

LET ME FIRST ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE ORDER OF THE CPUC's·
INVESTIGATION.

THE BASIC PROBLEM MCI HAS WITH THE PROCEDURAL

APPROACH FOLLOWED SO FAR IS THAT THE COMMISSION IS PUTTING THE
CART BEFORE THE HORSE.

MCI RAISED THESE CONCERNS IN A MOTION

FILED WITH THE COMMISSION LAST SUMMER.
IN SEPTEMBER.

THAT MOTION WAS DENIED

SPECIFICALLY, THE COMMISSION IS CONSIDERING
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GRANTING PRICING FLEXIBILITY TO THE LECS IN PHASE 2 OF ITS
INVESTIGATION, BUT IS DEFERRING THE
ON COMPETITION TO PHASE 3

OF LIFTING THE BAN

IT NOT APPEARS THAT PHASE 3 HEARINGS

MAY NOT CONCLUDE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF 1990, AND THAT A
COMMISSION DECISION IN PHASE 3

NOT ISSUE UNTIL LATE 1990.

IF THE LECS ACTUALLY GET WHAT THEY ARE ASKING FOR IN PHASE 2,
WHILE MCI, AT&T AND OTHERS ARE STILL LEGALLY SHUT OUT OF THE
INTRALATA MARKET, THE LECS WILL USE
TO LOCK UP THE MARKET FOR

"PRICING FLEXIBILITY"
COMPETITIVE SERVICES.

THAT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD FROM MCI'S PERSPECTIVE.

EFFECTIVE

COMPETITIVE MAY NEVER DEVELOP UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.
CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE

THE LECS WILL GAIN

FROM THE
FREEDOM

TO CHANGE PRICES FOR MANY OF THEIR SERVICES WITHOUT INQUIRY INTO
THEIR EARNINGS BY THE CPUC AND WITHOUT THE CONSTRAINT ON THEIR
MONOPOLY POWER WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED BY COMPETITORS.

STATED SIMPLY, THE COMMISSION SHOULD FINISH PHASE 3 BEFORE

B

UNLEASHING THE LECS ANY MORE THAN IT ALREADY HAS.

ONCE THAT IS

DONE, BUT NOT BEFORE, THE COMMISSION CAN CONSIDER IMPLEMENTING
THE VARIOUS PLANS SUBMITTED TO IT FOR "ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS."

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF MCI'S PLAN FOR

REGULATION OF MONOPOLY LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANIES IS THAT THE
COMMISSION SHOULD DETERMINE WHICH OF THE LECS' SERVICES ARE
SUBJECT TO COMPETITION AND WHICH ARE NOT, AND WHICH COMPONENTS,
OR "BUILDING BLOCKS," OF THEIR NETWORKS ARE USED TO PROVIDE
THOSE SERVICES.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT .THE LECS'

PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL SERVICE COULD BE SUBJECT TO COMPETITION,
ASSUMING THAT THE CURRENT LEGAL BAN ON COMPETITION WERE LIFTED.
HOWEVER, IT IS EQUALLY TRUE THAT SOME ASPECTS OF AN END TO END
PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL SERVICE, SPECIFICALLY, THE "LOCAL LOOP" AND
CARRIER ACCESS PORTIONS OF THE SERVICE, CAN BE PROVIDED ONLY BY
THE LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANY.

SO THAT IF A CUSTOMER CHOSE MCI,

RATHER THAN PAC BELL, AS ITS PRIVATE LINE OR TOLL CARRIER, MCI
WOULD HAVE TO SECURE A PORTION OF THE SERVICE FROM PACIFIC.
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IN

IS A MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK

BUILDING BLOCK. 11 IF PACIFIC OR ANY

OTHER LEC IS PERMITTED TO CHARGE MCI MORE FOR THAT LOOP THAN IT
WOULD "PAY" ITSELF

•

THEN PACIFIC HAS AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE IN

COMPETING •

THE CORNERSTONE OF MCI'S

IS

THOSE MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK

"BUILDING BLOCKS" SHOULD FIRST BE IDENTIFIED.

NEXT, THE LECS

SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THOSE COMPONENTS TO EVERYONE,
PRICE AND WITH THE SAME TERMS

INCLUDING THEMSELVES, AT THE
AND CONDITIONS.

ONCE THAT IS DONE -- AND ONLY AFTER THAT IS

DONE -- SHOULD THE

•

CONSIDER PRICING FLEXIBILITY OR

LESSENED REGULATION FOR THE LECS.
ALONE.

THIS IS NOT MCI'S PLAN

INDEED, MANY OF THE PARTIES IN PHASE 2 SUPPORT THIS

CONCEPT, INCLUDING THE COMMISSION'S OWN DIVISION OF RATEPAYER
ADVOCATES, BAY AREA TELEPORT, AT&T, AND OTHERS.

THE LECS STAND

VIRTUALLY ALONE IN OPPOSING THE NOTION OF "UNBUNDLING" MONOPOLY
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SERVICES AS A CONDITION FOR PRICING FLEXIBILITY.

ONE OF THE PLANS NOW BEFORE THE COMMISSION -- PACIFIC BELL'S
"CALIFORNIA PLAN FOR RATE STABILITY" -- HAS RECEIVED MORE
PUBLICITY THAN ANY OTHER.

I'D LIKE TO SPEND A FEW MINUTES

DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS THAT MCI SEES WITH CPRS.

AS I SAID

EARLIER, MCI OPPOSES ANY MOVE TO GRANT MORE PRICING FLEXIBILITY
TO LECS AT THIS POINT.

BUT THERE ARE ALSO SOME PARTICULAR

PROBLEMS INHERENT IN CPRS.
REDUCE SUBSIDIES.

FIRST, PACIFIC SAYS THAT CPRS WILL

IN FACT, IT DOES NOT.

THE SUPPLIERS OF THE

LARGEST SUBSIDIES ARE PACIFIC'S INTEREXCHANGE CARRIER
CUSTOMERS.

CPRS CONTAINS NO PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CARRIER ACCESS

CHARGES, AND DOES NOTHING TO REDUCE THE SUBSIDIES NOW BEING PAID
BY IXCS.

FURTHERMORE, CPRS ACTUALLY INCREASES THE SUBSIDY NOW

FLOWING TO ONE CLASS OF CUSTOMERS -- RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYERS.
WHILE MCI SUPPORTS THE MAINTENANCE OF AFFORDABLE LOCAL EXCHANGE
RATES, AND DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT RESIDENTIAL PRICES BE
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THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF

INCREASED, IT DOES

PRICES WHICH ARE
BELOW COST, AS CPRS DOES.

CPRS ALSO CONTAINS A

MECHANISM, IN WHICH PACIFIC WOULD SPLIT
WITH ITS RATEPAYERS.

11

SHARING"

EARNINGS 50/50

BUT PACIFIC SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES ONE SET

OF RATEPAYERS FROM THESE SHARINGS -- ITS INTEREXCHANGE CARRIER
CUSTOMERS

THIS IS BLATANTLY UNFAIR, SINCE ACCESS CUSTOMERS

NOW PROVIDE THE

IDY

IT'S ALSO ANTI-COMPETITIVE,

SINCE PACIFIC WOULD CONTINUE TO COLLECT

CARRIER ACCESS

CHARGES, WHILE REDUCING THE PRICES FOR THE SERVICES FOR WHICH
INTEREXCHANGE CARRIERS MIGHT SOME DAY COMPETE

FINALLY, CPRS

WOULD EXCUSE PACIFIC FROM ANY COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWS OF ITS
EARNINGS BETWEEN NOW AND 1992.
BELIEVE THAT PACIFIC'S

THERE IS NO REASON TO

WILL NOT CONTINUE TO DECLINE OVER

THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS, AS THEY HAVE DONE OVER THE RECENT PAST.
REMOVAL OF THE RATE CASE AND ATTRITION MECHANISMS WOULD DEPRIVE
ALL OF PACIFIC'S

OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF THOSE FUTURE

B

COST REDUCTIONS.

TO RECAP MCI'S VIEWS:

THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT IMPLEMENT ANY PRICING
FLEXIBILITY FOR LECS UNTIL IT LIFTS THE CURRENT BAN ON
COMPETITION.

UNBUNDLING OF THE MONOPOLY BOTTLENECK "BUILDING BLOCKS" OF
LEC SERVICES, AND REQUIRING THAT ALL CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING
LECS, PAY THE SAME CHARGE FOR THOSE "BUILDING BLOCKS" SHOULD
HAPPEN BEFORE ANY FURTHER PRICING FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED
FOR LECS.

-- PACIFIC BELL'S CPRS SHOULD BE REJECTED.

I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE.
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ATTACHMENT G

BAY AREA
TELEPORT
1141 Harbor Bay Parkway
Suite 101
Alameda, California 94501
(415) 769-5300

TESTIMONY OP JOHN AYERS
PRESIDENT 1 BAY AREA TELEPORT

•

Special Hearing on Telecommunications Regulation
california Assembly
Utili ties and Commerce Committee
Sacramento, June 6, 1989

I
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Chairwoman Moore and Members of the Committee, I am John
Ayers, President of Bay Area Teleport (BAT). BAT is a private
provider of high-speed digital network services to business and
government. Our network connects eleven counties in Northern
California, including the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, San
Jose, Sacramento, Santa Rosa and surrounding communities. BAT is
headquartered in Alameda.
Because BAT has, since it began operations in 1986, taken an
activist role in the shaping of public policy -- both at the
California Public Utilities Commission and in the Legislature -- I
appreciated your Committee's invitation to come to Sacramento and
comment on emerging issues facing policy makers in the area of
telecommunications regulation.
My purpose today is neither to criticize the Commission nor
any other telephone company. Many of the processes that are in
place -- and the shortcomings and benefits of those processes -are the result of decades of historical precedent. But the
Legislature can take affirmative steps to recognize some of these
structural shortcomings. The Legislature must continue providing
the leadership for telecommunications pol
for the 1990s and
beyond.
What I offer
the perspective of one entrepreneurial
company attempting to compete in a highly charged marketplace.
BAT is but one of several metropolitan-area providers now
operating throughout the U.S. This trend suggests not only a
marketplace willing to buy new telecommunications technologies and
offerings, but a sufficient amount of private capital currently
being directed into the development of private networks to augment
and benefit from a high-quality public switched network. This
investment of private capital flow should be encouraged by policy
makers -- it will be discouraged if the risks of investment are
deemed unacceptable due to policies which give undue advantage to
monopoly providers.
I am happy to report that the companies providing competitive
local services are quickly becoming organized: I am a member of
the board of directors of the Association for Local
Telecommunications Services (ALTS) -- a national organization
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proceedings
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We
ieve the Legislature should
immediately to insulate
Commission decisions from non-record or informal influences by
requiring that each finding of fact be based upon substantial
evidence in the record. This will greatly reduce the risk of
careless or arbitrary decision making, and should do much to
restore confidence in Commission decisions.
Conclusion
The safeguards proposed by BAT are
the "alternative
regulatory frameworks" OII are essential for safeguarding
competition and consumer welfare. BAT also urges the Legislature
to enact SB 1125 and AB 338 (with the amendments discussed above).
The Legislature should continue its monitoring to ensure that the
Public Utilities Commission enacts the proposed safeguards before
making any decision modifying the regulation of local exchange
carriers.
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BRIEF OF API ALARM SYSTEMS

Benjamin H. Dickens, Jr .•
Blooston, Mordkofsky, Jackson
and Dickens
2120 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
(202)659-0830

I

Counsel For API Alarm Systems
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framework
Division

brief

of

11

discuss

identified

several

API's views as to each.
Additionally,
issues,

such

as

API

these

has

companies'

tariff

liability

limitations and complaint and advice letter procedures,
which may be impacted by the Commission's adoption of
any particular alternative framework proposal; they are
discussed separately in this brief.
observ~tion,

API wou

As a preliminary

note its support for any changes

in the regulatory process which are necessary and in

798

the public interest to keep pace
titive

th

ical and

in

marketplace.

This

cations

brief

scusses

r

potential problems that API has
the proposals discussed in

ngs

and

ified in some of

is

; API does not, as

a general princ

e

regulatory changes

necessa

any other
and in the public

interest by the Commission.
As a
only

one

applied
and

threshold matter, API does submit that

alternative
to

the

GTEC.

companies

intrastate

This
are

framework
rat

conclusion

the

utilities in the state

two

plan

adopted

and

both Pacific

arises

rgest

be

because

these

telecommunications
companies have

Any

to accurate

att

serv

wou

costs

of

environment

in a two

difficul

ct

r

such
ial

ies like API -- and this difficulty
r serv

only

which are jointly

provided between Pacific and GTEC.

Differences in the

treatment of basic network connections ("Basic Service
Elements")

I

similar

as

pr

by

generate

these

two

companies would

tantial customer confusion and

hamper accurate

forecasts of telecommunications costs

and

that

quantities

enhanced

services

company's

plan

shou

to

has

be

the

ordered

publ

problems,

to

provide

Although

including

some

each

of

the

areas mentioned and discussed in greater detail, infra,
the imposition of one
at

least

for these two companies will

avoid

creation

administrative diff

ties

s

brief

presented

by

GTEC s

Pacific's

and

will discuss

DRA' s

additional

companies like API.
rst

plan;

of

it

discuss
will

then

Finally,

proposals.

problems
discuss

this

brief

issues which API believes are common to

both

proposals,

API.

References to the transcript of the proceedings

in this case will
Volume

( "V"),

appropriate

and

concluding

recommendations

of

made by indicating the appropriate

followed
ination
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by

the

letters

Reference

"TR 11

and

the

to

exhibits

introduced
made

into

by

evidence

the

appropriate

in

abbreviation

number.

s

proceeding

"Ex."

Reference

will be

followed
to

the

by

the

interested

parties in the proceeding will be made in the manner in
which they appeared.
I.
GTEC's

GTEC's Plan

witnesses,

McCallion

and

Williams,

submitted testimony describing the broad parameters of
GTEC 's plan
and

the

which

for

an alternative

changes

are

in

the

necessary

Broadly speaking,

regulatory framework,

Commission's

to

implement

tariff
that

process

framework.

and as set forth in Mr. McCallion's

direct testimony, (Ex. A-56), GTEC's plan is predicated
upon

the division of

into

two

its presently regulated service

categories.

Se

ces

constraints and rate "rebalancing"

ject

to

price

11 be placed into

Category 1 and would be subject to price changes based
upon

an

index

subject

to

proposed by GTEC.
competition

Services allegedly

and/or

considered

to

be

discretionary would be placed in Category 2, and would
be

subject

flexible

pricing,

including annual price increases of up to 10%.

(Ex. A-

56, p.
rate

to

6).
of

upward

and

downward

Earnings above a pre-determined benchmark
return

ratepayers.

would

be

shared

(Ex. A-56, p. 17).
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with

Category

1

The benchmark rate of

revi

return wou

eve

current rate case proce
for

flexibly

subject

on

Advice Letter fili

ten days not

would

be

based upon

If

outlined GTEC' s plan

11

rates on an annual basis (Ex.

l'

ri

6)

"information age"

services

Charges

Id. pp. 12-14).

to reba
p.

nated
2

GTEC

A-73,

s (Id.) and the

wou
Cat

i

cha

to

two

GTEC's

services

ex ami ned GTEC' s

Id

plan

at p. 15).

to

offer

API

has

cross-examined its witnesses

in this proceeding.

significant concerns that

API

the plan as a whole is not cost effective, and that the
plan

would

particu

r

unfair

"Category 2" users like API
revenue maximiz
These concerns are

rat

certain

be subjected to
cost based,

r

res

for

pricing.

in order.

GTEC Has Not Demonstrated
That Its Plan Is Cost Effective
The

evidence

in

the

record

indicates

that

GTEC's plan assumes an increase in the overall rate of
return from 11.13% to 12.42% to be used as a benchmark
return.

GTEC has quantified the revenue requirement

value associated with a change in the rate of return as
approximately $515, 000 per basis point.
TR

40 40 ;

Ex • A- 9 2 ) .

Thus,

B

(See, V. 35,

the upward move requested

for GTEC's overall rate of return alone would represent
approximately
requirement.
requested
that

$65

million

Accordingly,

revenue

in

increased

revenue

given the magnitude of the

requirement

change

and

the

effect

it would have on rates in the traditional rate-

setting

process,

question what

the

Commission

should

justifiably

ratepayer benefics attend the 129 basis

point increase requested for GTEC's rate of return.
The record does not support a conclusion that
GTEC's

proposal

however.
as

to

passes

such

For instance,

its

anecdotal,

financial
at best.

a

cost/benefit

test,

the evidence produced by GTEC

performance under

the plan

was

GTEC' s witness Williams includeC:

the results of a model detailing expected rates under
its

plan

(Ex.

A-73,

p.

12),

which

was

the

only

prof erred evidence as

to GTEC • s performance under the

plan.

2395).

(V.

however,
capable
plan.

22,

that
of

the

TR

results

demonstrating

The

of GTEC's
customer

discloses,

"model" are

not

benefits under

the

Specifically, on cross-examination Mr. Williams

admitted

that

the

model

assumed

unsupported by any factual basis.
facts

record

to

accurate"

confirm
(V.

34,

that
TR

these
3964).

expense

reductions

Mr. Williams had "no

expense
Indeed,

reductions
Mr.

are

Williams

testified that he did not know whether the cost savings

848

in h s

he had ass

While
"benefits"

I

GTEC's
tter

failure

in

its

plan

submits

that

the

plan's

pricing

for

defects

indeed.

index,

GTEC's

reason

this

that,

would

substantiate

for

departure

monopoly
In

admitted

nothing

is

to

cost/benefit

the

by

McCallion

achieved without

(V. 34, TR 3962).

an incentive

presented

cou

l

services
regard,

other

than

prevent

equation

concern,

from

the

API

cost-based

are

serious

GTEC's

witness

GTEC's

basic

proposed

rates

from

increasing beyond costs under its plan (V. 19, TR 193031); and as will be discussed in greater detail, infra,
GTEC's proposal to engage in upward flexible pricing of
up to 10% annual
as

low

, for certain monopoly services such

private

departure

from

line,

cost-based

certainly

pricing

for

represents
services

a
not

subject to competition in GTEC's territory.
API discusses the portions of GTEC's proposal
having

more

treatment

of

immediate
Category

impact
2

upon

services);

it

below

nonetheless,

underpinnings to support GTEC's request for an

858

(the
the

increased rate of return under the plan appear unsound
in the first instance.

As Mr. Williams testified, the

expected savings to be produced under the plan are not
based upon fact, but upon Mr. Williams'"best shot" (V.
34, TR 3964).

Indeed, GTEC could point to no specific

methodologies or practices that it would change under
incentive
failure

regulation.
to

better

API's

quantify

concerns
the

about

"benefits"

GTEC's
of

the

ccst/benefit equation presented by GTEC's plan, is only
heightened by the numerous defects contained in GTEC's
proposed

implementation

of

Category

2 services,

as

discussed below.
GTEC's Improper Treatment
Of Category 2 Services
As

previously mentioned,

GTEC • s plan seeks

considerable pricing flexibility for so-called Category
2 services.

Of particular concern to API is GTEC' s

proposal to include analog private line services as a
Category 2 service, although API is also concerned that
as the network evolves into a more information oriented
context, GTEC's plan will financially punish companies
like API who purchase future, network access services
from GTEC.
A threshold observation about GTEC's proposal
to include services within Catego

86B

2, based upon their

characteriza ion as
the a

t

nato

itra

has

i

though

GTEC

private

these

init

p

to

line

service

witness,

lion,

services were

manner in which GTEC
For

i

that

ject to

s

a

rm

even

ensuring

pr

consistent

t

with

companies

or

witness,

ir

patrons.

Dr.

Hausman,

services are

GTEC's

lema i

rized under

(V. 14, TR 1290).

th s

approach

GTEC s
its

validity of GTEC' s

11

own

to

ces were considered to be

Pacific's

indica ted that

Given

conduct

studies (V. 27, TR

e same ser

Indeed,

GTEC's

not conducted studies

discretionary
Id.

not

speed

titian, nor did he know

r

determine if

he

even

low

category,

s

if his company had
2977}.

example,
I

within

stat

, is

or discretiona

t

service

classifications

standards,

(API

doubts

to
are
the

discretionary" criterion) ,!:..J it is

!:..J

For instance, in the case of alarm grade private
line services, API's witness, W.K. Edwards testified
that alarm grade private service is neither competitive
nor
discretionary" within GTEC's territory.
He
demonstrated that such services are not available from
vendors other than GTEC within GTEC's territory and
that high grade alarm service, only available through
private
line
service,
would
not
be
considered
discretionary" by customers either required by law or
practical circumstances, to purchase this high grade
alarm protection. (See, Ex. A-96, pp. 7-8).
11

11

878

not surprising that GTEC proposes no review mechanism
for its plan to ensure that its serv
continue to meet its own est
TR 4053).

sifications

ished criteria.

(V. 35,

GTEC' s apparent intention to engage in the

discriminatory classification of Category 1/Category 2
services at the outset, however, is apparent.

In this

regard, Mr. McCallion testified that Centrex (a service
provided by GTEC which is competitive) loops would be
classified as a Category 1 service, while the related
features

would

testified,

be

however,

categorized
that

at

Category

2.

He

private line loops would be

classified as Category 2 (V. 27, TR 2988) . . Even GTEC's
witness,

Williams,

treatment

as

disagreed

inconsistent

this

proposed

with his own philosophy of

categorizing these services.
GTEC' s

with

(V. 34, TR 3992).

Thus,

own testimony demonstrated that its Category 2

classification

scheme

is

not

arbitra

but

I

is

slated for an application that is discriminatory.
The
treatment
disturbing.

of

financial

impacts

Category 2
Generally,

of

customers

customers

GTEC's

proposed

are

equally

subject

to

GTEC's

Category 2 pricing would be subjected to annual
increases of up to 10%

rate

(compounded) without regard to

cost, without any substantive review by this Commission
and simply based upon marketing and revenue maximizing
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consi

GTEC s

rations

such carte

Val

e

i

pricing
provided
asked

ici

la

Commission.

an

rejected by this

insi

t

these

r

its

if

API submits that

into

GTEC's

Cat

services

2

tness, Mr. McCallion.

overall

revenue

or

corporate
was

When he was

price

cap

would

be

appropriate for Cat

ry 2 services, he rejected that

suggestion

"it

because

discretion
Although

limit

(v.

revenues 11 •

to maximize

Mr.

would

McCallion's

management's

explanation of

amount was selected by GTEC as the

TR 2 9 9 4 ) •

27 I

how

the 10%

approp~iate

annual

rate inflator was equally candid, it was decidedly less
"Ten percent

scientific:
number

for

that.

study,

but

rat

need

It
r

it

is

seemed to be a
not

upon a

is based

detailed

basically just a

r with the ceiling."

to put a

reasonable

(V.

22, TR

2381).

API

submits

that

the

Commission

should

be

rightfully disturbed about putting such a tool in the
hands

of

GTEC

Telecommunications
extremely

sensitive

against
intensive
to

this

Corri.mission

companies

price changes

services upon which they rely.
before

this

in

background.
like
in

the

API

are

network

API's ongoing presence

rate cases and other cases

related to both Pacific and GTEC is evidence of that

898

fact.
as

That dependence promises to become more critical

GTEC's

monopoly

network

evolves

to

support

more

sophisticated network information age services and as
GTEC

moves

into

com~etitive

the

services itself,

(see,

the

GTEC's

fact

that

compound
(V.

27,

~~

V.

10\

provision

of

26, TR 2956).

annual

TR

2995,

2499),

its

Given

increases

indefinitely into the future under
ability to

those

could

its plan

impose

such

large rate increases over a relatively short period of
time

could

easily manipulate

the demand

for

certain

network services within markets in which GTEC also acts
as an unregulated competitor.
it

may

increase

private

GTEC's indication that
line

rates

based

upon

"strategic pricing" considerations (V. 35, TR 4049-50)
underscores that concern.

Indeed, as if to erase any

doubt as to the unfettered discretion that GTEC intends
to ar raga te to itself for Category 2 service pricing,
Mr.

Williams characterized the Commission's review of

Category 2 advice letter filings as "clerical" (V. 27,
TR

3094);

furnish

he
cost

did,

however,

support

for

private line increases (V.
if

the Commission and

indicate

that GTEC might

'politically'
35, TR 4049).

sensitive
API wonders

the regulated process would be

better off by regulation based upon political contests.
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As
of

concern

previously ment
to API centers

enhanced services
TR 2956),

,

an additional area

GTEC' s

plan to offer

ring the life of its plan (V. 26,

and the manner in which network access will

be offered

to

r

enhanced service providers.

The

t, as Mr. McCallion testified, a

record demonstrates

prime objective of GTEC s network deployment under its
plan will be its abili
27,

TR 2968);

to offer enhanced services (V.

he also testified that its offering of

alarm services is "a possibility" (V. 27, TR 2970).
further

indicated

that

GTEC

plans

to

account

enhanced services "above the line" (V. 27,

~R

He
for

2971-72)

and that information age network access (Basic Service
Elements)

would

be

offered

by GTEC

as

a

Category 2

service (V. 23, TR 2518).
API

tness,

necessity of deploying
terri tory,
GTEC' s

and

network

API
to

Mr.

indeed
support

Unfortunately,
services

ratemaking purposes,
type

services

such

pointed

out

the

ONA-type services within GTEC's

enhanced service offerings.

enhanced

O'Brien,

supports
more

evolution of

"information age"

or

(Ex. A-97, pp. 10-11).

GTEC's

as

the

"above

proposal
the

line"

to

include

items

for

and its proposal to include ONAas

Basic Service Elements

in

its

Category 2 services, threatens to scuttle whatever pro-

91B

competitive benefits GTEC's plan might otherwise offer
in

this

regard.

As

the

Commiss

is aware,

under

conventional ratemaking methodology costs not borne by
one

service

Pacific's

are

likely

to

Mr.

George

witness,

be

borne

by

Schmitt,

another.

essentially

agreed with this proposition when presented with the
hypothetical

example

of

Pacific's

entry

into

the

burglar and fire alarm business in a manner which lost
money.

(V. 7, TR 316).
Since API believes that losses in GTEC's non-

regulated,
--

at

enhanced service operations are inevitable

least

in the short-term -- GTEC' s proposal

to

include these operations as above the line items will
unfairly burden GTEC's regulated ratepayers with losses
in

competitive

markets.

competitive and monopoly

allocation
services,

services

more

information age environment would consist
cost

these

a

competitive

correct

with

that

way

ensuring

deal

submits

appropriate

of

to

API

between

in

the

GTEC's

and allowing GTEC

stockholders to enjoy the profits or bear the losses,
as the case may be.
GTEC' s

proposal

to price ONA type services

such as Basic Service Elements (BSEs) as a Category 2
service -- subject to almost no meaningful oversight by
the Commission -- is bad for the same reason.
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As Mr.

O'Brien

pointed

out,

required

to

fer

r

instance,

services

ONA

Bell constitute a

I

As
constrained

a

final

note

to

point

out

on

's

that

this

plan,

API

Commission

is
has

recently found that GTEC has been unable to correctly
bill API

for

private line services;

in its Decision,

the Commission noted many problems with GTEC's billing
for

these

services

and

with

interpretation of its tariffs.

its

application

and

See, Decision 88-12-036

mailed December 12, 1988, pp. 64-75 (API Alarms Systems
v.

General

GTEC • s

Telephone

proposal

to

Company of California).

flexibly

938

price a

large

Given

number

of

services,

including

new services which have not yet

even been introduced, API believes that GTEC's advice
letter filings will occur with greater frequency in a
new environment -- a development which will undoubtedly
further complicate GTEC' s billing system.

API doubts

that GTEC' s billing system will be able to cope with
these added pressures, given its inability to correctly
bill

for

private

line

services

now.

API

thus

recommends that if the Commission approves any flexible
pricing for GTEC,

it require demonstrable proof that

GTEC has eliminated the ·problems in its billing system.

II.

Pacific Bell's California
Plan For Rate Stability (CPRS)

Pacific's

CPRS

proposal

was

generally

summarized by its witness George F. Schmitt.

The CPRS

plan presented by Mr. Schmitt would freeze residential
rates

at

their

current

rough

levels

1992,

eliminate Touchtone charges for res

would

customers

and expand local calling areas; it would raise analog
private

line

services
would

rates

and

between

the

establish

the

ratepayers

and

predetermined

the

rates

plan's

benchmark;

it

r

business

inception and 1992;

sharing
company

for

of
for

would

earnings
earnings
introduce

it

between
above

a

pricing

flexibility for certain services; and it would replace
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the

current

rate

case

and
nal

regulatory monitor
rmat

result in a more i

process

with

, CPRS would allegedly
se

ces oriented network

investments Pacific says that it will make

based
under

attrition

~·.9.·,

CPRS.

Ex.

A-1,

pp.

11-21,

and

Attachment A)
API submits

that CPRS

fers from the same

drawbacks as

GTEC 's proposal on the question of

whether the pr

1 passes muster under a cost/benefit

analysis.

And although Pacific's CPRS does not contain

the same potential for
monopoly

(~._g_.,

nonetheless
business

customers

account

for

in

of

unjustified

and

rate

is

increases
vague

its

to

for

and/or
and

enhanced services and network access

for

1

Pacif c's

i

flexibly

it

price

those services.
from a

flexible pricing of

low speed private line) customers,

proposes

overreaching

the upwa

re to justify its plan

cost/benefit prospective, and the shortcomings

its

plan

vis

a

vis

business

and

so-called

information-age services, will be discussed in order.
The Absence Of Evidence To Justif The Plan
From A Cost Benefit Anal s1s
Since
elimination

of

Pacific • s
the

rate

plan
case

is
and

pinioned

upon

the

attrition process,

coupled with an increase in its overall rate of return

B

for

benchmark measurement purposes,

API submits

that

the Company's plan should have demonstrable benefits to
the

ratepayers

which

justify

implementing the plan.
this

record,

and

the

related

costs

of

Those benefits are missing in

the Commission should not buy into

Pacific's plan without first seeing those benefits.
For

instance,

a

proposal hinges upon a

key

element

of

Pacific's

request to raise its rate of

return for the CPRS environment, above which earnings
will

be

shared

ratepayers.

This

percentage
Pacific's
equates

points

the

return

is

and

its

approximately

150

equity

currently authorized

return,

a

requirements

higher

company

for

to

increase

between

$150

(V.

in

63,

the

million
TR

increase

7979-80).

requested

return

capital
which

than

roughly

in

revenue

(Its

overall

overall

is

approximately 103 basis points higher than its existing
return.
8051).

(Compare V.

10,

TR 715-718 and V.

64,

TR

And although Pacific's equity cost witness Dr.

Vander Weide testified that the incremental equity cost
of CPRS was 50 basis points

(V.

62, TR 7779-81)

(as

opposed to the difference between Pacific's currently
authorized

rate

of

return

and

the

return

level

requested in this proceeding} it is nonetheless clear
that CPRS will impose a premium cost in the rate of
return context.

96B

The Commission should thus ask, what are the
benefits

is cost,

r

proposed freeze on

given

s c rates is occurring during the

perio~

in which its costs are declining rapidly.

~·.9_·'

Dr.

Harris'

responses

questions on this subject.
logical answer to this

•

that Pacific's

Pacific

to

incentives
would

in

those

s

for

s

to

record

tion

tivity

sa vi

cross-examination

V. 8 , TR 3 91-9 2 , 411 ) .

would

be

that

improvements
the

ratepayers

realized

under

support

such

not

A

and one would expect

provided,

pr

p

outstrip
The

have

to

the
an

added

under

CPRS

that

would

status ~·
inference

on

Pacific's behalf, however.
For

instance,

ing

Pacific's witness Schmitt
savings

programs

incentive
instituted

•

rate

that

maki

(V.

not

10,

would
that

be
would

TR 614).

cross

examined,

ink of any cost
instituted
not

under

otherwise

Nor was proof

be

supplied

anywhere by Pacific that ratepayers subject to sharing
would

benefit

plan.
the

more,

When Mr.

plan

should

in

terms

of

rates,

under

the

Schmitt was questioned as to whether
be

tracked from a

business as

usual

perspective so that such a cost/benefit analysis could
be per formed

in 199 2 or

199 3,

he

replied:

"I can't

think of any reason why you would want to." (V. 10, TR

682-83).
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Indeed,

Pacific's

failure

regard permeated its showing.

of

proof

in

this

It failed to examine its

cost of capital or capital requirements during the CPRS
environment

(V.

64, TR 8049), it failed to produce on

the record any studies as to the economics of CPRS and
its effect on the cash flows of the company {V. 64, TR
8053-55)

and

it

failed

to consider

the

capital cost

effects of modifications that the Commission might make
to the plan, such as those proposed by ORA and/or GTEC
(V. 62, TR 7781-83).
that

no

studies

performance
251-252'

of

618).

(Also see Mr. Schmitt's testimony

were

the

made

to

predict

company under

Against

the

the plan;

this background,

financial
V.

API

7,

TR

submits

that Pacific has failed to demonstrate that CPRS passes
muster under a cost/benefit analysis.
CPRS Proposes Unfair Treatment
For Business Services And Open Network
Architecture-Related Services
API

believes

that

CPRS

presents

a

particularly one-sided proposition for business service
users,

which

include

large,

unjustified

API,

rate

by

singling

increases.

them out

for

For example,

the

record clearly demonstrates that Pacific has targeted a
number

of

business

services for

rate increases

that,

during the life of the plan, would range from over 100%
to well

over

1,000%.

Pacific's witness,

988

Dr.

Harris,

was presented with Pacific's quantification of proposed
business service increases
(Ex.

A-6)

a

was

ri

ask

to

increases as a percen
answers

show

business

that

service

li
late

Exhibit

Pacific's

the

are

answering

line

an

service

range

to

of

increase

amount

100%; to increase PBX trunks by over 100%

I

plan

and Dr. Harris'

plans

connect

of

exceeding

to increase

approximate

400%;

to

increase TAS service by over 1,000%; to increase 3002-C
bridged alarm service

rates by between 600% to 700%;

and to increase 3002-C

ivate line

approximately 1500%

A-6;

556-7).

(Ex.

548-553;

these increases as "bordering

on rate shock."

(V. 9, TR 55

Thus,

r these bus

might

"California

•

9, TR 520,

It is noteworthy that Pacific's own witness,

Dr. Barris, characteriz

plan

V.

rcuit mileage by

be

more

Plan

for

8, V. 25, TR 2798).
customers, Pacific's

aptly
Rate

characterized

Shock."

Aside

as

the

from

the

turmoil that such large rate increases will undoubtedly
cause

for

network

dependent

companies

such

as

API,

CPRS's apparent dependence on these rate increases is
particularly
litigation

significant

that

will

be

in

light

spawned

of
in

the

protracted

the supplemental

rate design phase (SRD) of this case as a result.

The

spectre of such a protracted rate design proceeding was
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noted

by

API's

witness,

Mr.

Edwards,

who

explained

API's view that 3002-C private line service is already
priced

at

recently

its

cost,

authorized by

Application 85-01-034.

given

substantial

increases

the Commission for Pacific
(Ex. A-96, p. 5)

in

Mr. Edwards

further noted that these proposed increases proposed by
Pacific will likely mire the commission in protracted
rate design hearings in this case, given the absence of
a

finding

for

service costs in Pacific's most recent

rate design decision.

(Id.)

API believes that these

large increases are particularly unfair, when the rest
of Pacific's CPRS proposal pointedly avoids looking at
costs.

Indeed,

if the success of CPRS is predicated

upon these increases,

then its plan seems destined for

failure -- Pacific's existing cost studies will simply
not support these increases -- at least for the private
line category.
Pacific's Proposed Treatment For The Regulatory
Treatment Of Enhanced Services And Related Access
Should Be Rejected
The record in this proceeding is replete with
references to the fact
is

to

make

available
of

charges

that the key objective of CPRS

information

age

services

to Pacific Bell customers.
for

more

widely

The elimination

Touchtone service offered by Pacific,

together with planned network upgrades,

1008

are certainly

steps

in

Pacific'$

The

direction

that

offer

intention

detarift

basis

unbundl

Open

consistent

with

7,

(V •

Communications com..11i s s ion
317-318i

Ex

pp.

A-97,

itecture

API

6-7),

rejected by the Commission:

"above

pl

7, TR

submits that

two

As

central purpose
tween

rate

not be allowed

witness Mr.

API

for

making
engage

of ONA services.

in the flexible prici

•

(V.

by Pacific should

line"

t

purposes, and Pacific shou

field~*

Federal

Detariffed, competitively

provided enhanced services offer
be

services

the

that purpose.

r

provide

(ONA)

with

filed

to

fie's proposal in this area should be

elernent.a of

not

and

314)

TR

plan

its

reflects

enhanced services on a

Ar

Network

recorc also

0 Brien

the

ide a "level playing

ONA is to

Bell

testified,

Operating

Companies'

enhanced

services operations

(such as Pacific's) and the Bell

Operating Companies'

competitors, who also also offer

these unregulated services.

(Ex.

A-97,

pp. 8-9).

As

Mr. O'Brien further testified, since ONA services are
regulated

basic

network

functions,

allowing

pricing

flexibility by Pacific for these services would allow
it

to

unfairly

influence

which it competes.
these

ONA

services

competition

(Id., at 9).

as

in

The FCC has described

requiring

1018

in markets

unbundled

"basic

service building blocks" offered under tariffs, called
"Basic Service Elements" (BSEs)
FCC

104

2d

Order" j.
blocks

at

958

"214

See, Reoort and Order,
("The

(1986)

Computer

III

API submits that since these basic building
will

be

used

to

provide

access

to

Pacific's

competitors, they should remain within the conventional
regulatory

framework

anticompetitive

in

order

manipulation

by

to

prevent

Pacific.

Pacific's

failure to even know at this point which BSEs it wants
to

flexibly

FCC's

price

recent

deficient

(V.

finding

both

in

7,
that

TR

319},

coupled with

the

Pacific Bell's ONA plan is

terms of

the BSE pricing,

and the

terms under which they will be offered,

confirms this

result.

Open

See,

Architecture

"Filing

Plans,"

And

Review

Memorandum

of

Opinion

Network

and

Order,

released December 22, 1988, CC Docket 88-2, Phase 1, at
As API witness Mr. 0 1 Brien testified, Pacific's

,1496.

ONA

plan

before

should

this

regulatory

be

finalized

Commission

environment

even
for

at

the

considers

federal

level

changing

these services

the

39,

(V.

TR

4615-16}.

Pacific•s
services,

proposal

to

include

enhanced

offered on a detariffed basis, pose similar

problems.

In

Pacific•s

intent

this

regard,

Mr.

to

provide

enhanced

1028

Schmitt

confirmed

service

on

a

-

25 -

de tar if fed basis, with above the line accounting for
rate making purposes (V. 7, TR 314); he also admitted,
however,

that such treatment would require regulated

ratepayers to cover any losses for those competitive
products.
upon

(V. 7, TR 315-316).

such concerns,

agreed

that

Indeed, perhaps based

Pacific's witness,

enhanced

services

Dr.

Hausman,

should be subject

to

below the line accounting treatment (V. 14, TR 1292).
As

API

has

previously

noted,

it

believes

that

"information-age" service competition will proliferate
in Pacific Bell's service area, if Pacific's network
access

is

field."

offered

to

others

on

a

"level

playing

API believes that such level competition is

dependent

upon

treating

Pacific's

enhanced

servict

offerings as truly deregulated services, and according
them

below

the

line

accounting

treatment.

Mr.

Schmitt's testimony that Pacific can "live with" below
the line treatment

•

fact

that

above

(V. 7, TR 248), coupled with the
the

line

accounting

treatment

is

apparently the result of Pacific Telesis policy (V. 7,
TR

250),

enhanced

further
services

supports

not

operations

operations.

1038

including

within

its

Pacific's
regulated

ORA's Regulatory Change Proposal
As outlined in Ex. A-85, and as specifically
described

in

Mr.

Ahern's

testimony

(Ex.

A-85,

Chapter 1), ORA's proposed regulatory framework would
split monopoly and competitive lines of business, and
would

institute a

form of indexing

(or price caps)

which would proceed from rates based upon 1991 and 1992
test years

for

Pacific Bell and GTEC,

( Id. at 1-12, 13).

respectively.

For operations that are deemed to

be monopoly in nature, a benchmark rate of return will
be established,
with ratepayers.

above which

returns would be shared

Quality of service would be monitored

under ORA's proposal, and ORA's plan would be in effect
for

a

five-year

Finally,

period.

(Id.

at

1-13,14;

15-16).

for new and competitive services, ORA would

establish a

separate organization which would

offer

those services on a detariffed basis; these services
would be subject to sharing for returns realized above
a predetermined benchmark, while the stockholders would
bear the risk of any losses.

(Ex.A-85, Chapter 3-4-6).

API has examined ORA's plan from the "macro"
effects of applying the plan to Pacific Bell and GTEC,
and API has also examined ORA's. plan from API' s unique
interest in private line and ONA related services which
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it now purchases, and will purchase in the future from

these companies.

API's concerns and recommendations in

these two areas will be discussed in order.
First,
for

•

API questions

the factual predicate

implementing ORA's proposed regulatory framework

which

would

replace

traditional,

cost

of

service

regulation, with a form of "price cap" regulation (Ex.
A-85, p. 3-9).

API has seen no evidence in the record

that traditional cost of service regulation has been
such a failure that it should be scrapped and replaced
with

ORA's

suggest

proposal,

that

ORA's

nor

indeed

proposal

does

would

the

evidence

succeed.

For

instance, this brief has earlier discussed the failure
of both Pacific and GTEC to supply proof that incentive
regulation

would

produce

greater

savings

(or

more

efficiencies) as proposed by those companies than would
the

current

regulatory

witness Khoury
I

testified

framework.
that

Similarly,

ORA's

the present system of

regulation contains incentives to achieve efficiencies,
and that productivities have been realized over time in
this environment.

(V. 54, TR 6661).

In addition to the absence of a factual basis
upon

which

to

conclude

that

traditional

regulation

applied to Pacific and GTEC has been a failure, API is

105B

equally

concerned

plan.

about

the

instance,

For

recommendation

to

downside

API

review

risk

believes

its

in

o~~·s

that

proposed

ORA 1 s

alternative

framework's operation after a five-year period may be
too long.

(Ex. A-85, p. 3-21).

Since January 1, 1984,

(the date of the Bell system divestiture) significant
changes

have

industry

occur red

ranging

in

from

the
the

telecommunications
method

by

which

jurisdictional cost allocations are performed, the way
that local exchange carriers are compensated for the
interstate access use of their facilities, to the way
that interstate carriers are regulated for their common
carrier

services.

While API does not believe

that

these changes have undercut the basis for existing cost
of

service

regulation

California,
retain

they

enough

for

GTEC

and

nonetheless underscore

flexibility

for

this

Pacific
the

in

need

to

Commission

to

address similar industry changes in the ensuing fiveyear

period.

API

thus

submits

that

the

five-year

period recommended by ORA for the initial operation of
its proposed plan creates too much downside risk.
API also is concerned about ORA's proposal to
establish a 500 basis points floor below the benchmark
return

as

propriety

a
of

threshold
ORA 1 s

for

plan.
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measuring
( Id.

at

the

3-22).

continued
If

the

benchmark were set too low, this floor might impair the
ability to finance plant additions and/or to attract
capital on reasonable terms -- all of which would have
a

ratepayer

impact.

Indeed,

API

appreciates

ORA's

candor in describing its aprehension about its proposal
in this regard and its indication that it would have
preferred an experiment first.

(Ex. A-85, at 1-15-16).

Against this background, API does not believe
that

a

sufficient

wholesale

change

record

in

exists

current

to

justify

regulation

that

the
ORA's

proposal presents -- particularly when the stakes are
so

high.

And while API

does not doubt that ORA's

beliefs are sincerely held, ORA's own doubts as to its
proposal point to the fact that some experience should
be gained with this type of proposed regulation before
it

•

should

be

applied

recommends

that

monitored

closely

purpose.

the

to

FCC's
by

Pacific
price

this

and
cap

GTEC.

API

proceeding

Commission

for

be
that

The FCC has recently concluded that price cap

regulation is appropriate for AT&T and is proposing the
mandatory
(~-~.,

carriers.

application
Bell

of

such

Operating

regulation

Company)

local

to

major

exchange

Report and Order And Second Further Notice

of Proposed Rulemak ing, FCC 89-91, released April 17,
1989, CC Docket 87-313.

This Commission may want to
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judge the success of the FCC's endeavor first before
implementing ORA's proposed regulatory scheme here.
As

previously

competitive services.
services,

separate

API

is

also

ORA's proposed treatment of new and

concerned about

of

indicated,

ORA's proposal for this category

essentially consists of establishing a

entity

for

the

provision of

the services,

coupled with the de tar iff ing of the services and the
implementation
profits.

of

(See,

proposal

a

sharing
Ex.

~._g_.,

would

also

system

A-85,

seek

to

at

for

related

34-5).

establish

ORA's

accounting

guidelines to prevent the improper transfe.r of costs
between regulated and nonregulated operations.
at

76-7).

As

an

initial matter,

API

( Id.,

supports

the

detariffing of enhanced services including the complete
deregulation of the service offerings to end users.

On

the other hand, API believes that care should be taken
to ensure that "new" services which are basic network
functions
regulatory
embrace

services)

ONA

(~._g_.,

ORA's

oversight.

that

principle

by

remain

subject

to

proposal

appears

to

recognizing

that

Basic

Service Elements constitute such an exception within
the

"new

Indeed,
possible

service"
ORA
for

category.

witness
a

new

Ahern

(Id.,
agreed

service

1088

to

at

that

also

3-4,
it

be a

3-19).

would

be

monopoly

service.

(V. 36, TR 4286-87).

API's comments here are

merely to add emphasis to ORA's recommendations on this
point;

care

should

be

taken

to

ensure

that

basic

services are not inadvertently deregulated as "new" as
advances occur in the basic network.
API is constrained to point out that for the
II

sake of consistency, it disagrees with ORA's proposal
to establish a sharing mechanism for profits associated
with

detariffed

services.

API

is

particularly

concerned about the proposal with regard to enhanced
services, since API believes that all enhanced services
should

go

below

the

line

for

ratemaking

purposes.

ORA's proposal would apparently place losses for those
services below the line, but share related profits with
ratepayers.

If the ORA is concerned that it will be

unable to detect cross-subsidy between regulated and
competitive

operations

within GTEC

and

Pacific,

it

should address that concern through accounting and cost
allocation procedures.

API

believes,

however,

that

ORA's proposal is a bad substitute for such accounting
protections, and one which could unnecessarily blur the
dividing

line

between

regulated

services.
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and

competitive

The Commission Should Examine Advice
Letter/Complaint Procedures And Tariff
Liability Issues That Will Be Implemented
By Alternative Regulatory Frameworks
During the hearings in this proceeding, API
has been concerned that the adoption of any alternative
regulatory framework proposed herein be examined for
its

impact

upon

the

advice

letter

and

complaint

procedures under the Commission's Rules, and that the
Commission examine
Thes~

tariff

liability issues as well.

topics will be discussed in order.
It

is

evident

that

GTEC's

and

Pacific's

alternative regulatory framework plans would place a
substantial burden on the advice letter and complaint
process.
letter

For instance, Pacific would use the advice
process

to

request

the

flexible

pricing

of

certain services (V. 7, TR 257) and GTEC would use the
advice

letter

process

to

both change prices,

on an

annual basis, for its Category 1 services and to change
prices,

on

services.
Mr.

ten

days'

notice,

for

(See, Ex. A-56, pp.l2-14).

Williams,

: additionally

its

Category 2

GTEC's witness,

testified

that

the

complaint/advice letter process would be an appropriate
avenue by which to solve problems in an alternative
regulatory
19).

framework

environment.

(V.

34,

TR 4018-

API submits that the present framework for advice

llOB

letters and complaints may not carry the load sought to
placed

upon

it

in

the

new

environment

proposed

by

either GTEC or Pacific.
For instance, Administrative Law Judge Ford
specifically designated as

a

policy matter,

whether

changes should be sought in the Public Utilities Code
I

regarding the mechanics of bringing a complaint in the
new environment.

(V. 66, TR 8307-08).

the Public Utilities Code
that

the

reasonableness

requires,
of

any

Section 1702 of
in this regard,

rate

may

not

be

challenged by a complaint unless it is signed by the
mayor or other officials of a city or county or by not
less than 25 actual or prospective customers.

If the

Commission adopts a framework which relies more heavily
upon

the

complaint

regulation,
Code.

•

API

procedure

would

as

a

substitute

for

support such a change in the

API believes, however, that the degree to which

the advice letter and complaint process needs to be
changed
will

to

become

accommodate
more

any

apparent

new regulatory framework
after

the

Commission's

adoption of a decision in this proceeding.

GTE has

noted the propriety of changing the advice letter and
complaint process in a new environment (See, Ex. A-73,
p. 12; V. 27, TR 3025), as have other parties such as
ORA (V.

56, TR 7022} and API (V. 39, TR 4614).

lllB

API

that

recommends

accordingly

in

the

event

that

regulatory changes are implemented which make use of
the advice letter or complaint process, workshops be
convened to ensure the consistency of these mechanisms
with any new regulatory framework.
In

the

briefing

conference

held

in

this

proceeding, Administrative Law Judge Ford designated as
a policy

issue whether

current

tariff

the Commission should modify

liability

limitations

regulation is relaxed (V. 66, TR 8306).
that the

issue is more broad.

for

which

API believes

API would state the

issue as what safeguards should apply for competitive
activities

engaged

by

proposals,

from

jurisdictional perspective.

a

Pacific and GTEC under

their
This

issue arises because as (and if) regulation is lessened
or

eliminated

for

these

companies'

operations

in

certain competitive markets, the degree to which this
Commission exerts its regulatory oversight will affect
the stockholders,

ratepayers and competitors of these

companies.
Witnesses

for

both . companies

and

ORA

testified that the appropriate forums for challenging
competitive pricing issues should lie in the courts,
and not in this Commission.

For instance, Pacific's

witnesses,

Harris,

Drs.

Hausman

and

112B

testified

that

antitrust laws and the courts should be the forums to
handle

claims

of

anticompetitive

Pacific's proposed framework
2806).

Dr.

Hausman

activity

under

(V. 13, TR 1042; V. 25,

further

testified

that

in

the

context of enhanced service offerings, the elimination
of

tariff

liability

limitations would be consistent

with the concept of a level playing field.
1298).

(V. 14, TR

GTEC's and ORA's witnesses also agreed.

For

instance, GTEC' s witness McCallion testified that the
court system was the appropriate legal avenue available
to competitors to prevent below cost pricing (Ex. A-56,
pp. 18-19; v. 27, TR 2986).

Likewise, ORA's witness

Ahern testified that predatory pricing claims should be
heard in the courts (V. 36, TR 4295-6).
API believes that this Commission should make
clear the extent to which customers who, like API, may
look to this Commission's processes for anticompetitive
claims against Pacific or GTEC in a new environment.
Potential competitors of these companies in enhanced
service markets stand in the same shoes.

The lack of a

clear

either

decision

customers

and/or

on

this

issue

competitors

will

without

leave

an appropriate

remedy -- either at the Commission or in the courts -or

may

result

ratemaking

in

treatment

disputes
of

as

antitrust

1138

to

the

appropriate

judgments..

See,

Southern Motor Carriers' Rate Conference v. U.S., 105
s.ct.

1721

(1985)

(antitrust liability for

regulated

operations will exist in the absence of a clear state
policy to displace competition and state supervision of
anticompetitive conduct; 105 S.Ct. at 1727).
API certainly has no objection to handling
claims of unfair pricing or anticompetitive conduct in
the

courts,

Pacific

and

competitors

consistent

with

the

DRA.

order

to

In

and

cus tamers

testimony of GTEC,
both

without

avoid
an

leaving

appropriate

remedy, and to avoid unintended results either before
this

Commission

should be clear
freedom

for

or

in

the

courts,

this

Commission

in any decision granting competitiVE>-

GTEC

and

Pacific

as

to

the

scope

of

regulation and extent of competition which is thereby
authorized.

Conclusion
API

submits

that

neither

Pacific

nor GTEC

have justified the overall framework proposed by these
companies,

from

a

cost/benefit

perspective.

An

examination of the record discloses that both companies
have

failed

to demonstrate

that

ratepayers

would be

better off under either of their plans as they would
implement

them.

Additionally,

1148

GTEC's

proposed

treatment of Category 2 services would be manifestly
unfair

to companies,

such as API,

that buy services

from GTEC and for which no other alternatives exist.
Pacific's

plans

for

these

discretionary pricing,
Pacific can

customers

involves

less

but API does not believe that

justify its proposed cost increases for

business services in supplemental rate design.

Thus,

to the extent that Pacific's plan is dependent upon the
substantial increases outlined in this brief, it must
fail.
API believes that Pacific's flexible pricing
treatment
Although

of

ONA

services

competition

also should be

in

the

enhanced

rejected.
service

marketplace should proliferate, the flexible pricing of
network access for these services by an entity which is
also a competitor, provides the incentive and ability
to

engage

in

rejected.

discriminatory

At

the

very

behavior;

least,

API

it

should be

recommends

that

Pacific Bell's ONA plan become final at the FCC, and
that

discrete ONA

services

that will be offered by

Pacific be identified, before flexible pricing is even
considered for these services.
price
current

cap

plan

does

regulation

elimination.

not

API believes that ORA's

demonstrate

sufficient

to

problems

with

justify

its

API recommends that experience with the

115B

FCC's price cap plan be garnered first, before such a
substantial

change

in

the

regulatory

process

is

considered here.
Finally,

API

believes

that

ORA's

proposed

treatment of enhanced services involving below the line
treatment of losses, but not profits, should be changed
consistent

with

API's

proposed

treatment

of

all

enhanced service operations below the line.

B
H Die~
Jr.
Blooston, ordkofsky,
Jackson & Dickens
2120 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
(202)659-0830
Counsel for API Alarm
Systems

1168

Before the
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
of the
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of
Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks for Local
Exchange Carriers

)
}
)
)

I

87-11-033

CLOSING BRIEF OF API ALARM SYSTEMS

Benjamin H. Dickens, Jr.
Blooston, Mordkofsky, Jackson & Dickens
2120 L Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C.
20037
(202) 659-0830
Counsel for API Alarm Systems

May 30, 1989

117B

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY OF API'S RECOMMENDATIONS •••••••••••••••••••• ii
I.

Pacific's Argument To Retain Existing
Tariff Liability Limitations Is Improper
For Enhanced Services Offered Under CPRS •••••••• l

Current Tariff Liability Limitations ••••••••••••••••• !
Tariff Liability Limitations Apply To The Current
Regulatory Environment Which Closely Regulates
The Operations of Pacific And GTEC ••••••••••••••••••• 2
Adoption Of The GTEC Proposal Or The Pacific
Proposal Should Incorporate Modified
Tariff Liability Limitations For Detaroffed
Enhanced Sservices ....................•...•.•.•••.... 4
II.

The Implementation Of Any Alternative
Framework For Pacific And GTEC Should Await
A Decision In The Supplemental Rate Design
Phase Of This Proceeding •••••••••••••••••••••••• ?

CONCLUSION . ••••••••.•••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••• • 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

1188

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

API
opening

is

brief

and

extensively

as

(Pacific),

an

API
has

the

framework

plans

Brief

is

in

API's

this

opening

position
by

and

an

participated

party.

(GTEC)

filed

Systems)

advanced

(ORA).

those

who

otherwise

Company's

GTE California

been altered by

party

Alarm

interested

Ratepayer Advocates

Closing

of

who

discussed

alternative

interested

(Brief

proceeding

brief

an

on

the

Pacific

Bell

the Division of

Its basic views have not

parties'

accordingly

Opening Briefs.
limited

to

two

This
issues

which nonetheless require brief discussion in light of
the opening round of briefs.
First,
Brief

API

incorrectly

hybrid

form of

with

traditional

submits

urges

that

the

Pacific's

Commission

to

Opening
adopt

a

regulation which would clothe Pacific
liability

protection,

normally

reserved for regulated operations, for operations that
will

not

service

be

regulated

offerings).

under

While

negotiate

such

limitations

customers

in

deregulated

that

use

its

a

through

a

mechanism is improper.
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CPRS

Pacific
of

(i.e.,
will

tariff

be

liability

environment,
or

other

enhanced
free
with

API

to
its

submits

regulatory

Second,
reliance

that

API

both

submits

GTEC 1 s

and

that

given

Pacific 1 s

the

heavy

alternative

frameworks plans place upon rate design, the Commission
should

consider

holding

the

Phase II decision in abeyance

implementation

of

(at least as far as

its
it

relates to rate design factors) until Supplemental Rate
Design is completed in this proceeding.l/

lf

References to the transcript of the proceedings in
this case will be made by identifying the party and
witness
sponsoring
the
cited
testimony,
and
by
indicating the appropriate
Volume ( "V"), followed by
the letters
"TR" and the appropriate pagination.
References to exhibits introduced into evidence in this
proceeding will be made by the abbreviation "Ex."
followed by the appropriate number.
References to the
interested parties in the proceeding will be made in
the manner in which they appeared.
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I.
Pacific's Argument To Retain Existing
Tariff Liability Limitations Is Improper
For Enhanced Services Offered Under CPRS
A.

Current Tariff Liability Limitations
Pacific Bell and GTEC currently enjoy limited

liability for errors and omissions in the services and
facilities

that

they

Pacific's

provide.

liability

limitations are delineated in CAL. P.U.C. No. A2.2.1.14
(Rule 14), as noted in its Opening .Brief (Attachment,
p.

Rule

4) •

mistakes,

14

states

omissions,

that

damages arising out

interruptions,

delays,

of

errors or

defects in any of its services of facilities shall not
exceed an amount equal to the pro rata charges to the
customer

for

the period during which the services or

facilities are affected (Rule 14, SA. 3).

If an error

or omission affecting one service causes a diminution
in

the value of another

service,

Pacific's

liability

would include such diminution, but would not exceed the
total

amount

of

charges

to

the

customer

for

all

services or facilities during the period the customer
experienced service problems Id.
This
exceptions.

general
First,

if

limit

on

liability

has

two

the error or omission causing

the problem is attributable to gross negligence,
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then

Pacific may be held liable for damages totaling up to
$10,000.
if

the

Second, no limit is placed on its liability
error

or

omission

causing

the

problem

is

attributable to willful misconduct, fraudulent conduct,
or violation of law (Rule 14, §A.l).
B.

Tariff
Liability Limitations Apply To The
Current Regulatory Environment Which Closely
Regulates The aperations Of Pacific And GTEC
Pacific's Opening Brief contains an extensive

discussion of the legal and regulatory development of
the

limitation of

currently
and

liability doctrine

subject.

Court

An examination of

precedent

discloses

that

application

cited

while

to

to which

the

in

these

existing

its

rules

it

is

the Commission
brief,

may

regulatory

however,

have

valid

environment,

they are out of place in an environment where enhanced
services will be offered on a detariffed, deregulated
basis by both Pacific and GTEC.
For
Investigation

instance,
Regarding

Telephone Corporations,
the

proposition

the

doctrine

that

of

Pacific
Limitation

contemplate

for

71 Cal. P.U.C.

229 (1970)

for

limited

122B

re

Liability

five

the

In

of

principal

reasons

underlie

liability.

(See,

Pacific's

Opening Brief, Attachment at 6).
cited

cites

Each of those reasons

traditional

form

of

rate

regulation.

An example is provided in item "(1)" which

states that limited liability allows the provision of
service at a cost to the public that might be higher
without

the

limitation.

contemplates
court

the

judgments

Id.

traditional
are

Such

logic

regulatory

sometimes

held

to

obviously

scheme
be

since

properly

includable as an above the line expense which are in
turn spread to the ratepayers as a whole.
Memorandum
May 19,
Part

31

Class

Opinion

1989

B Telephone Carriers

249 P.

FCC

89-136,

Accounts

for

Class A and

to Account For Judgements

Costs Associated With Anti trust

2d 686

confirms

released

("Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend

Cole v. Pacific

7),

Order,

Uniform System Of

and Other

•

and

See, e.g.,

Tel.~

(1952),
that

the

Lawsuits")

Tel. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416,
also cited by Pacific,
existing

liability

(Id. at

limitation

rule contemplates a scheme of close regulation:
The theory underlying these decisions is that
a public utility, being strictly regulated in
all operations with considerable curtailment
of its rights and privileges, shall likewise
be
regulated
and
limited
as
to
its
liabilities.
In consideration of its being
peculiarly the subject of state control, its
liability is and should be defined and
limited.
[Correll v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. )
There is nothing harsh or inequitable--:ln
upholding such a limitation of liability when
it is thus considered that the rates as f1xed
by the Commission are established with the
rule of limitation in mind.
(emphasis
added)
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Thus,

the

court

found

liability limitation equitable

for companies like Pacific and GTEC which are strictly
regulated

in all

of

their

operations and which have

their rates fixed by the Commission.
::!._:_

Pacific TeL !_ Tel.

See also Davidan

Co., 16 Cal. App.

3d 750,

94

Cal. Rpts. 337 (1971); Waters::!._:_ Pacific Telephone Co.,
12 Cal. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753, 523 P.2d 1161 (1974);
Pacific Bell v. Colich, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (1988).

c.

Adoption Of The GTEC Or Pacific Proposal Should
Incorporate
Modified
Tariff
Liability
Limitations
For
Their
Detariffed, · Enhanced
Serv1ce Offerings
Under

regulatory
contrary

CPRS

the

oversight

roles

to Pacific 1 s

merely "streamline"

Commission's
would

traditional

be

diminished,

baseless claim that CPRS would

existing regulation sufficient to

retain limited liability precepts.
at

8).

While

(Pacific's Opening

Brief,

Attachment

indeed

retain some control over certain of Pacific 1 s

service

offerings,

Pacific

service

operations

will

be

admits

the

Commission

that

offered

on

its
a

may

enhanced

detariffed

basis, Opening Brief, at 98, n.*, -- a conclusion that
is inescapable given the FCC's preemptive deregulation
of
104

these services.
FCC

2d

958

See generally, Report and Order,

( 1986)
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("Computer

III").

Thus,

the

li

traditional
liability

rationale

must

for

applying
this

r

limited
set

of

services.
Under the
supra,
be

ing test established in Cole,

increased re

accompanied

Following

the

by

ion of regulation should also
less

strict

rationale

liability

implicit

limitations.

in that case,

if an

area is completely deregulated, then public policy does
not demand liability 1

tation.

This same conclusion was voiced by Pacific's,
GTEC' s

and

DRA' s

witnesses

on

the

record

here.

As

pointed out in API's initial brief in this phase, both
companies'

witnesses

testified

activity claims arisi

•

anticompetitive

r their proposed frameworks

should be heard in the courts,

and in this same vein

Pacific's witness,

testified that

liability

•

t

Dr.

Hausman,

limitations

should

be

tariff

eliminated

Pacific's enhanced service offerings.

for

See, e.g., Brief

of API Alarm Systems, pp. 34-36.
API submits that Pacific simply cannot have
it both ways
deregulated,

if its enhanced service operations are
as

they

surely

will

be

under

existing

law -- then it must play by the same rules as do its
competitors.

A contrary
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result

is

more

likely

to

introduce a playing field tilted in favor of Pacific's
enhanced service operations,

with a consequent impact

on competition.
These same concerns permeate Pacific's
GTEC's)

plans

to

price

network

services on a flexible basis,

access

(and

for

these

(see, e.g., Brief of API

Alarm Systems at 13-15; 23-25), while at the same time
they intend to compete in these markets.
Commission

extends

limited

Id.

liability

If

to

the
cover

anticompetitive activity for regulated operations which

it may

are designed to influence unregulated markets,
unintentionally
GTEC.
clear

API' s

invite

initial

delineation

of

regulatory au thor i ty
API

reincorporates

API's position,

such

activity

by

brief

outlined

the

the

ambit

of

in this area

those

however,

remarks

the
id.

Pacific
need

and

for

a

Commission's
at 35-36)

here.

The

gist

and
of

is that Pacific's and GTEC's

proposed alternative frameworks should not result in a
playing

field

competitors
those

for

that

competitors

these
is

not

companies'

enhanced

level,

that

without

a

or

meaningful

claims of unfair or anticompetitive activi
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service

would
remedy

leave
for

II

The Implementat
Framework For
fie And GTEC
Await A Decision In The
Supplemental Rate Design Phase Of This Proceeding

("BAT"),

In

the

it

ar

proposal is
the

Bri
generally

rge

Commission

Pacific's

not

shou

Supplemental

this proceeding,

that

Rate

any

Design

("SRO"),

is completed.

scheduled

( BAT B r i e f

for

at 6- 12 ) •
s opening

it agrees both simply because it makes sense,

and because SRD now
upon

decision

r GTEC or Pacific) until

Although API did not raise this point in
brief,

CPRS

a matter of rate design, and that

reached in Phase II (either
the

of Bay Area Teleport,

Phase

observations

II

than
to

rs to
be

each

re.

even more dependent
The

company's

relevance of
proposal

these

will

be

discussed in order.
First, as BAT noted, Pacific's CPRS proposal
is

largely

freeze

rate design driven given

residential

rates,

to

eliminate TouchTone charges

and to raise certain business rates,
private line rates.

its proposal

Id. at 6.

including analog

As API's initial brief

pointed out, Pacific's proposal is sadly lacking in the
most

basic

cost

details

evaluation of its plan.

1 B

as

to

allow

a

fundamental

(Brief of API Alarm Systems,

at 17-20).

In Pacific's Opening Brief, it nonetheless

proceeds upon the basis that certain services are below
costs (e.g., private line), which the Commission should
now agree to raise "in principle," as a component of
Id. at 33-34.~

CPRS,

While API does not believe that

Pacific's private line services are priced below their
relevant costs (it has examined the subject in several
Pacific rate proceedings), it does not quarrel with the
proposition

that

related costs.

rates

should

generally

plea

for

principle"

their

Pacific's CPRS plan appears much more

dependent upon its rate design factors,
its

cover

an

approval

would suggest.

of
For

price

however,
increases

instance,

what

if

than
11

in

the

Commission were to approve freezing basic residential
rates,

giving

away

TouchTone

and

eliminating

attrition/rate case proceedings, only to discover that
SRD

would

not

justify

further

rate

increases?

If

Phase II were not yet implemented, consequent damage to
Pacific's
minimized
downside

stockholders
from

such

risks of

a

and

ratepayers

miscalculation.

would

be

Given

the

implementing Phase II now,

~

however,

Pacific's Opening Brief on this point characterizes
API witness Edwards' testimony in a manner (perhaps
inadvertently) which infers his agreement that private
line services are below cost.
Mr. Edwards' testimony
was emphatically the opposite, however.
(API Ex. A-96,
p. 5} •
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API submits that

better course is to await Phase II

implementation until after
picture

Commission has a clear

service costs from SRD.
The need to

Phase II implementation for

GTEC until after SRD is even more compelling.
opening brief noted,

I

As API's

GTEC's proposal to include alarm

grade private line services as a "category 2" service,
and

to

subject

them

to

serial

rate

increases

as

a

result, represents a complete abandonment of cost-based
pricing

for

these monopoly

Alarm Systems, at 10-12)

ser

ces.

(Brief

of

API

Indeed, as API pointed out,

this particular feature of GTEC' s plan appears solely
designed

to maximize

the Company's revenues.

Id.

at

API submits that SRD will demonstrate the fallacy

11.

behind GTEC's logic on this score, since analog private
line costs simply will not tell the story that GTEC's
carte blanche pricing request promises.
GTEC's

'

emphasis,

Opening

however,

flexibility

to

Brief
the

adds

need

should

price

be

analog

initially

delay

to

any

for analog private line pricing, as GTEC

would implement it, until after SRD.
it

particular

noted

that

private

based

upon

services were either

GTEC' s

line
GTEC's

In this regard,

proposal

services

to

was

assertions

flexibly
at

least

that

those

'competitive or discretionary'
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--

criteria that API submits were thoroughly discredited
on

the

record,

implementation
Opening

line
plan

now

(API

appears
~

by assuming,

rates

are

would

inconsistencies

scheme.

Brief

entirely,

by

GTEC's

Brief at

8-9).

GTEC's

to

shifted

priori,

below costs,

give

in

users

have

that analog

and by arguing

of

those

gears
private

that

services

its

price

predictability, and would avoid 'policing' difficulties
for

those

admits

private

do

not

services.

meet

pricing

its

which
own

GTEC

now

apparently

criteria

for

category

2

{GTEC Opening Brief, at 31-33).
Against

GTEC's

lines

proposal
of

this
to

analog

background,

engage

in

private

API

the

line

submits

upward

services

that

flexible
should

be

rejected out of hand, since GTEC apparently admits that
its own criteria may not be accurate in this respect.
And at the very least, API submits that to the extent
that

GTEC

is

relying

upon

private

line

revenue/cost

relationships to justify its proposal, any decision on
its

flexible

pricing

request should be delayed

until

after SRD, where those relationships will be examined.
CONCLUSION
API
maintain

submits

vestiges

of

that

Pacific's

traditional

1308

request

regulation

to

(limited

tariff

competitive,

liability)

operations

it

whi

submits

define
services

•

the

that
scope

subject

to

enter,

is

service

inconsistent

ir play and should be rejected.

with notions of
also

seeks

enhanced

the
of

to

Commission
its

should

regulatory

'streamlined,'

API

explicitly

authority

for

or non-regulation,

in order to maintain the Courts' ability to discipline
GTEC's

and

Pacific 1 s

anticompetitive

activities,

as

recommended by these companies' witnesses.
Finally, API submits that ·Phase II decisions
should not ·be implemented for GTEC or Pacific,

(to the

extent that they are dependent on rate design factors
as discussed herein), until the completion of SRD.

~a~~min H. Dick
, J •
Blooston, Mordkofsky, ,
Jackson & Dickens
,
2120 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202)659-0830

Counsel for API Alarm
Systems
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CENTEX TELEMANAGEMENT, INC.
PRESENTATION to
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE
on
UTILITIES and COMMERCE
June 6, 1989
SPECIAL HEARING on "TELEPHONE REGULATION"
you remember the forgotten class
I am here
In the three years
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ttee the number of small
since I last
600 to 6000, primarily
businesses CENTEX
not. CENTEX
located in Cali
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believes small businesses
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made available to
As you may
management
company. CENTEX
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as those typi
employed by
businesses. CENTEX' bus
is managing the
telecommunication
of these
the local

CENTEX favors
exchange telephone
telecommunication needs
I emphasize customers because
considered in 1
of their
promoting it or render
the
it. Competitors of a monopo
market. Customers
fairly and equally.

are being
ition, either
to participate in
are
with entry into the
are concerned with being treated

As customers CENTEX' clients may be adverse
affected by
regulatory changes which do not
ze the LEC's continuing
monopoly power. The
ion which the California Public
Utilities Commission must answer is: How can customers be
assured equal access and
pric
to the telecommunication
services contained
the LEC's central offices?
In the past, concerns of customers about these services and other
telecommunication issues could be
any of several
forums. The most
of
is the traditional rate
case.
If the California
ic Utilities Commission decides to reduce
in any way
li
of this forum to LEC customers, the
availabili
ficacy of the other forums becomes
essential. This concern is the
CENTEX' participation
in the Commission's ''Alternative
Framework" proceeding
and our
of your
tat
fore this
Committee.

1

B

CENTEX has suggested four safeguards to the Commission that must be
made part of any changes in the regulatory process:
1. LEC services must be made available on a nondiscriminatory basis. Small businesses, whether ordering
services on an individual basis or utilizing an external
management company such as CENTEX, must be assured equal
access to the same services as any other business customer
at equal rates, terms, and conditions.
2.
The functional elements of the LEC network services must
be made available on an unbundled basis. By unbundled we mean
the ability to order the technology of the network in the
smallest components which are technically feasible.
The
focus here should be meeting the broadest general business
needs, not the convenience of the LEes.
3.
Any flexibility granted to the LECs should not be
implemented until a more effective, timely, and less costly
complaint procedure is created and made available.
(CENTEX
has proposed that a workshop be held, under the auspices of
the CPUC, to develop such improvements.)

4.
Strict procedures for establishing cost-based
pricing of LEC service elements should be instituted by the
Commission and made part of the upcoming rate design hearings
which are part of this "Alternative Regulatory Framework"
proceeding.

CENTEX supports the traditional goals of utility regulation
listed in the letter of invitation which announced this hearing.
The Commission is being asked to make changes in the regulatory
process whose purpose it is to accomplish those goals. Our
message to the Commission, to this Committee, and to the rest of
the Legislature is to insure that the interests of smaller
businesses, which represent the heart of California's economic
health and growth, are not forgotten if any changes are made.
The inclusion of the safeguards proposed by CENTEX in any changes
to the regulatory process will be a good first step in protecting
the interests of small businesses as well as those of other
telephone utility customers.
THANK YOU.
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Centex Telemanagement Brings Back The Phone Company
By Jolm A. Jones, Investor's Daily
For business. people who miss the
simpler times of the old Bell System, a
young outfit called Centex Telemanagement Inc. has reinvented the one-stop
telephone company. For a management
fee, the San Francisco-based company
analyzes the communications needs of
its small and medium-sized business
clients, picks out the best combination
or services and equipment from today's
often conrusing
or choices, and
sets
the system
the client's
local telephone con:lpanty.
Centex doesn't own a~y

Since it began
19114,
Centex has built
to
about 3,500 clients. The
now
serve$ six major California
and
it has expanded to the East Coast
service in New.¥ orlt and Boston.
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Centex
the bulk

companies and
bill each Centex
network center u a group. Centex in
turn breaks down the charges and bills
its individual clients.
Analysts said the local telephone
companies pin from having Centex
bring their local area networks business
that might otherwise go to independent
,..,...n..,r~- as well as ~tetting the clients'

of

earlier.
million from
As the business bas grown, Centex
has trimmed its expenses u a percentage
of sales. General and administrative
expenses fell to 12°/e or billings in the
first quarter from 15% a year
while client acquisition expenses fell to
1 "l•L

..-..rJ...atift...,., fr.nrn
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said Centex can contract for
101'12-<ils!ance services at lUI average of
of AT&T's direct-dial
and
sell them to Centex clients for
of
the AT&T rate. The clients still make
substantial
"Tile risks are that
don't have
investment" in equipment,
, "Entry barriers are
so competition could appear. To
date they've seen three or four compel·
j itors try this and fail. Execution is a
I pretty difficult thing."
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Finally, the approach we recommend the State Legislature
to take is one of increased oversight of the CPOC and one which
encourages more public hearings and less stipulations and side
agreements. More evidentiary hearings should be held in the major
metropolitan areas to facilitate greater participation by local
consumer groups. The California Legislature should order the CPOC
to continue ROR regulation unless it can prove with substantial
evidence that change is needed. Finally, we believe it would be in
the public interest for some form of government/private consumer
advocacy, independent of the CPOC.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views.
Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of further assistance.
Very truly yours,
JAMBS K, HAHN,

Ci~torney

By~~~z~

Assistant City Attorney
EJP:sa

(213) 485-3160
3005I
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WENDT -LOPER

Governmental Relations, Inc.

JUNE 5, 1989

TO:

MEMBERS, ASSEMBLY UTILITIES AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE

FR:

DENNIS L. LOPER

RE:

US SPRINT TESTIMONY

Attached is the testimony of our client, US Sprint. Ms. Pongracz
was unable to testify in person due to a conflicting schedule.
Thank you for considering her comments.
ATTACHMENT

925 L Street • Suite 780 • Sacramento, CA 95814 • (916) 446-7843
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The Honorable Gwen Moore, Chairwoman
May 31, 1989
Page Three
Pacific's plan may cost ratepayers more money that Diablo Canyon, since
Pacific's own estimate of the cost of upgrading its network to fiber-optics is
about $25,000,000,000, and such investment produces no additional revenue. It
could destroy or severely damage many of California's telecommunications
businesses including cable television, none of which could compete with a
subsidized telephone assault.
I

The need for legislative oversight was never greater! We look forward to
seeing you at the hearing next Monday.
Sincerely,
Dennis Mangers
DHM/mb
cc: Members, Assembly Utilities &Commerce Committee
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LAW OFFICES OF

JACKSON, TUFTS, COLES BLACK
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROI'ESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

WILLIAM H. BOOTH

650 CALIFORNIA STREET

PARTNER

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94108
(415) 433-1950

TELEX ll 9103 722166
FACSIMILE

m

SAN JOSE OrriCE:
60 SOUTH MARKE:T STRE:E:T
10TH F'LOOR
SAN JOSE, CALIF'ORNIA 95113
(408) 998-19S2 (415) 494-1950

(415) 392-3494

June 7, 1989

FEDERAL EXPRESS
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Mr. Robert Jacobson
Principal Consultant
Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce
State Capitol
P.O. Box 942849
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
Re:

California Bankers Clearing House Association
Special Hearing

Dear Mr. Jacobson:
Enclosed please find six copies of the Comments of
California Bankers Clearing House Association with respect to the
hearing on telephone regulation. As you know, we had intended to
provide Mr. Gerard F. Milano, executive director of California
Bankers Clearing House Association, to testify at your hearing
scheduled for Monday, June 5, 1989. When the date was changed at
the last minute, a conflict precluded his attendance.
If you have any questions in regards to this matter, please
do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,

_

0~.~~

•

William H. Booth

WHB/cmk
Enclosures
03/WHB4CK
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE

HEARINGS ON TELEPHONE REGULATION
OF THE CALIFORNIA BANKERS CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION
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by

excluding the issue of intraLATA competition from Phase II of the
investigation, the CPUC may be headed toward a diminished form of
LEC regulation at a time when the necessary price-constraining
competition does not exist. If so, the LECs will be able to use
their market power to drive out competition and reduce, rather
than expand, the choices faced by California's ratepayers.
Accordingly, the CBCHA has encouraged the CPUC to reexamine
the

process by which

rate

of

return

regulation

has

been

implemented in order to determine if procedural corrections
should be made.

It has also strongly argued, however, that the

policy itself should not be abandoned.

California's ratepayers

are in many ways held captive by the LECs, which completely
dominate the market for local telephone services and thus the
market for connection to almost all other type of services.
Unless

the CPUC maintains

precluded

from

using

the

a

process whereby the

traditionally

LECs

are

predatory practices

available to a monopolist, these captive ratepayers will face the
risk of increased, uneconomic prices and reduced alternatives.

•

Such a situation can not be in the interest of either residential
or business customers.
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o ANPA opposes 1egis1 ive efforts
low the 1 Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) to engage 1n electron1c publishing, including H.R. 2140
introduced April 27, 1989 by Congressmen Swift and Tauke.
o ANPA believes that the owners of monopoly transmission 11nes (the Regional
Bell Operating Companies) should not own or control the content that goes over
those 1ines because of their incentive and ab111ty to engage in
anti-competitive behavior. The local telephone lines of th1 regional phone
companies are a bottleneck through which electronically published information
must pass. The 1982 consent decree prohibits RBOC entry into e1eetronic
pub11shing for good reason. The prohibition was imposed because of the
inability of the FCC to prevent anti-competitive behivior by the phone
compan1es.
o We urge the Congress to reaffirm its commitment to a pub1ie poli~y that
encourages a diversity of information sources for the American consumer.
Under H.R. 2140. the RBOts would be allowed to provide electronic publishing
in a state•if they offered a gateway within that state. The existence of a
gateway does not measure the ability of an RBOC to act anti-competitively. !f
the phone companies are allowed to offer electronic publishing, they w111 na..,e
the incentive and ability to engage in anti-competitive conduct. This wi11
mean less • not more • information sources for the American consumer. since
the monopoly phone companies have a track racord of discrimination against
other competitors. It will also mean that the ratepayer will bear the brunt
of phone company entry into these services. as cross-subs;dies from the
ratebase have bttn virtually 1mposs1blt to prevent. H.R. 2140 actually would
weaken the FCC's existing ratepayer protection measures.
ANPA supports the development of a diversity of electronic information
services, but if this 1s to happen, there must be a level playing field.
Pub1ic 1ccess to information and international competitiveness will not be
improved by RBOC involvement in information services content. If allowed, 1t
would present unacceptable anti-competitive risks in an emerging market that
would result in less 1nformat1on for the public and 1 reduced ability to
compete 1n 1nternattona1 markets.

* The American Newspaper Publishers Association 1s a non-profit trade

association representing more than 1,400 newspapers throughout North America
Its membership comprises approximately 90 percent of the daily and Sunday
c1rcu1at1on 1n the u.s. Many nondatly newspapers a1so are members.
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At
s point, the local tKthange 1s the only viable means of distribution for
most electronic information services. There is no alternative. Information
content services remain particularly vulnerable to manipulation and
d1scr1minat1cn by the .onopoly phone company th&t provides the only ~e•ns of
transmission. The history of the ATlT case points to the ability of the phone
.company to discriminate in favor of its own operations and the inadequacy of
accounting safeguards to prevent cross-subsidization. This later point was
admi
by FCC officials during the AT&T litigation. That is why the
prohi tion on RBOC entry into content should remain. The so-called
safeguards in H.R. 2140 are much weaker than those applied to AT&T in the
past, and would not prevent discrimination and cross·subsidy.
U S. District Court's March 7. 1988 decision gave the RBOCs a tremendous
opportunity to offer a wide array of information services including a variety
of ~gateway• services, voice storage and retr1eva1, voice messaging,
electronic mail and electronic white pages. AHPA believes that development of
these infrastructure services by the RBOCs will help spur consumer access and
use of information content services, and this is their proper role in the
information marketplace. These services are in add1t1on to the wide range of
information sector services the RBOCs already provide. including basic
exchange serv1ce, provision of consumer services and equipment and printed
white and yellow pages, to name just a few.
The electronic information services marketplace for both voice and data is
developing. Numerous newspapers and other entrepreneurs are providing voice
text information services for consumers. These services art proving
extreme1y popular.
The advertising market is just as susteptib1e as any other form of electronic
1shing to RBOC abuses. Electronic yellow pages fall within the realm of
nformat1on content and should be off limits for an RBOC to offer for the
reasons set forth above. There are a number of businesses, large and small.
wh1
are·enter1ng this market. Entry of the RBOCs would stifle this
aarkatp1ace evolution.

u.s.

.

1s a world leader in tha davelopment of new electronic information

U.S. exports three times the amount of information services
With respect to the French Minitel system. it is important

it imports.

that information content comes from competing service providers
ndependent of the French te1aphone company. The French PTT has increased
penetration of home terminals by distributing millions of them as part of tne
M1n1te1 system. It should be noted that the ATlT Consent Decree today does
not prevent the RBOCs from distributing terminals. In fact. under current
1awt one
ona1 Bell Operating Company, Southwestern 8111, is already
ing terminals in connection with its new g1teway in Houston.
eccmmunicat1ons policy has been and remt1ns an important
ion of the Congress, le;1s1at1on to 11ft the restrictions on RBOC
s1on of content would present anti-compet1t1ve risks in an emerging
information age will continue to grow on1y if those who control
i11t1es have no incentive or ability to prefer certain
above others.

1e oversight
f i. . . . .

y
you to support information diversity 1nd oppo~ H.R. 2140 or
at1ve attempts to cr1pp1e true competition in the in ormation
ces marketp1ace.
1
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ATTACHMENT Q
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California Association of Long Distance
Telephone Companies
925 L Street. Suite 220
Sacramento. CA 95814
(916) 441-4166

Hand

June 14, 1989

The Honorable Gwen Moore, Chairwoman
Assembly Committee on
Utilities and Commerce
State Capitol, Room 2117
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Assemblywoman Moore:
On
f of the
i
of
Distance
Telephone Companies (CALTEL) I
to extend my thanks to
you for conducting a highly informative (and extremely timely)
hearing last week on the regulation (or prospective lack
thereof) of local exchange carriers.
You and your staff
obviously spent a great deal of time preparing for the hearings
as was evidenced by your questions.
Your hearing provided an excellent forum for those of us
who are concerned about the relaxation or abandonment of the
traditional
rate case structure for large local exchange
carriers such as Pacific Bell and General Telephone.
While I
understand that it was not possible for you to hear from
everyone, I did want to write to let you know that CALTEL
is
also very concerned over this development and generally shares
the views expressed by the witnesses from AT&T and MCI.
While there are problems with the present rate
structure, to a large degree those problems are fostered
local exchange carriers themselves.
As Ms. Seigel pointed
it is a bit disingenuious for Pacific Bell to respond to
intervenor claim with a barrage of discovery requests
rebuttal witnesses and then argue to the Commission that
rate case takes· too long.
Believe me, those of us
handsomely funded than Pacific Bell would desire nothing
than
to
reduce
the time and expense
associated
participating in a rate case.
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The
Gwen Moore
June 14, 1989
2

we cannot endorse a proposal which would
attentuate the rate case process at the expense of ratepayer
protections.
We all know that the unit cost of providing
telecommunications services is dropping and it is essential to
ensure that as many telephone customers as possible (whether
they be large or small users of local exchange andjor long
distance
services)
share
in the
benefits.
The
cost
j
fication attendant to the rate case process ensures that
this will occcur. We have yet to hear any compelling reason for
abandoning the long-standing requirement that local exchange
carriers justify their rates on an on-going basis to the Public
Utilities Commission.
Again, you are to be congratulated for an excellent
hearing. Thank you for your continuing oversight of the fashion
which local exchange carriers are regulated.
best wishes.
Very truly yours,

~~

Smith, President
Association of Long
Companies
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1989

Mr. Gregg Cook
Pacific Telesis Group
925 L Street, Suite 850
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Gregg:
In his written testimony submitted to this Cmrunittee yesterday, Mr.
Bruce Jameson, Pacific's
comments in a footnote which
require further amplication.
Mr. Jameson states, in
to the Background Paper I prepared,
that "The paper.. .is in error in its characterization of this subject." He is
referring to my remark in the Background Paper that "the PUC twice
rejected" Pacific's CPRS plan. My Webster's defines "reject" as "to refuse
to acknowledge, acquiesce in, or submit to." Mr. Jameson is one-third
right and two-third's wrong: the PUC certainly acknowledged Pacific's
proposal, but it did not acquiesce or submit to it. Nor did the PUC use
Pacific's plan. ("Not to use" is another definition of "rejection.")
In the same footnote,
Jameson
that the Background Paper
"also contains other errors of fact." I would appreciate Mr. Jameson's
the readers of the Committee's hearing
enumeration of these errors, so
report can be properly informed. I fear that readers may find Pacific's
written submission tantalizingly incomplete without this elaboration.

1 B

Mr. Gregg Cook

2

June 7, 1989

Can we have this addendum prepared before next Wednesday, when
our report will go out to print? Thank you for your assistance.

~ly,
I

ROBERT JACOBSON
Principal Consultant
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ATTACHMENT S
June 13, 1989

Mr. Robert Jacobson
Principal Consultant
Assembly Committee
on Utilities and Commerce
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
Dear Mr. Jacobson,

•

In your letter of June 7, 1989 to Gregg Cook you asked for
further amplification of my recent comments to the Utilities
and Commerce Committee.
The following are major comments, but
are not all inclusive.
First, page 5 of your paper entitled "'Don't Hang Up!·:
The
PUC and Telephone Service in the 90's -- Regulation,
Deregulation, or Reregulation?" contains the following:
"The
PUC twice rejected Pacific Bell's "California Plan for Rate
Stability, ... ".
As I stated in my filed testimony the PUC has not rejected
Pacific's proposal.
In June 1986, af er the hearing on
Pacific's Rate Projection filing, the forerunner to the
California Plan for Rate Stability, Commissioner Donald Vial
issued a ruling stating that Pacific's Rate Projection filing
merits further consideration and inviting Pacific to propose a
proper forum for the PUC to consider the matter.
(A copy of
Commissioner Vial's ruling is attached.)
The ruling clearly
did not reject Pacific's proposal on the merits; it simply
delayed consiieration of it.
The current Commission OII is the
second occasi n for Pacific's proposal to be considered.
Again
the Commission has not ~ejected Pacific's proposal.
Some
aspects of Pacific's proposal were adopted by the Commission in
their Phase I decision (D. 88-09-059) of this OII and other
aspects of the proposal are pending in Phase II and Phase III.
Second, there are several other errors in your paper which need
to be corrected.
For example, on page 5 of your paper, you
state:
"This year, after extensive investigation of Pacific
Bell's technology investments revealed that some o: these
investments were not necessary, the PUC directed Pacific Bell
to reduce its rates by more than $120 over the next three
years."
You should be aware that the Commission has not
decided anything.
The settlement agreement between Pacific and
ORA did not find that any "investments were not necessary".
Further, this proposed settlement is pending before the
Commission.
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On page 6 of your paper, you state:
"In 1988, the PUC
completed Phase One of the Investigation, allowing for ... (3)
less scrutiny for special contracts negotiated getween Pacific
and GTE and their largest customers."
In D. 88-09-059, the
PUC did not provide for less scrutiny for special contracts.
Indeed each contract requires PUC preapproval before the
services for which the contract is written can be installed.
Thus, Phase I tightened contract scrutiny by now requiring that
contracts with governmental agencies be preapproved whereas
previously such contracts did not require preapproval.
Your letter indicated you wished to include more complete
information in the Committee's report.
I would appreciate this
letter and its attachment being included in its entirety in the
report.
Sincerely yours,

. Jamison
Executive Director
State Regulatory Proceedings

Attachment (1)
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In tht Hatter of the Application of
PAOl1IC JILL. a corporation, for

autbori~J to tnerea1e ctrta1~ iatralt&tt rates ana char&•• appliea~l• to
ttltlhoae aetviot furn1ehe4 Within
the tate of California •

•
On Mar 27, 1986, a htarin& vaa ht14 \tfore tht full
Coaaita1on i~ the rate 4tailn portion of thia procee4in&· !he
heatin& vaa htl4 purtuant to a lulin& of thi• Coaailtiontr 4ate4
April 1, 1986 vbioh in relevant part retu1rt4 !acifie Jell (Pacific)
to prtaeut corporate oftictrl havial tirst-han4 knovlt4&t of
Jacific'• present lona-r~ 11veetaent etrate17 aa4 overall \ulin•••
plan to teetif7 un4tr oath an4 eub3tet to oro•a-examination on
Pacific'• pro~ecte4 ratta over the next five to 10 r•ara. !he Rulinc
&110 htl4 that !aeifio'• rt~Q1&r rate ca1e 1hcvin' could ao forward
except that the propolt4 rate lhift troa 1ntraLi!A toll to local
exchaaat rates voul4 bt liaitt4 to &D aaOUftt not creater 1hAA that
reooaaen4e4 bJ Public ltaft D£v1aioa (!ID) 1ft 1t1 Jtbtu&rf 7. 1986

•
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I

compromiat propoeal1 unlttl another order or r~lina allove4 a
creater ehift after the ecamiaaicn b&4 acre inforaation aa to lonarMCI ratea.
laoStio prc4uce4 three extcut1ve vitaeaaee, !. J. 8ae~c•r,
1t1 prta!ttnt ana chief executive officer, tte o. Camp. 1t1 vice
prea14eftt-aarktt1n&a an4 Otorc• J. Bohaitt, ita viet pre•14ent of
operation• north.
lather than preaent a currtnt projection, Saenaer preaentea
a cofioeptuallr new pro)oaal fo~ rt,ulat1on of fao1t1o vh1ch conten4a
that the preaentl7 acht4ul.t rate 4ta1an htartnca lhoul4
forvar4
a.M. the Coma1ea1on ahoul4 uopt lao1tto•a propoa&l. !ben Pacific
voul4 tree&e )&sic rtai4tnoe rate• ~t tht levels propott4 1n ita
lateat :tiline (110 for ont-pa.rtr unl1a1tt4 local aerv1ot 1 up from the
preaent 18.25) throu&h 1~89. It &44t4 tha.t Pao1:t1c pre4icte4 that it
voul4 Dtt4 to reque1t cnl7 ao4tlt baeio rel14enee increaaea.;throuah
1995·
Saenser maintaine4 that thie freeze an4 potaiblt ao4eat
increatt voul4 be ~ceaible it, in a44ition to adoptinc !acific'e
pen41~1 rate propoaal, thia Coamialion &&r••• to the follovin&:

co

1 Jacifio'e Jrcpolal lhifta o••~ 1400 aillion ift revenue froa .
1•f.r.W!.l L..,ll •• ,-~.S.••
1et&1
P&too. !fhe JID ooaproai.lf
propoaal lhifta about 17t aillioa out of ••••&&• toll rates via a Ill
to SLU tracait~on, rtali,ae certain nort~trD lac Praac1eoo ,_, Area
oallinl rate1 (4tcreaa.S.~f th.a _, about 112 aillion). ac4 epreade the
aaouat of rtvtnue rtaovt fraa theae two 10urcea alona with the
aaouat of tbt current author!ael b1111n& turch&r&t of a\out 1120
a1111on. anifotal7 tor all aer.ioe o&t11orie1 •xcept ooia, ~ittline.
u4 Cent.rex.

•••llaaa•

••
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1.

Intent (IOI)
U

1989 WBIB

the COaBilliOB VOU14

~o1ntl1

2.

I

&)JU"O&Ch

of rat•• utll

~4erl11na aeauaptioae
re~latorJ traaework itaelf.

an4 the new
Allowina !aoifio
equ&llJ ahare &nJ

ita rateparere to
in exo••• of
lacific'l a~thorilt4 rate of rttU:B•
'· !tahapint
Jflllnt
atruaturt to aovt
~vulnera~l• r•v•nu• ao~roee~ tovar4 coat, ana
to iapleaent a bulk rate Jl&n for the
reeovtrJ of aontraffic ••n•itive (1!1) ocate
froa intertzch • carriers tor acotll to .

e.
' 9.
10.

earn1~11

!acifio'a evitch 4 nttvork.
Maintaininl the Coaaiaeion'e prtltnt policr
ot a1lowinl
a aonopol7 in i~tr&LA!A
aarketa ..
Allovinl Pac1
a4juet prices for certain
strv1ctl within a pre4tteralnt4 priot ranee
vi th a :tloor
"reltv~t costa• an4 a c&p
,
Itt with f1J&r4
aarket tac~ort.
·
le,lao1al ~tiae-oontuain, hearin.-• for the
authorisation of aew offeriacm or rate chana•
req,1.uusta ri
a re
Jrooe£ve.
Allov1
aove capital reoovet7 to
the act
ratt ot capital aoaa~ptioa an4 to
eliminate itl R£epreciatioa reserve
4eticieaor• a. tulcklf &a potli\le.
Al1ow1aa tacltio the option of uain, 1te
ahare of earai
over the authoriae4 rate of
return to offlt the 4tJrtoiat1oa reaerve
4tf1c1eru~tf ..
Al10Y1BI hot. fie to tspua 1ta network
otter!~, or aa the witn••••• 4tlor1)e4 it,
8 )1 1.11 tbt it IU lite 11
Coatiauial to cYtrltt t~eif1c, )ut vit~
•appropriate aontiauiaa IUtYtilluce• aft4

with a •a11s1oa &D4 aoall• of tao1f1c ana the
Coam1111on which are •coapati,le.•

1

..

Ca&:p';

an4

that of Satn&er. Sehmitt•a
&o&la an! objectives tor lena-term
at level of capital espenditure; taraett! •

•

t•

aaplifitl~

taethaon;r
inveatmente vi
a
throuch 1990 ..
!he moat 1mmt41ate Jfobltm created bf tbie teetimcny 11 the
concern t%preeaed b7 aanr of the 1nttrtatt4 ~artita in 'the rate case
an! relate4 :Pae111e procee41DII ;!. J'ormt.l rtapcnaee prottttina
Jacific'a tilin& vert received from ~aer'a Group, MCI, lf!f. GTE
Sprint, an4 !SD. So•• parti·e; art ccnctrnt4 a'bcnat whether the
Comaiaeicn plana to ccnai!tr S&tn&•r'e prcpoell and, it ao, whether
that will chan&• the oouree of the acetae caat which 11 preatntl7
~tin& heard.
!ht1 art alec concerned about apparent inconaiattnciea ·
between Saen&er'e propcaal &n4 tbt !tt&ilt4 &atn!t4 rate !tei&n
propoaal Pacific filed with the Commiation on 1_, 19, 1986. !he7
nee4 to know whi=h one(a) to reepon! to in their prepare! t~stimo~
due on J~lf 20. (In tha C&lt 01 tht 1ndepandent telephone companita,
the filial date 11 June ,0.1 It the Ccmaiaeion plans to eon1ide~
~acific'a propoaal, partie• Y&nt an opportunitt to ccn4uct 41acovtr7•
further crosa-exam1ne tbe thrtt corporate witntlltl, an4 file
eomaente and brief1. !urther. if tbe Ccmmiation 4ecidea to permit
additional ahitta trom toll to local exch&a&l an4/or to accept
'aeific'a propoa&l, the11 partite point out that Pacific voul4 \e
entitled to amen4 itl ptopoae4 rate 4eaian eo that bear1n11 should be
held on the nev rate 4eat;n.
I think acme of thelt concern• can be alleviated
•
iaae4iatt1J. firat, the prCJOIIl and teetiaonr preaente4 on Ka, 27,
altboU~h indicative of hov 'acitic aeea thl future, 4oee not previae

2 A letter to ALJ Colfan troa Alan t. !tJptr &ttorneJ for Veattrn
Juralar 6 71rt Alarm aeociaticn, 4tacribea thtlt concerftl cleatl7
and aucciuctlJ'.

1

autticitn! a
lhift bttYIIft

a revenue
areater th&n that
allcw1~1

, prcv:::!~v!•,::::;urt

paraitte4
'ao1tio'•
froa tht atatu.

\

i81UII, lOCI

r ccna14eration, but it 4oel
it JfCPOIII rtVitvin&
~een a44rtllt4 <••I• 4tprte1ation
of other pr.octt4in&•
nttvork). Jurther, we are
on ~r curre~t.revitv of
il&tion tactora, an4 other
rate oaat. AI etatt•a
potential revenue

Of whiOb

reaerve), othtra

•

(tntere~oh&n&e

I

carr

not prep&re4, as Pac
J&eifio•a ao4arniaat
relate4 aatter1 eti
re1ponat point• out, sill
ion.
reduction• ~~ under oon1i
In the area
ve were •~pectinc to be bttter
1ntorae4, we 414 ltarn
Pacific that it ha. & relat1vtl1 flat
lonc•ttra invt1tment
!hie
aort of into~ticft that .. the April 1 Julinl aate4
thil tort are atill
nee4e4 to &ivt the
f&e1fic •••• itaelf in
five to 10 Jl&rs,
formulate ita own
concept of Ykat 4ir
ific ahoul4 taka •. Va auat
rtaain cautious aa4 c&Dnot
aajor reaulatorr cb&nl• when v•
have ao little on vtioh to -aae a ~ilion of the future.
Vhilt it &Jfe~l p011ible for local esohaft&t rata atab1l1t7
throuab 19~9 to \a attaiat6 \J a aoieat aaen4aent to Jac1f1c 1 1
pea41D& rata 4tt11B tt1ttacn1 eve~ within the liaitationa of tbe
reven~• shift that h&a
iapoet4 earlier in thie p~oott41nl• the
~k of fao1f1o'• propoaal conat1tute; a tar•reaohi~ 4eparturt from
ptiiiAt rattaakia, Jroot4urtlt It 11 lot appropriate.to tap&A4 the
ecope of this rate proote4iat
oo~iler euoh a ft*W oocotpt ot
recui&tion, espeoill1J 1D view ot tbt propoeal'e coaples
i~terrelatioBehipe with other aajor prooee4iDII•
!here ate tvo

•••n

/

1

I

I

;~

•

{

,\

1

I
poeeible.:torua for cons14er1a& aueh an overhaul. Ont 11 u
;,r
appl:l.ce:Uon p1"oeilt41nl where f&oific veula :tilt a 4etaile4 requeat to · J
sate .uch chan&••· an! the other voul4 bt an Or!tr Inat:l.tutifta ·
Inveatiaation where, perhape, we vou14 &44r••• the iaJaot or
applSoa\111 tr of euch eh&nltl on all lccll exch&nlt carrier a. I will ~~I
lee.vt 1t to J&c:l.f'io to ta.ke the next tttp 1.1 far 1.1 ita J!rcpoaal ccea .. 11!
!here fore, l'f IS !'O'Ul) that t
'·
1. lxcept tor tht concept of loeal exch&nlt rate atabtlitr
throuJh 1989, tht overall prop~ell put forth~ !. J. 8aen111" at the
btarina on Mar 27, 19!6 will not be cona14ere4 in tbt priaent
proctt4iq.
2. Jteauae of the proxia1t1 ot their filina 4ate, an! tht
confuaion encendtre! b7 tht x_, 27 hearin&, in4epen4ent telephone
coapaniet' :t111n1 !ate 11 exten4t4 troa June ,0, 1986 to Julr 1•,
1986.
.
;. It Pacific vithtl the Coami111on to further oonai4er ite .'/1
propce&l tor a new tJJHt of ratemakiftl replation. it eht.ll filt u. · .·
application or othtrviee tue reapcnai'btlitr for prcpoainc a proper /.
tcrua tor ccnl14trin& the aatter.
Date! June 12t 19!6 0 at
francieco. California.

1

B

:

•
· A·l5.01.0,., lal5.0,.078 AC/v41
CllfUtC.lJJ OP IJBVi2J

·· I otrtit, ~bat %h&vt ' ' aall thl1 4at ••rve4 a tru. oop7 ·
of tbt or1&iaal attaobt4 At•l,ata Coaa1111oatr'• Iulie& oa Corpor&te
Otfioer teetiaonJ oa Ill J&rtltl of rtoora in tbla Jrocte41ft& or
their attor~t71 of reoor4.
.
»att4 Juat 11, 198S, at laa Pranc11co, Ca11forftia.
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CONNECTION, lit.

CA. 04047

(415) 098 4400

From: Dennis E.
President
The Extensl
12 Glen Ln
NovatoJ CA. 94947
To:

Assemblywoman
Gwen Moore

Ref:

Ant!

t1ve

tI

1n deregu1

business,

Dear Ms. Moore~
Five
the justice department made a decfsion that a
monopoly telephone system was not 1n the best interest oi the Un1ted States
Government or the publ1c.
lslon was one that bore no teeth.
Although legally we have a deregulated lephone system 1n this country~ 1n
rea11ty) the deregulation has created etwfronment g1vlng telephone ut1llty
companies a license to steal

My name is Denn1s Love and I run a small Independent telephone
serv1ce company ln Mar1n County Cal1forn1a. I started the company 1n March
of 1985 lnsplred by the governments fntentlon to create a competttlve free
market system through wh1ch the American dream could be rea11zed.
Unfortunately~ my dream has turned 1nto a n1ghtmare full or both the bad
aspects of a regulated industry as well as the bad aspects of a deregulated
tndustry, I find it hard to believe that this was the true lntent1on of the
federal government when it first took its historlc step in telephone
deregulation.
1985 1rned a complatnt wfth the ca11rorn1a Public
Utllltles comm1ss!on (CPUC) charging ant1-compet1t1Ve pract1ces 1n
violation of federal ant1trust law on the part of Pac1ftc Bell and General
Telephone of Ca11forn1a. I was represented ln th1s filing by Marty Matt1s of
Graham and James, a well respected law flrm involved in administrative
law in the San Franc1sco bay area. It has been two years and six months
s1nce that fi11ng, but because of legal maneuver·ing on the part of the giant
uti l ftles and the conspfcuous absence of a dec!sfon on the part of the CPUC,
the orlglnal Intent or deregulation has not yet materfalfzed ln the state or
Callfornta the Un1t~d States of America~ although on March 22na the FCC

on November 17th
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some cost a1l
brought up 1n our

The
g1na1 f111ng lth
1

dld

were Issues that 1

New business's like mine fight to stay afloat In a sea of ant1- •
competit1Ve giants and the pub11c continues to be milked by those glants
who have actual
d 1n
their concerns were not ith what the
public wanted~
ders
prof
Ms. MooreJ by the
at ions/ they are bound to
pass JUdgement these
three
final brlefs l)ave been
filed. Apr11 20th I spoke with ALJ (Administrative Law Judge) c. Ford who
Informed me that she had
cases
could not possibly even think
about a proposed dec1sl untll July or this year. That would mean nearly
three years before the
the j
th1s case.
Other tssues are pending that w111 have 1ast1ng harmful effects and
cost the rate-payers <the vot1ng publ1c) mnlions of dollars 1n wasted
revenues. one such lssue 1s a box that utilltles. not just 1n Ca1iforn1a, but
across the ent1re nat1on are lnstalllng on the outside wall of all new homes,
Thls box, called an SNI CStandard Network Interface) has a modular jack 1n1t
~compat1b1e with all
lephones so that anyone who 1s des1rous of
using your phone servi can walk right up, plug right ln and run up your
phone bill. The longer is dec on takes, the greater the damage and the
higher the cost of modifications removal or replacement of these boxes. It is
estimated this cost for li
ia alone will be one bi111on one m1111on
dollars over the
years, to be
d for by your voters. While we walt
for a declslon the
'

the success
of

concerned
from the

am also
being taken

be
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reasonable for three years but
been unsuccessful 1n my patience. I ask
that you at least take the t1me to lnquire as to the reason thls dec1s1on
making procQSS, on 1ssuos raisQd ln my complaint/ (cas& 6 8611028 and
related matters, appl icatfon 85-01-0341 !85-030-78, 011 84 before the
CPUC), is being tucked away In the bowels of the bottomless pit of the.
legislation,

I am asking for your ass1stance in th1s matter in whatever form tt
may take and would like to mclude you 111 our list of supporters during our
next media campalgn. We simply must speed up this process! I would be
happy to speaK wlth you In length on the subject and prov1de you w!tt1
whatever mater1a1s you may request. Please feel free to call me at (415)
898-4400.
Thank you for your considerat1on of this matter.
Sincerely~

Dennjs Love
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4/24/89

«DATA
«TITLE»

«PUC»
«N#1E»

«ADDRESS»
«CITY», «ST»

Dear Com

lam
caused me
financially.

a procedural problem. that hiS
of inside wire installation
a complaint with this commission alleging

Pacific Bell and General
)

1dated wlth app11cat1on
standing

proceeding. We flled
mony and
rned open1ng

commtsslon
be directed to draft, as exped1ently
days since the date of
1eve that th1s
a delay on my case.
unaware of the
"

1

B

no longer wllltng to
1 understand that the

comm1eeion may feel that 1t has "b1gger f1sh to fry", but that does not

change my right to a decision on the matters 1n question.
Unt11 this case 1s resolved~ any decisions on other cases will be based
on a foundation of Quick sand, as this case w111 have a permanent efiect on
utnit1es regulated operat1ons. would 1t not be better to have a strong
foundat1on 1n place before bu11d1ng your new house?

Dennis E. Love
President
The Extens1cn Connect ton, Inc.

cc:

All commissioners~
Ms. Bonnie Packer Pac1f1c BellJ
Ms. Blunt Esq G.T.E.
Mr. Marty Mattes~ Grahm & James
C. Ford, ALJ
Carol Matchett, ORA
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ATTACHMENT U

TESTIMONY
of the
TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION
BEFORE THE
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND COMMERCE
June 6, 1989

Good morning. My name is Barry Ross and I am the Executive Vice
President of the California Telephone Association, a trade
association representing all of the local exchange carriers
in
the state.
Today my testimony is focused on the impact of
alternative
regulation of the telephone industry and
specifically how such changes may affect the smaller companies.
With twenty three local exchange carriers providing service in
the state, it's noteworthy that only two the largest two, have
filed proposals before the California Public Utilities Commission
for alternative regulation. The remaining twenty one companies
will be significantly affected by the outcome of the proposals
under consideration and it is for that reason that these other
companies have been following closely the proceedings of I.
87-11-033.
The small and medium sized companies within California have
individually and collectively provided input into this lengthy
decision process.
Specifically they have sought to have the
Commission consider that the impacts of the proposals to their
companies have not been quantified and they believe it is important that some further study be done to show what those impacts
may be. The changes in zone calling rates and the redefinition
of what is basic service ( ie. free touch-tone service) as
proposed by Pacific Bell would have an impact on the services
provided by the small and medium sized companies. Additionally,
the
freezing
of
local
service rates for a period of time
also
has
an impact
that has yet to be measured.
The same
would be true if the Commission were to adopt all or parts of
the GTE California plan.
It is interesting to note that the California High Cost Fund, a
mechanism with which the Chairwoman is familiar, is the method
most of the small and medium sized companies have recommended as
the mechanism to adjust for revenue requirement changes brought
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Are the proposals here in California or the myriad of national
proposals of alternative regulation the final regulatory answers?
The answer is a definite no. Will there be modifications and
changes along the way? The answer is yes. Is it possible for
California to make changes once it decides on some alternative
form of regulation? The answer is yes. Contrary to what many
here today may have you think, the process will not be cast in
stone.
The requests made by Pacific Bell, GTE and the DRA are
each limited in time and come with modifiers that preserve the
Commission's power to assure consumer's interests are properly
weighed against the company's interests.

•

The small and medium sized companies find significant benefit to
proceeding forward with the current investigation.
We believe
that an adequate record has been established that these companies
are all affected by the outcome of the Commission's decision.
Just as the small and medium sized companies have not filed
actual proposals for alternative regulation, it would be inappropriate to apply the resolutions found in this proceeding in a
broad brush manner to these companies. Additionally, the small
and medium sized companies believe they should be permitted at
some later time to exercise an individual option on whether to
come under such alternative forms of regulation.
Depending on who you are and what you want out of this
process,
the Commission investigation may be either very
burdensome and
cumbersome or exceedingly swift and lacking in consumer
and
customer input.
But that's the nature of a regulated vs.
competitive environment. We in the industry trust that we will
be able to persuade the
policy makers
that this process, as
laborious and burdensome as it is, should and must result in a
better mouse trap, a better way to address
the
traditional
goals of regulation for the telephone industry.
We believe
that a very strong argument can be made that we should try.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this
important issue.
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